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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Writing Beauty: 
John Ruskin’s Vision of Neural Imagination in the Works of  
Nathaniel Hawthorne and George Eliot 
 
By 
Sheena Berwick 
  
This dissertation responds to a growing awareness of beauty and visual sensibility in 
mid-to-late 19th-century British and American novels. These works demonstrate the authors’ 
appreciation of beauty as a condition of body, mind, soul, and culture, as well as their ability 
to create through the text an evocative technique of writing that creates an imaginative and 
sensual connection to beauty in the reader’s neuro-visual experience of their art. In 
considering this development, the dissertation explores the human imagination of writer and 
reader: ideas, coded into neural transmissions between writer and reader through the medium 
of text, which create and recreate fictional worlds through mental images, and consequently 
produce emotional realities in the reader. I attribute this creative partnership in writing and 
reading to the perception, writing, and reading theories of John Ruskin, and especially his 
discussions of beauty, sensuality and imagination expressed throughout the early volumes of 
his master works, Modern Painters.  
 vi 
Ruskin thought of the experience of beauty in nature and art as an embodied product 
of the brain/mind, traveling freely through the mind and body changing one’s perceptions of 
the world and our relations to it. The human response to art in this view is transmitted 
through the individual back into society affecting others and transforming institutions. If we 
think of beauty this way, we are thinking of it as a nueroaesthetic communications network 
circulating pleasure and delight and social enhancement—emotional, psychological, physical 
and moral enchancement moving as a personal gift to the soul of the community. Another 
way to understand this happy interchange would be as a neuro-hormone pleasure highway.  
Ruskin, after all, proposes his own version of this when he imagined the idea of the 
undefinable thing called beauty—what science has since discovered as hormonal and 
chemical products of the brain—distributing elixirs of pleasure from the mind through the 
body’s mapped highways of veins and arteries.  Ruskin’s description of these sensations in 
reaction to beauty were based on his attention to his physio-biological processes. One 
hundred and fifty years later modern science put Ruskin’s theory to a neurological test . 
Semir Zeki—a founder of the field of neuroaesthetics and the first scientist to study the effect 
of beauty and romantic love on the brain— discovered through fMRI technology that the 
experience of “beauty is part of a continuum [at the orbito-frontal cortex] representing a 
value attributed to it by the brain. The experience of the pleasure of beauty, he discovered, 
increases with neural activity associated with the individual brain’s response. Zeki’s work 
confirms Ruskin’s deductions of the mysterious passage of beauty from the brain’s response 
to perception channeled through the body. This opens up Ruskin’s writings and those of the 
novelists influenced by him to a revelation of their early contributions in the field of 
neuroaesthetics.  
 vii 
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l. A New Perception of Vision: Revelations of Things Unseen 
A developed experience of the visible world is not an 
accidental pleasure, but something that involves the whole 
moral and emotional nature of man.1 
                                 John Ruskin, Modern Painters  
 
Truth and Beauty. Linked for millenia, truth and beauty existed together as aesthetic 
twins, until the mid 19th-century when John Ruskin added an essential third sibling—
perception. Charlotte Brontë was shocked into this recognition one night as she and Elizabeth 
Gaskell sat by the glowing fire in Gaskell’s parlour. Reading aloud from Modern Painters, 
Ruskin’s impassioned defence of J.M.W. Turner’s expressionistic art, Brontë had an 
epiphany. Not a cognitive breakthrough as one would expect— the usual result of reading 
compelling words on a printed page. No, her exclamation and claim was that the “energy and 
beauty” of Ruskin’s sentences had caused in her a visual epiphany. The Modern Painters’ 
author, identified annoymously as by “A Graduate of Oxford” in the first volume (1843) of 
the 5-volume work, wrote sentences in a way that made Brontë see as she’d never seen 
before. In a letter to the book’s editor remarking on the “beauty of the writer’s style,” Brontë 
said he made her feel “as if I had been walking blindfold — this book seems to give me 
eyes”.2  
Brontë’s metaphoric description of a transformation from blindness to sight was an 
optical reality. It was as if some deficiency of attention, a “blindfold[edness],” had prevented 
her from seeing, not because the object wasn’t there to be seen, but because she discovered 
                                                
 1 Ruskin. Complete Works (hereafter CW) Modern Painters, Vol 111, Part 1V, Ch. xvi. 
 
 2 Brontë Quoted in Wettlaufer, 245. Letter to W.S. Williams, published in MacMillan’s Magazine 64 
(1891). 
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by reading Ruskin that looking is not the same as seeing. Seeing, as in perceiving, opens the 
eyes to revelations of previously unseen things. What’s more, and even more important, 
Ruskin would argue, is that seeing leads to truth —and beauty.  
This is Ruskin’s mission in Modern Painters: to teach artists and writers to look and 
see. He defends Turner’s art against the critics “ribald buffooneries”3 because he believes 
that Turner’s greatness lies in his ability to convey the “truth” of light, color, movement and 
atmosphere in his increasingly abstract, luminous paintings through his great powers of 
perception, a cultivated skill that his critics simply did not understand. The early passion of 
Ruskin’s life is to open the eyes of painters and critics to the power of visual sensibility, to 
promote acute perception as the sine qua non of a fine mind and good art, and to elevate sight 
to its “proper place” in the hierarchy of human senses. “A developed experience of the 
visible world is not an accidental pleasure,” Ruskin said, “but something that involves the 
whole moral and emotional nature of man.”4 Thus, elevating sight as the most powerful of 
human senses— even above language—Ruskin claimed: 
 “The greatest thing a human soul ever does in the world is to see something, 
and tell what it saw in a plain way. Hundreds of people can talk for one who 
can think. But thousands can think for one who can see. To see clearly is 
poetry, prophecy and religion —all in one.”5  
This last sentence is at the heart of Ruskin’s philosophy of the good society with art as its 
crowning jewel: all artists’ (painters and writers) appreciation of beauty, through cultivated 
                                                
 3 Ruskin.pref. 1st ed. CW Modern Painters, Vol.1, 6.  
 
 4 Ruskin. CW. Modern Painters, Vol 111, Part 1V, Ch. xvi. 
 
 5 Ibid. 
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visual sensibility, leads to superior art that inspires people and elevates their minds to the 
finer qualities of virtue, love and charity, improves lives, and transforms society.  
The originality of Ruskin’s views on sight and knowledge is both religiously and 
scientifically audacious. Religious, because by rearranging the sensual hierarchy to claim that 
seeing is the prerequisite of knowing, Ruskin is committing a heresy. By preempting logos—
intellectual contemplation, knowledge and reason—as the highest expression of God’s spirit 
in the world and replacing it with sight, he is defying 19th-century Christian orthodoxy. 
Furthermore, without benefit of science, Ruskin boldly also declared that sight was 
responsible for the “visual capacities of the mind [and also] of memory and imagination.”6   
This insight of the visuality of the mind also flew in the face of scientific knowledge 
at a time when the visual cortex—the back quarter of the brain consisting of seven distinct 
areas that receive, process and combine information from the eyes into whole images— is 
not yet thought to be part of the brain; visual and cognitive faculties, sight being passive and 
cognition being active, were considered separate entities. Not until almost a century later did 
scientists understand that the optic cortex was a vital cognitively functioning part of the 
human brain.7 Yet, in 1843 Ruskin wrote:  “[U]nless the minds of men are particularly 
directed to the impressions of sight, objects pass perpetually before the eyes without 
conveying any impression to the brain at all; and so pass actually unseen, not merely 
                                                
 6 Qtd in Hugh Witemeyer’s George Eliot and the Visual Arts. A Victorian Web Book. Yale UP, 1979, 
Ch. 10 
 
 7 See Semir Zeki’s A Vision of the Brain, Prologue, 3. Zeki writes that the genesis of the idea of the 
separation of seeing as a passive process and knowledge as active are difficult to trace, although Kant’s belief in 
two faculties of Sensing (passive) and Knowing (active) by the end of the 19th century was accepted by 
neurologists. “[T]his doctrine retarded our present notion of the organization of the visual cortex and of brain 
function by over a century,” Zeki says. 
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unnoticed, but in the full clear sense of the word unseen.”8  Unseen. In the case of Ruskin, 
that appears to be so. There’s no record that the church fathers and great men of mind science 
paid any attention to the claims of the unnamed Oxford graduate.  
Perhaps it was reading Ruskin’s explanation of “true perception,” a skill that 
transforms seeing into an “ appreciation of the mystery, variety and beauty” in the natural 
world that jolted Brontë from her blindfoldedness. Weaving together the primary faculty of 
perception, “of color, and form, and bodily sensibility,” “perception quickened by love, and 
judgment so tempered by veneration” leading to consequent “attributes of [a] noble mind” 
which he believed was the “chief spring of real poetry,” Ruskin further associates this 
“higher sensitivity” with leading to “other pure feelings of our moral nature.” 9 Ruskin’s 
culminating point is that the path of perception leads to truth, a truth that leads to a deep 
apprehension of natural and spiritual beauty.  
Ruskin was deeply religious, raised not on nursery tales but on the Holy Bible, which 
his evangelical Scottish mother insisted he read from beginning to end each year—and then 
start over. Thus, in his earliest writing, in his ubiquitous use of the words eyes, see, sight, 
impressions, perception, brain, intelligence, mind, sense, emotions, pleasure, beauty, poetry, 
truth, prophecy and religion, we see his uncanny instinct to straddle beauty’s aesthetic divide 
between God and man. He deftly uses religious language to reaffirm the spiritual quality of 
beauty, creating a religion of beauty, while nevertheless retheorizing its value as residing in 
the mystery and power of art through visual sensibility. For Ruskin, the pleasure of beauty is 
not “mere sensuous gratification, but cultivated by higher senses [is] part of a scheme that is 
                                                
 8 Ruskin. CW. Modern Painters, Vol.1, Part 11, Section.1, Ch. ii. 
 
 9 Ibid. 
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exquisitely adapted to our nature and our desires.”10  But on beauty’s provenance—believed 
to be a transmission to humanity as a gift from God—Ruskin straddles the God/man divide: 
“The pleasure of beauty is a co-production of [human] intellect, the emotions and 
sensuality,” he says.11 In his conception of the experience of beauty as the result of biological 
processes in the human mind, Ruskin, in effect, in anticipation of Darwin, channeled the 
God-given experience of beauty down a path from the spiritual kingdom to the biological 
roots of the moral and emotional nature of the Victorian mind. In either case, it is a spiritual 
experience. 
If edging visual sensibility into contention with reason as the primary human faculty 
had been the sum total of Ruskin’s contribution to 19th-century culture, it would still have 
caused a groundbreaking shift in artistic perception. Indeed, in Strangeness and Beauty, an 
anthology of 19th-century aesthetic criticism, the editors credit Ruskin’s sight-and-knowledge 
insight as intellectually revolutionary, precipitating a “ psychic revolution.” 12  As Charlotte’s 
Brontë’s visual conversion suggests, Ruskin’s campaign indeed changed the way at least one 
19th-century writer looked at the world. But, as looking is different from seeing so Ruskin 
discovered that writing is different from expressing a truth in words. As he endeavored to 
express the intellectual stimulation of landscape art and his complex emotional reactions to 
the shapes, colors, and ideas of paintings he became frustrated by what Barbara Wettlaufer 
describes as “ an awareness of language’s expressive insufficiences” and his profound 
dissatisfaction “with the power of words to express ideas, emotions and experience.”13   
                                                
 10Warner. Introduction to John Ruskin, 12. 
 
 11 Ruskin. CW.Modern Painters. Vol.11. Part 111.Sect. 1. Ch ii. 
 
 12 Warner, 11. 
 
 13 Wettlaufer, 217 
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His observation that language was moribund was a timely and astute cultural 
observation. Everything was changing in the revolution-wracked Victorian world, a 
world that historian Walter E. Houghton characterizes as moving from “the past to the 
future.” All ages are ages of transition,” he observes, “[but] never before had men and 
women thought of their own time as an era of change from the past to the future.”14 
The life-altering experience Houghton is describing is a revolution of the mind and 
soul, the final act in an Age of Revolutions during which Victorian society 
transitioned from a feudal and agrarian order to a democratic and industrial society. 
At the same time, in the sciences the first steps were being taken towards the 
exploration of the human brain and its mysterious product, the mind. This new 
frontier–the beginning of mind studies, of the neurobiological connections between 
the mind and the body—resulted in a redefinition of the essence of the human 
condition and a dawning of the individual’s innate source of self-definition.  
The “expressive insufficiency” of language was not a new awareness for Ruskin. In 
1841 in a lengthy letter from Naples to an Oxford college friend in which he discusses his 
use of particular poetic metaphors to capture the precise sensation he is trying to express, he 
questions how one “would undertake to convey to another person a perfectly distinct idea of 
any single emotion passing in your own heart: 
you have no actual expression for the simple idea . . . You can say . . . you feel 
depressed, delighted, dark, bright; are any of these expressions competent to 
illustrate the whole feeling? If you try to reach it you must heap metaphor 
after metaphor, and image after image, and you will feel that the most 
                                                                                                                                                  
  
 14 Warner, 1. 
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mysterious touch nearest and reach highest, but none will come up to the 
truth.15 
 
Ruskin’s frustration is palpable, somewhat equivalent to a painter wanting to paint a 
glorious sunset with only black and white paint in his paint box. With his close friend 
as a sounding board, he formulates his theories of an expressive language that will 
appear full-fledged two years later in Modern Painters: a visual language of 
metaphors and images and word impressions that he hopes will transport the reader to 
“the whole feeling of the truth.” Still an undergraduate, Ruskin’s astonishing vision is 
to make the reader a creative partner with the writer. How? “The object of all art,” he 
tells his friend, “is not to inform, but to suggest, not to add to the knowledge but to 
kindle the imagination.” The best poet Ruskin assesses as the one who “can by the 
fewest words touch the greatest number of secret chords of thought in his readers’ 
mind and set them to work in their own way.”16  He wants to put readers “to work in 
[their] own way,”  using their “secret  chords of thought.” Chords of thought? The 
non-musical meaning, the dictionary tells us is ‘Emotional feelings or responses.’ 
Ruskin’s idea is that a partnership of artistic imagination, driven by the writer’s visual 
language, and then “work[ed]” on by the reader’s imaginative capacities, is the key to 
a new kind of literature. A three-part process—a printed text that unites the 
imaginative labors of a creative artist and a creative reader. In 1841, in a hastily 
written note from vacation, 24-year-old Ruskin has reorganized the brain by adding 
the visual cortex as its driving force, reimagined linguistic and narrative theory, and 
                                                
 15 Ruskin’s Letters to a College Friend, 83.  
 
 16 Ibid. 
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repositioned the reader from a passive receiver of a text to a creative laborer in a 
newly described function of reading that calls for seeing in the mind’s-eye, imagining 
and feeling. The change in fiction produced by this engagment of the mind and the 
senses, Wolfgang Iser explains in The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic 
Response (1980) happens, just as Ruskin imagined, when “meaning is no longer an 
object to be defined but an effect to be experienced.” 17   
Charlotte Brontë seems to agree with Ruskin on contemporary language’s expressive 
deficiency. In the finale of Jane Eyre, the new Mrs. Rochester says, “I hold myself 
supremely blest—blest beyond what language can express.” Yet, elsewhere, Brontë takes the 
reader inside the stream of Jane’s agitated mind, as she blurts out fractured phrases—“But 
where am I wandering, and what am I saying; and above all feeling? . . . fevered with 
delusive bliss one hour—suffocating with bitterest tears of shame and remorse the next”18— 
fragments of ideas, in an unending torrent of frenzied words that perfectly convey the 
“feeling of truth” that Ruskin speaks of. Elsewhere, throughout Jane Eyre there are copious 
examples of a Ruskinean perceptiveness, and especially a deep sensitivity to beauty. Aptly, 
for example, this description of a painting: 
The dim forehead was crowned with a star; the lineaments below were seen as 
through the suffusion of vapour; the eyes shone dark and wild; the hair 
streamed shadowy, like the beamless cloud torn by storm or electric travail. 
On the neck lay a pale reflection like moonlight; the same faint lustre touched 
the train of thin clouds from which rose and bowed this vision of the Evening 
Star. 19 
                                                
 17 Iser, 10. 
 
 18 Brontë,159. 
 
 19 Ibid. 
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Charlotte Brontë seems to give the reader eyes. 
Ruskin’s contributions to painting, architecture, geology, ornithology, botany, 
education, the labor movement and politics, and his skills as a poet and painter are legendary 
and have been the subject of numerous of studies. I want to claim here that little critical 
attention has been paid to one of Ruskin’s significant achievements: he encouraged writers to 
turn inwards to seek the essence of human sensibility in tune with scientific developments, 
and showed them in Modern Painters how to mirror in their words the mind’s experience of 
consciousness, which we now know is transmitted by the billions of neurons crammed into 
the wrinkled mass under the skull. His influence helped transform how writers wrote.  
As writers struggled, like Ruskin, to find expression for the new age of the embodied 
mind, his insight that language was exhausted and that verbal representation through images 
could revive it, burst open a vein of creative experimentation in British and American 
novelists. They began to produce expressive language imbued with meaning and experience 
that appealed both to intellect and emotions. By intuitively linking language as an inevitable 
expression of cultural change, especially in a time of advances in knowledge of the brain and 
the mind, Ruskin’s elevation of sight as the primary sense and thus the key to mind-
conscious writing, helped vivify the sensual experience of a different world view.  
Brain and Mind. Sensing and Knowing. Reading and Seeing. Writing and Feeling. 
Pleasure and Beauty. All these transmitters of consciousness, conveyors of the sensations of 
aliveness in the world, converged uniquely on mid-century Victorians’ apprehension of what 
it means to be human and, Ruskin’s insights on sight and knowledge and the power of a new 
expressive medium, caused what Warner and Hough called a “psychic revolution.” 20 Ruskin 
                                                
 20 Warner ,11 
 
 10 
greatly influenced other writers of his own era, such as George Eliot and Marcel Proust, who 
Richard A. Macksey writes, associated Ruskin’s genius with what Carlyle saw as deciphering 
and translating an “inner reality.”21 Describing Ruskin as a “prophet,” Eliot wrote:  “I 
venerate him as one of the great teachers of the day.”22 Of course, the Decadent Oscar Wilde 
was famously opposed to Ruskin’s aesthetic philosophy of art and was not particularly 
interested in Ruskin’s views on Turner’s genius. “Who cares,” he wrote, but he was awed by 
Ruskin’s powers of expression and explained why in this marvelously Wildean way:  
 
That mighty and magical prose of his, so fervid and fiery-colored in its noble 
eloquence, so rich in its elaborate symphonic music, so sure and certain, at its 
best, in subtle choices of word and epithet, is at least as great a work of art as 
any of those wonderful sunsets that bleach or rot on their corrupted canvases 
in England’s Gallery.23  
 
Virginia Woolf, embraced Ruskin’s conviction that visual and literary art deals with 
two planes of reality, one visible, the other invisible,” a practice that she perfected in her 
characters’ stream-of-conscious mind talk.24  Many decades after Ruskin’s death, Virginia 
Woolf seconded Charlotte Brontë’s visual epiphany revering him as, “someone who can 
teach us to see . . . better than anyone else.” In a review of Modern Painters she wrote that 
Ruskin’s writing style “takes our breath away. . . as if all the fountains of the English 
                                                
 21 Qtd in “Proust on the Margins of Ruskin”. The Ruskin Polygon, 182. 
 
 22 Qtd in  “Belles Lettres”, Westminster Review, 65 (1856). 
 
 23 Wilde. “The Critic as Artist” in The Portable Oscar Wilde. 
  
 24 Qtd in Hugh Witemeyer’s George Eliot and the Visual Arts. A Victorian Web Book. Yale UP, 1979, 
Ch. 10  
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language had been set playing in the sunlight for our pleasure”. 25 In a sentence that 
physically takes our breath away at the visually magical metaphor of words and sentences 
dancing in Vesuvian plumes of arcing, sun-spliced water, Virginia Woolf perfectly describes 
the effect of reading Ruskin’s sentences. One of the physiological affects of encountering 
beauty is breathlessness. Woolf has produced with words a beauty that “takes our breath 
away,” just as Ruskin’s beautiful words had that power over her. That a reader’s 
reimaginings of evocative metaphors to restate images first imagined by another writer at his 
desk can reproduce deep feelings of beauty is evidence of Elaine Scarry’s words: “[Beauty] 
seems to incite, even to require, the act of replication. . . Beauty brings copies of itself into 
being.”26 
This longing for beauty comes as no surprise to visual neurobiologist Semir Zeki, the 
creator of the field of neuroaesthetics, and the world’s leading researcher on the visual brain, 
who since the 1970s has been researching the brain’s response to art and the neural basis of 
the experience of beauty and other emotional states such as romantic love in which visual 
input plays a prominent role.27 Zeki and his research team in 2003 identified through fMRI 
technology that “beauty is part of a continuum [at the orbito-frontal cortex] representing a 
value attributed to it by the brain, a value that incidentally can change from one viewing to 
another and differs between individuals.”28 The team discovered to their surprise that 
judgments of beauty and ugliness of works of art —in categories of portraits, landscapes, still 
life and abstracts— are not found in separate areas of the brain, but are polar extremes of the 
                                                
 25 Woolf, The Captain’s Death Bed. 
 
 26 Scarry, 3. 
 
 27 Zeki is a founder of the Institute of Neuroesthetics which is associated with the Wellcome 
Laboratory of Neurobiology based at University College, London, UK., and at UC Berkeley, CA. 
   
 28 Kawabata and Zeki. “Neural Correlates of Beauty.” 
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same continuum: the “intensity of the neural activity reflects linearly the degree of beauty 
bestowed on the object by the viewer.”29 The emotional reward, the experience of the 
pleasure of beauty, increases with the neural activity. In all his writing, Zeki is at pains to 
point out that despite the explosion of neurological research how little is known about the 
higher functions of the brain and how tentative scientists have to be in their claims. However, 
among Zeki’s underlying assumptions is that “all visual art must obey the laws of the visual 
brain”— in conception, execution and appreciation, and that artists [visual and literary] are, 
“in a sense, neurobiologists who study the capacities of the visual brain with techniques that 
are unique to them.” 30  
In A Vision of the Brain (1993) Zeki thinks of Shakespeare and Wagner as among the 
greatest of neurobiologists, arguing that they “probe[d] the mind of man with the techniques 
of language and of music and understood perhaps better than most what it is that moves the 
mind of man.”31 Zeki’s reasoning is that “if the primordial function of the brain is the seeking 
of knowledge,” which he claims is done by the formation of concepts of both material objects 
(e.g. house) and abstract ideas (e.g. beauty) then, the brain’s products —such as art and 
literature—must provide important insights to the working of the brain.32 Zeki in Splendors 
and Miseries of the Brain unpacks this insight in the works of Dante, Rimbaud, Mann and 
Balzac. I see a meeting of the minds of Ruskin and Zeki: evidence from the fields of Zeki’s 
research suggest a close relationship between Ruskin’s great cause, perception, and art, 
beauty and love. In this search for insight into the neural bases of emotions — “the heights of 
                                                
 29 Ibid. 
 
 30 Statement of aims of Institute of Neuroesthetics. http://neuroesthetics.org/institute.php.  
 
 31 Zeki. A Vision of the Brain. Prologue,1. 
 
 32 Zeki. Splendors and Miseries of the Brain, 3 
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joy and depths of despair,” Zeki says, “in creative works of art, literature and music, provide 
not only enjoyment, but lead “to the enrichment of our understanding of ourselves.”33 
As the 19th-century’s John Ruskin is to the understanding of the cognitive depth of 
visual power, the 21st-century’s Semir Zeki is to the appreciation of literature’s extraordinary 
brain-revealing power. I believe that together through their works they facilitate a dialogue 
on the source of the mind, beauty and literature across the centuries— Ruskin on what 
writing can express about the sensual experience flowing from the mind of man; 
neuroaethesist Zeki on how literature “has revealed one vast area of evidence [of brain 
function] that neurobiology has not yet tapped, or has done so to only a trivial extent.”34  It is 
into this dialog between literature and science, between the past and the present, that I am 
entering in this project. 
This dissertation is a result of my growing awareness of beauty and visual sensibility 
in mid-to-late 19th-century British and American novels. What interests me most about these 
works is the authors’ appreciation of beauty as a condition of body, mind, soul, and culture, 
as well as their creation of beauty in the reader’s experience of their art. My claim is that 
there is an unusual flourishing of interest in beauty in this period, and that the narrative topic 
of characters, minds, and ideas that are founded in perceptions of beauty, is matched by an 
evocative technique of writing that creates an emotional reality that can be described as 
delight, pleasure or beauty. In narrower terms, this dissertation is an exploration of human 
imagination: ideas, coded into neural transmissions between writer and reader through the 
medium of text, which create and recreate fictional worlds through mental images.  Further, I 
attribute these changes to the visual, sensual, and moral philosophies of John Ruskin.   
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I have claimed elsewhere that Ruskin’s writing showed writers a new way to see the 
world, and a new way to express feelings, and thus, changed the expressive possibilities of 
the art of the novel.  I point to Hawthorne’s fascination with the beauty of adultress Hester 
Prynne in The Scarlet Letter, and the picture he draws of the “delicate, evanescent, and 
indescribable grace . . . those who knew her had expected to be dimmed and obscured by a 
disastrous cloud, were astonished, and even startled, to perceive how her beauty shone out 
and illuminating her inner goodness, making a halo of the misfortune and ignominy in which 
she was enveloped.” 35 Or , I offer George Eliot’s creation in Daniel Deronda of Gwendolen 
Harleth, whose physical beauty is pondered lavishly in hundreds of pages, yet her unlovely 
mind is captured in a moment of exposure when she is seen as “a sort of serpent now, all 
green and silver, [who] winds her neck about a little more than usual.”The tempting quality 
of the beauty is in the details.36 
My claim about Ruskin does not imply that all his contributions on perception, 
writing and reading are sui generis. Theories of beauty reaching at least back to Plato, 
literary theory back to Aristotle, Newton’s theories of sight and color, and Locke’s theories 
of senses as a source of knowledge occupied Ruskin’s early reading, and the work of 
Wordsworth  and the Romantics were part of his DNA. My claim about Ruskin’s impact on 
writers, and on the future path of the novel that led to Virginia Woolf’s modernism, is that 
his theory was a holistic treatment of artistic communication, some of it fresh expression 
from his brilliant mind.  In a Romantic sense of man talking to man through the faculty of 
sense, mind and body, using skills of perception, and visual language, and the truth of 
emotional reactions, Ruskin was arguing, as no one before him, for a language that made the 
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reader see and feel. His age, a time of massive political, intellectual and scientific revolution, 
was fertile for the birth of a language that bespoke a new cultural dawning.  
I approach the dissertation through the lens of intellectual history, considering 
science, narrative theory and the art of the novel prior to the publication of Modern Painters. 
Against this background, I use narrative, visual and aesthetics theories and emerging 
neuroscience to open up the inquiry into how Ruskin’s art criticism and visual fervor 
transformed writing and reading. I examine to what extent these writers take up Ruskin’s 
philosophy of a society-wide based economy of aesthetics— of perception, knowledge, truth, 
and beauty in the arts— and if so, how they interrogate the value of the beauty of nature, 
body, mind, character and community in Victorian life. Ruskin’s emphasis is primarily on the 
two kinds of beauty he considers most significant to the quality of human life —the physical 
beauty of objects that transforms human experience of the world, and the beauty of mind and 
character that enriches other lives through empathy. With these two aspects of the perception 
of beauty in mind I have chosen Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter to examine his 
vivid creation of adulteress Hester Prynne’s sensual physical beauty and her innate goodness 
in opposition to her sexual sin, and George Eliot’s treatment of the two warring visions of 
human beauty in Gwendolen Harleth’s body and mind in Daniel Deronda, Eliot’s last novel 
before her death.  
I evaluate both writers imaginitive processes to illuminate how the author creates the 
fictions of expressive language constructed more closely to the human thought process and 
enhanced with the visual sensibility that Ruskin demonstrated in Modern Painters claiming it 
was a channel to the world’s often unseen mystery and beauty; I explore how Ruskin’s 
theory of the role of the reader as an imaginative co-equal with the writer. turns reading into 
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seeing in the mind’s eye, triggering neurobiological reactions and setting loose emotional 
experiences; And I hope to show how the mind that receives these fictions, the reader’s mind, 
absorbs and reproduces visual expressions that through neuronal activity in the brain 
physiologically create for the reader the rewards of pleasure and beauty.  
The answers to these questions on beauty, the mind and literature, or more properly 
the source of these answers, lie in the connections between and among the intensely 
complicated neuronal networks of the brain, the imaginative powerhouse of the mind, the 
multi-faceted sensual knowledge of the body, and in the material evidence of the 
brain/mind/sensual world-shaping creations —the literary productions that reveal the interior 
and exterior unfoldings of the human experience of beauty.  
Two centuries of philosophy and aesthetics have debated beauty to a semantic 
standstill. In pursuit of its meaning one is drawn into an endless chain of connections of the 
transcendent and the earth-bound, synonyms that double for but don’t capture the singularity 
of the meaning of beauty that philosophers and lexicographers have said is ineffable and 
inexpressible. Perhaps because meaning of beauty is considered inexpressible, the longing to 
express its precise quality is irresistible, and the descriptives used to do so are multitudinous 
and luxurious enough to match the capaciousness of the word’s meaning and the abundance 
of the sensations that mark its presence.  
If we think of the experience of beauty in nature and art as an embodied product of 
the brain and mind, as Ruskin believed and Seki’s research studies have confirmed, with the 
power to travel freely through the mind and body, changing one’s perception of the world 
and relation to it, and thus returning through the individual back into society affecting others 
and transforming institutions, if we think of beauty in this way, we are thinking of it as a 
 17 
communication network circulating pleasure and delight. Another way to describe this happy 
interchange would be as a neuro-hormone pleasure highway. It is this highway, I want this 
project to demonstrate, that the reader walks along when she disappears inside the pages of a 
book in company with great 19th-century writers such as my subjects Hawthorne and Eliot, 
and, of course, with noteable others such as Charlotte Brontë, who deals with the pain of 
beauty through its absence in Jane Eyre and Thomas Hardy with his evocation of the beauty 
of nature mirrored in the face and body of his heroine Tess of the D’Urbevilles.  
I claim that writers show an extraordinary interest in exposing the idea of Beauty in 
all its facets, material and spiritual, to an interrogation of its classical God-given provenance 
against the increasingly secular society and the emerging frontiers of mind science. It is not a 
coincidence that from the mid-1840s to the 1880s we can chart Ruskin’s rise to the heights of 
cultural influence until his reign was overtaken by the rebellious cry of  “art’s for art’s sake.” 
This cultural soundbite initiated the beginnings of a new aesthetic sensibility, a view that 
once popularized, severed for a time the connection between art, virtue, society and spiritual 
transcendence that came so naturally to the deeply religious Ruskin. In contrast to Ruskin’s 
encompassing sense of society-enriching art, this new aesthetic opened the doors to an 
artistic avant-garde which deliberately set itself against the social conventions and moral 
precepts of the late Victorian era. But, as modernist novels show, literary visual language 
would not disappear, and neither did the influence of Ruskin’s belief in beauty’s transcendent 
role in life and literature. The endless quest for the source of beauty from its classically 
understood presence as a manifestation of the beauty of God in the human senses to today’s 
functional magnetic resonance imaging of neuropeptides and synapses, now seeks, and is 
slowly finding beauty’s source in the shiny man-made laboratories of neuroscientists.  
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This is not to say that earlier writers and philosophers did not imagine these hidden 
sources of sensation without benefit of functional MRIs. Indeed, they did: That authors and 
philosophers moved inside the mind so many lifetimes before the advent of the 
neuroscientific advances that now make it possible to literally see the excited brain synapses’ 
joyous responses, makes their Ruskinean perception all the more vivid.  
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 ll. John Ruskin’s Beautiful Revolution of the Mind 
The greatest thing a human soul ever does in this world is to see 
something, and tell what it saw in a plain way. Hundreds of people can 
talk for one who can think, but thousands can think for one who can 
see. To see clearly is poetry, prophecy and religion—all in one.  
                             John Ruskin. Modern Painters37 
In contrast to the “psychic revolution” stirred up by John Ruskin’s bold theories of 
the brain, the mind, and language in Modern Painters, his visionary campaign to teach artists 
“to see something clearly” seemed banal. His assertion that “to see clearly is poetry, 
prophecy and religion—all in one” was passed over as youthful extravagence —until its 
strange truth took hold. But, ironically, the revolutionary theories that turned Victorian 
scientific, religious and cultural certainty on its head were all born of his belief in the 
primacy of visual sensibility. Each of Ruskin’s theories of visuality and language were 
instrumentally, intractably connected to the others: 
1. Visual perception is the premier organ of knowledge. Therefore the visual 
cortex—not then considered part of the brain—is the brain’s cognitive 
powerhouse and the gateway to a civilized mind. This means that visual 
sensibility is pre-eminent to language. 2. Therefore, the centuries-old Adamic 
doctrine’s theory of knowledge and language should be overturned as Locke 
had pointed out. This means that the relation of the signifier and the signified 
should become arbitrary, freeing the “double conformity” of communication 
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from its distortions and absurdities of trying to convey ideas with inadequate 
linguistic  
2. tools.38 3. As a consequence of both the above, the English language is 
moribund and no longer capable of expressing the dynamic realities of 
nineteenth-century life. This demands an expressive language and syntax alive 
with the intellectual advancements and changing consciousness of the age. 
Ruskin believed these changes could transform language into a expressive medium of 
speech and writing capable of conveying the ever-changing aliveness of the cognitive and 
sensual experience of life in the 19th-century. Most important, he wanted language to spring 
from a new awareness of the power of sight. Driven by this belief in the transforming power 
of visual perception, Ruskin wanted to teach the world to do what they thought they already 
did effortlessly —to see. 
 Ruskin’s “seeing” and telling in a “plain way,” a way that is detailed and specific to 
evidence and effects, avoiding vagueness, sounds alluringly simple, even obvious, but is an 
ironically eye-opening observation of how the simply obvious is neither simple nor obvious. 
Looking is not seeing. We imagine that if we look at something in front of our eyes we see 
it.39  Far from it. Looking is what the eyes do automatically during our waking hours —on 
guard, robot-like— unceasingly darting back and forth, side to side, up and down. Looking is 
a superficial acknowledgment that a person, an object, a landscape, is vaguely in our line of 
sight. Looking is the possibility of perception. It is the ignition key to seeing. Looking 
becomes seeing if, and only when, we are alerted to, or are attentive enough to the world to 
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turn the key so the mindless function of looking engages mindfully with our neurological 
motor—the brain. It takes intention, and patience, as Ruskin explains:  
The great mistake that people make is the supposition that they must see a 
thing if it is before their eyes. They forget the great truth told to them by 
Locke . . . ‘whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the 
mind . . . if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception . . .’ And 
what is said here, which all must feel by their experience to be true, is more 
remarkably and necessarily the case with sight. . . . Thus, unless the minds of 
men are particularly directed to the impressions of sight, objects pass 
perpetually before the eyes without conveying any impression to the brain at 
all; and so pass actually unseen, not merely unnoticed, but in the full clear 
sense of the word unseen.40 
The lack of impression Ruskin refers to, as neurologists have since discovered, is the 
absence of a neural connection between looking and attentive observation. The habit of “just” 
looking is the drug of a somnolent consciousness. It is the absence of a prick of interest, the 
lack of the desire to be surprised, the shutting down of the expandable mind. Just looking 
short-circuits the process that engages the cognitive operation that leads to knowledge. 
Without attention there are no visual impressions, what William James describes as “a sort of 
solemn sense of surrender to the empty passing of time.”41 Without visual impressions the 
essential uniqueness of the object is lost on the mind—is unseen. Thus, the consequences of 
not seeing in a perceptually aware sense, as Ruskin understands it, means cognitive loss: loss 
of knowledge, loss of intellectual benefit, and the needless deprivation of sensual experience.  
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Ruskin’s passion to open artists’ minds to the power of visual sensibility as the most 
powerful of all human senses was an audacious move. To question the belief in the Adamic 
theory of language was to defy the authority of the text of the Holy Bible: “In the beginning 
was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. . . . All things were 
made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made.”42 That God was the 
author and creator of words was for centuries the Church’s doctrine: language, the divine gift 
of God to man, was inviolable. The perfection of the Adamic language theory rested in the 
absolute certainty of the relationship between words and objects in contrast to the uncertainty 
of impressions gained through singularly capricious bodily senses that should not be trusted 
as a source of knowledge. In the Adamic language the signified and the signifier were not 
arbitrary.“The linguistic sign is not double, but unitary.”43 If language is believed to be 
immutable, if the writer is balked by tradition, unable to express the rational and visceral 
truth of 19th-century reality, how is mankind to adjust to a changing cultural consciousness? 
No one who knew Ruskin would believe that a child who loved Pope's Homer and 
Walter Scott, Pope’s The Illiad, Byron, Robinson Crusoe and Pilgrim’s Progress and who 
said that the Bible that he read every day gave him “the best part of my taste in literature,” 
did not love language.44 He was fascinated by the written word, and loved the evenings after 
dinner when his father read to him. But as he grew older, he came to understand that the 
marvel of language was in its ability to share ideas with others. It was clear to him that 
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thought preceded speech, that thought was made possible by knowledge and imagination, 
that the raw components of knowledge came from the senses as Locke said, “from the 
external world through the senses,” the most powerful of which is eyesight. Visual acuity, 
Ruskin reasoned, was therefore the gateway to knowledge. He wanted to promote perception 
as the path to cognition and intelligence and to elevate sight to its “proper place” in the 
hierarchy of human senses. As Ruskin writes in Praeterita, as a child he had learned 
“patience in looking,” and “precision in feeling.” Anticipating the delights he might discover 
by looking deeply at the world, he speaks of his yearning and intensity saying 
unselfconsciously, “I have never known one whose thirst for visible fact was at once so eager 
and so methodic.”45 Ruskin was on the path to discover that his “thirst for visible fact” was a 
longing for a deeper fusion of vision, cognition and knowledge with learning and language.   
In the later half of the 18th-century Johann Gottfried von Herder had also puzzled 
over the connection between vision and cognition in relation to language. As befits one of the 
fathers of Romanticism, Herder takes an environmentally nuanced view of the “infinite 
complexity” of vision which he describes as an experience “so bright and over-resplendent, it 
supplies such a quality of attributes, that the soul succumbs to the manifoldness.” Although 
overwhelmed by the “manifoldness” of sight —being “frightened” Herder calls it—like 
Ruskin, he says we can learn to focus, to master the overwhelming. Where Ruskin calls for 
attention; Herder calls for “reflection.” They mean essentially the same thing. “Man gives 
proof of reflection,” Herder explains, brilliantly describing the process of visual memory, the 
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“drifting dream of images that passes his senses,” the flickering neuronal movie that the 
brain, we now know, calls up, refreshed from the past, for our reflection. Herder writes: 
Man gives proof of reflection when . . .[ he] can segregate one wave in the 
entire ocean of sensations which rushes through all his senses—segregate it, 
stop it, direct his attention to it, and be conscious of his attention. He gives 
proof of reflection when out of the whole drifting dream of images that passes 
his senses he can collect himself in one moment of wakefulness, dwell 
voluntarily upon one image, observe it lucidly and more calmly and pick out 
for himself characteristics that this is the object and no other. 46 
Although undeniably astute, Herder holds the common 18th-century view that while the 
visual cortex—the back quarter of the brain consisting of seven distinct areas that receive, 
process and combine information from the eyes into whole images—lies in contact with the 
brain, it is not part of the brain.   The “sense of vision” is “too subtle, says Herder. It is 
“confusing and empties our heads.”47 Eyesight’s role, then, is to provide a passive delivery 
system of images from the retina to the brain, which through the development of language 
makes understanding of the chaotic world possible. Even in the early days of the 20th-
century, Freud, whose medical training was in neurology, also believed that a “cogent 
thought process, to say nothing of conscious intellectual work, could not exist amidst the 
unruliness of visual experience.”48 The cognitive function Herder calls “segregation,” visual 
neuroscientist Semir Zeki explains is the visual brain’s routine cognitive operations of 
abstraction and concept formation that reduces the infinite complexity of the world to 
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categoric simplicity.49 The visual cortex enables us, for example, to identify objects 
instantly—that’s a house, that’s a car, that’s a rampaging elephant—without which our 
world, as Herder feared, would be completely chaotic and extremely dangerous. In defending 
the concept of “the intelligence of visual perception” in 1969, Rudolph Arnheim, an art 
historian and a leading figure in the psychology of art and visual perception, pointed out the 
impossibility of withholding the name of “thinking” from the cognitive operations in 
perception. “Visual perception,” he says, “is visual thinking.”  He defines “cognitive” as all 
mental operations involved in the receiving, storing, and processing of information—sensory 
perception, memory, thinking, imagining, learning.50   
[T]he cognitive operations called thinking are not the privilege of the mental 
processes above and beyond perception but the essential ingredients of 
perception itself. I am referring to such operations as active exploration, 
selection, grasping of essentials, simplification, abstraction, analysis, 
synthesis, correction, comparison . . . combining, separating, putting in 
context. These are not the prerogative of any one mental function; . . . There is 
no basic difference in this respect between what happens when a person looks 
at the world directly and when he sits with his eyes closed and “thinks.” 51 
Arnheim’s work, especially the groundbreaking Visual Thinking, published in the 1960s was, 
and still is, considered a revelation of the neglect of visual education in American schools. It 
updates and reargues Ruskin’s argument for the cognitive supremacy of the sense of vision.  
It is a cry from the grave one hundred and twenty five years after the days when the 
separation of sight and the cognitive powers of the mind were not in serious doubt. In the 
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1970s, visual neurobiology began to correct that error, but their attention to its cognitive 
claims is still lacklustre. 52  
The visual cortex’s cognitive activities enumerated by Arnheim are the neural 
operations of perception and forthwith through selection, segregation, analysis, abstraction, 
and contextualization —the processes of the infinite complexity of the visual mind—to 
enable the possibility of cognition out of chaos. Arnheim’s claim that there is no basic 
difference in the cognitive functions between looking at the mountains and sitting with eyes 
closed recalling the image of those mountains is essential to Ruskin’s theory of vision and 
the visual capacities of mind, of memory and of imagination. His insistence is on seeing with 
intense curiosity because a visual experience of an object becomes the knowledge base of the 
image that appears when thinking with closed eyes, for imaginative creative endeavors, for 
potent memories of events, faces, feelings, objects driven on to lifelong autobiographic 
memories stored in the hippocampus. Ruskin always refused “to distinguish between mental 
and physical vision.”53 This is how he imagines an external experience becomes an interior 
image: 
Facts representing [an object we want to recall] exist in the brain in a visible 
form, not always visible, but visible at will, as it being of such a color, or 
having such and such a complicated shape; as the form of a rosebud, for 
instance, which would be difficult to express verbally, neither it is retained in 
the brain in a verbal form, but a visible one: that is, when we wish for 
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knowledge of its form for immediate use, we summon up a vision, or image of 
the thing. 54 
 “Truly productive thinking takes place in the realm of imagery,” says Arnheim in frustration 
because he still has to argue the point. He finds himself in the position of having to persuade 
many educated professionals, even educators, that perceiving and thinking are “indivisibly 
intertwined.” Artistic activity, he says, is a form of reasoning in which artists—painters, 
writers, composers, dancers—think with their senses.”55 His campaign for the arts to be 
recognized as an integral part of school curriculum is an echo of Ruskin’s campaign to make 
people see and acquire knowledge with the cognitive power of their underused eyes. 
In 1843 when Ruskin writes in Modern Painters that looking does not become seeing,  
because “the minds of men” are not “particularly directed to the impressions of sight,” he is 
not entirely wrong. He accurately describes the conditions of the problem, but since what he 
knows of the brain is limited to empirical observation, he assumes the offending non-
attentive visual agent is man. He is saying that people are too preoccupied or too apathetic to 
look carefully, or too caught up in life’s trivialities to pay attention to devote time for the 
finer pursuits of the eye. Yet, in defining the problem as he understands it, Ruskin has 
unwittingly crafted ambiguous meaning that allows for a different reading of “the minds of 
men,” prefiguring neurological discoveries of a century later when visual neurobiologists 
began to untangle the massive puzzle of how visuality functions.56 It is the mind —the brain, 
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not the person—that “is not particularly directed to the impression of sight.”57 It is the brain’s 
programmed retinal neurons that are so intent on scanning the dangerous world that they 
cannot spare a millisecond to look for the pleasure in it. This mistaken reading causes 19th-
century reader Charlotte Brontë to feel she was “walking as if blindfold,” therefore 
responsible for her lack of visual conscientiousness. She thinks her mind is completely hers 
to control, and she’s failed to do so. In a letter to W. S. Williams, Ruskin’s publisher, Brontë 
says: “I like this author’s style much; there is both energy and beauty in it . . . Hitherto I have 
only had an instinct to guide me in judging art; . . . this book seems to give me eyes.”58 In 
reading Modern Painters Brontë learns that seeing is a personal engagement with an object, 
one without the preconceptions that prevent the uncovering and discovering of the thing in 
front of her eyes. Unlike Brontë, however, a reader in this century absorbed in the mind 
might understand that “the minds of men,” are hard-wired by evolution to operate 
independently for predestined purposes. Ruskin did not know that man’s short attention span, 
the eyes' constant flirting in search of a more interesting object— interesting in terms of its 
evolutionary job description— was exactly what nature intended.59 The brain’s selectivity in 
restricting choice makes reactions faster and surer and makes us safer. Arnheim writes: 
 The eye movement that helps to select the target of vision is somewhere 
between automatism and willful response. They must direct the eyes in such a 
way that the area of the visual field to be scrutinized comes within the narrow 
range of the sharpest vision. Because retinal sensitivity is so restricted the eye 
can, and must, single out a particular spot, which becomes isolated, dominant . 
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. . At early organic levels, the stimulus compels the reaction. . . . The response 
is steered by the stimulus rather than by the initiative of the observer. 60 
Our eyes are neurobiologically programmed to scan small pieces of the environment 
at a time—for as little as a fraction of a second—looking for signs of danger. They are 
searching for things that move— ravenous animals, hostile neighbors, flying spears and 
falling rocks—so that the amygdala can send a panic signal throughout the body, alerting us 
to oncoming danger, pumping up the adrenaline so that we can run for our lives.61  If no 
danger is evident, the eye dashes on, and on, a millisecond here and there— incessantly— 
never stopping to gaze at a beautiful red rose, uninterested in it actually, unless a wasp 
happens to be buzzing around among the petals. That stinging insect could be a problem. The 
multi-tasking visual cortex is also the body’s security guard, a critical link in the evolutionary 
chain of survival. To appreciate the function of eyesight, Rudolph Arnheim points out, it is 
important to understand that the eyes did not come about as instruments of cognition for 
cognition’s sake. 
The functioning of the senses . . . from the beginning aimed at, and 
concentrated on, those features of the surroundings that made the difference 
between the enhancement and the impediment of life . . . Active selectivity is 
the basic trait of vision, as it is a trait of any other intelligent concern; the 
most elementary preference to be noted is that for change in the environment. 
The organism, to whose needs vision is geared, is naturally more interested in 
changes than in immobility. When something appears or disappears, moves 
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from one place to another, changes its shape or color or brightness, the 
observing person or animal may find its own condition altered.62  
Because the eye’s retinal attention span is less than a micro-fraction of a blink, it will 
not stop and stare without some persuasion. This means if we want to see the intricacies of a 
peony’s petal formation we have to keep luring our attention back to look again. The rewards 
of persistence are manifold: a forever image, a gift to memory, the beginning of a desire to 
repeat, to make a habit of seeking the beautiful or interesting. At the body’s most elevated 
experience of pleasure, the astonishment and wonder of the “unselfing” experience of beauty, 
is often spoken of as an out-of-body experience in which the perceiver no longer feels 
attached to himself but is engulfed in an aura of of a reality that something matters more than 
the diurnal commonplace. Habit is a repetition, the copying of an action.  Habit is way of 
copying, another example to add to Elaine Scarry’s list of how “beauty brings copies of itself 
into being.” In On Beauty and Being Just she cites as examples of the replication of beauty, 
“its unceasing generation,” of begetting of children, taking photographs, making paintings 
and sculpture, writing sonnets, making laws, and the replication of sensation by staring and 
by distributing copies of images.63 Visual acuity is the prize of practice. That’s what Ruskin, 
who had the utmost patience while looking and no difficulty seeing the nuances in colors, 
textures and patterns that others missed, is urging Victorians to do —to take initiative, to pay 
attention, to diligently go back to look more closely at the object, so that the impressions 
reach the brain, create images, increase knowledge and cultivation, and stay vividly in their 
memory banks for future reference.  Today, we know that paying visual attention for more 
than a few seconds at a time takes determination; it is a tug of war between good intentions 
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and the superior eons-long neuronal habits. To combat those habits so that objects will not 
“pass perpetually before the eyes without conveying any impression to the brain at all,” we 
can keep going back to look at an object. By sheer willpower we can retrain our willful, but 
remarkably malleable, brain to forge new pathways in the cortex, a habit that turns looking 
into the Ruskinean basic requirement of mindful seeing. Ruskin’s well developed visual 
acuity raises an interesting question concerning his hyper-perceptive skills. If the normal 
human brain constantly has to be prodded to perform concentrated visual  perception, how 
did Ruskin come to have the kind of all-knowing-seeing that Marcel Proust sought to acquire 
as he struggled in his own writing to achieve a “reading-experience of rich-memory”? 64 Did 
Ruskin arrive in the world with preternatural vision as a favor from the Creator or was he 
born with underactive retinal neurons that stayed around to gaze longingly at immobile 
objects? Why would he be so inclined to lecture others about their careless habits of 
perception if he also had experienced the same difficulties in focussing? We have no 
definitive answers, but there are some interesting clues if we go back to his beginnings.  
 [T]he law was, that I should provide my own amusement. No toys of any 
kind were at first allowed:— . . . I had a bunch of keys to play with . . . and 
being always summarily whipped if I cried, did not do as I was bid, or 
tumbled on the stairs, I soon attained serene and secure methods of life and 
motion; and could pass my days contentedly in tracing the squares and 
comparing the colors of my carpet:                                      John Ruskin65 
To understand Ruskin’s lifelong laser-like focus on perception and beauty, his 
certainty about sight as key to a cultivated mind and his moral philosophy, one has to go back 
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to the early years of his life under the tyrannical and well-tolerated child-rearing regime of 
his evangelical mother. With Calvinistic pleasure-squashing fervor, Margaret Ruskin 
disapproved of the “frivolous” toys designed to amuse small children.66 Biographer Frederic 
Harrison, who had a 40-year friendship with the Ruskins, says of her: “The mother was a 
woman of great power, indomitable will, harsh nature and an almost saturnine religion.”67 
Before her only child’s birth, she prophesied his gender and tried to determine his future: she 
promised God that John would become a minister of the gospel. She set out to inculcate in 
him virtuous and abstemious habits of body, mind and soul. In preparation for his life in the 
pulpit, she decided he must be kept free of all worldly temptations and harmful influences, 
which she considered in this earliest years would come from attachment to playthings and 
playmates. She deprived him of both. She instilled in him what can only be described as 
saintly personal discipline and unquestioning obedience to his parents. He spent much of his 
time alone, and was not spared a thrashing when he whined for his mother’s company and 
attention. Here’s how Ruskin, as an older man, remembered those days:68 
My mother’s general principles of first treatment were to guard me with 
steady watchfulness from all avoidable pain or danger; for the rest, to let me 
amuse myself as I liked provided I was neither fretful nor troublesome. But 
the law was, that I should provide my own amusement. No toys of any kind 
were at first allowed:— and the pity of my aunt for my monastic poverty in 
this respect was boundless. On one of my birthdays . . .  she bought the most 
radiant Punch and Judy she could find in all the Soho bazaar—as big as a real 
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Punch and Judy, dressed in scarlet and gold . . . [My] mother told me it was 
not right that I should have them; and I never saw them again. . . . Nor did I 
painfully wish, what I was never permitted for an instant to hope, or even 
imagine, the possession of such things as one saw in toy-shops. I had a bunch 
of keys to play with . . . and being always summarily whipped if I cried, did 
not do as I was bid, or tumbled on the stairs, I soon attained serene and secure 
methods of life and motion; and could pass my days contentedly in tracing the 
squares and comparing the colors of my carpet:— examining the knots in the 
wood of the floor, or counting the bricks in the opposite houses; with 
rapturous intervals of excitement during the filling of the water-cart, through 
its leathern pipe, from the dripping iron post at the pavement edge; . . . But the 
carpet, and what patterns I could find in bed-covers, dresses, or wall-papers to 
be examined, were my chief resources, and my attention to the particulars in 
these was soon so accurate that when I was three and a half and was taken to 
have my portrait painted by Mr. Northcote. . . . my formed habit of serenity 
was greatly pleasing to the old painter; for I sat contentedly motionless, 
counting the holes in his carpet, or watching him squeeze his paint out of its 
bladders, —a beautiful operation, indeed, to my thinking. 69  
This lonesome toddler’s search for patterns to follow with his eyes and trace with 
fingers on the floors, walls, and fabrics in his home became his obsessive, “contented” and 
pleasurable daily pastime. In Praeterita, his memoir and final book, begun when he was 60, 
Ruskin recalls “comparing the colors of his carpet,” tracing the patterns on carpets, 
wallpapers and curtain fabrics and bed covers, his fingers a substitute for a crayon. The 
carpets in his home were most likely Axminsters and Wiltons hand-knotted in luxurious thick 
wool, the undisputed choice for wealthy English families of that era. Their glorious colors—
raspberry red, magenta, royal blue, olive, pink, cream, beige and green—and their exotic 
botany motifs and rococo designs—neo-classical diamonds, borders of hyacinths and 
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carnations, gryphons, armorial bearings, palmette and leaf, acanthus scrolls and Greek key 
borders, were a sensual feast of touch and vision. The pleasure of seeing and comparing the 
bright colors, of focussing, of categorizing shapes, of following the lines and loops and 
identifying the patterns they formed, developing knowledge of space, abstracting the variety 
of shapes, sensing the stirring imagination of invisibly replicating the beauty he saw, these 
daily habits were undoubtedly etched into the growing neuronal patterns of his immature 
brain.  
A child is born with 100 billion neurons—as many as an adult— but the immature 
brain does most of its growing outside the womb so that the baby’s head can pass safely 
through the birth canal. During the first six months of life every microsecond neuronal nerve 
fibers link up with others in great bursts of chemical activity. Neuronal activity in the brain 
world means the creation of networks to transmit knowledge. The brain’s primary function is 
to acquire knowledge, to analyze, organize and store it in the hypothalamus, which is the 
body’s lifetime memory bank. The brain is a great categorizer. The brain loves patterns. 
Patterns are visual concepts used to categorize knowledge, categorization allows for 
abstraction and simplification of a chaotic world.70 If we imagine the tiny Ruskin brain, its 
plasticity never more moldable, the axons and dendrites of his billions of neurons never more 
ready to be put to work, their synapses frantically making connections, crafting cognitive 
patterns and byways as he concentrates with delighted, desire driven, wide-open eyes on the 
shapes and colors of his carpet and their daily relationship to his small world, we can perhaps 
answer the question about Ruskin’s perceptive precocity. The mind that the well-intentioned 
Mrs. Ruskin imagined was hers to fill with devout habits —John read and memorized the 
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Bible daily under his mother’s tutelage until he left for college— was eventually diverted to a 
different end. Mrs. Ruskin helped create a brain tuned in to visual diligence and turned on to 
the myriad sensations of the earth’s sensational omnipresent colors, shapes and patterns and 
textures. She had taught her son how to pre-empt the inevitable path of the flighty guardian 
neurons. Sitting quietly looking and looking again at his little world was a better choice than 
a beating; it later became his vocation—a religion of beauty, as Robert de Sizeranne71 called 
it. Perhaps because she disdained toys and discouraged playmates, Margaret Ruskin 
inadvertently created a magic carpet out of an Axminster rug. 
Seeing, as in perceiving, is a commitment to attention, an act of intention, a reaching 
out towards something or someone, in which the deeply conscious focus of the eyes, the 
external organs of perception and with them the whole powerful interior apparatus of the 
visual cortex—the seeing brain that occupies one quarter of the entire brain and handles half 
of all information sent to the brain—encounters objects, landscapes, people, the world, 
revealed in astonishingly fine detail never possible with a superficial look. It was mastery 
over this fine detail of life that Marcel Proust sought as he absorbed the sensual intelligence 
of Ruskin’s writing on visual acuity as the way to capture the “very essence” of life, “its 
passions and creativity” to weave the record of those memories into an aesthetically 
satisfying narrative tapestry.72 Indeed, Proust wrote Remembrance of Things Past wrapped in 
reverence for Ruskin’s visual aesthetics. Artistically, he embraced Ruskin’s belief in the 
childish innocence and purity of the eye. 
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 By "childish innocence," Ruskin meant with a sense of wonder, looking as if seeing 
an object for the first time, without consciousness of what it is. In his work, Proust 
evangelized Ruskin’s emphatic insistence on the “innocent eye” approach to visual 
perception. In Le Temps Retrouve, “[Proust’s] narrator, following in Ruskin’s footsteps, 
repeatedly criticizes photography and cinematography, declaring them inferior to the human 
eye, the art of writing, and [especially] the workings of memory.”73  Ruskin was an early 
adopter of the Daguerrotype. He used it to record the beauty of old, structually threatened 
buildings and to capture details of landscapes, not to copy in his paintings, but as an aide 
memoire, and for his historical records of buildings that were crumbling and would be lost to 
the eye.74 Nevertheless, he denounced the use of most mechanical equipment as less effective 
for analysis of plants than the eyes “which the God who made them gave us.” In Praeterita 
Ruskin explains his denunciation of mechanical visual aids for studying nature:  
On fine days when the grass was dry, I used to lie down on it and draw the 
blades as they grew, with the ground herbage of buttercup or hawkweed 
mixed with them, until every square foot  of meadow, or mossy bank, became 
an infinite picture  and possession to me, and the grace and adjustment to each 
other of growing leaves, a subject of more interest to me than the composition 
of any painter’s masterpiece. . . . [The] use of instruments [microscopes and 
spectacles] for exaggerating the powers of sight necessarily deprives us of the 
best pleasures of sight. A flower is to be watched as it grows; its leaves are to 
be seen as they expand in the sunshine; its colors, as they embroider the field, 
or illumine the forest. Dissect or magnify them, and all you will learn or 
discover at last will be that oaks, roses, and daisies, are all made of fiber and 
bubbles; and these, again, of charcoal and water; but for all their peeping and 
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probing, nobody knows how. . . . [M]orning after morning did I rejoice in the 
traceries and the painted glass of the sky at sunrise. 75  
The profound difference between looking and seeing for Ruskin was mirrored in the 
contrast between two pictures, ostensibly of the same scene, one gripping, alive with the 
quality of the revelatory sensual experience of seeing, the other a listless, unexceptional 
pretty picture lacking the visual energy and detail that draws the viewer to engage. Ruskin 
wanted visual truth in paintings. The deadened images in landscape paintings preferred by 
the Academy infuriated him with their frozen unreal predictabily, what his student, Proust, 
called “numbing habitude.”76 The current painting techniques of centuries-old convention, 
sought art in a style of immutable perfection—a definitively ideal representation of the 
object.  The academy disapproved of experimental styles of painting, which limiting free 
artistic expression except for artists such as Turner who revolted against the noose of 
convention in favor of the reality of the honest eye. For example: on a stormy day, we could 
imagine a painter on a cliff top overlooking the ocean watching a sail boat capsizing in a 
violent storm. What does the painter see? A boat more hidden than seen: a partial hull, tipped 
at a perilous angle, plunging into mast-high waves whipped by winds over the engulfed deck 
out of which reached a barely visible slim reed of a mast and the ghostly fragment of a white 
sail shrouded in mortal combat with the sea. The storm’s watery and foamy elements and 
movement and the rain-laden clouds meeting the froth of the waves obscure the familiar 
lines, angles and curves of the vessel. Its structure is barely visible, consumed by the 
elements. The painter, if he is a devoted student of Ruskin, paints his impression of what he 
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sees at that moment, what is visible, what he visually “knows” as he sketches that day, not 
details of the fine architectural superstructure he had seen days before in a safe harbor, details 
that are now obliterated from view in the storm.  Most 19th-century academic painters 
schooled in the mode of the day, the perfect objective unchanging representative image, 
would have painted the boat they “knew” though unseen in the tempest. The example above 
of a subjective interpretation of a storm-swept boat, in all its terrible and beautiful drama, 
would be  the dynamic performance of a painterly bearing witness to the truth of an uncertain 
moment in time. The painter’s impression of the sailboat from a distance in a storm is the 
“knowing” that Ruskin exalts as visual knowledge, the creative difference between reality 
and an illusion. Turner’s and Ruskin’s quest for the “truthfulness” of art introduces viewers 
to something larger than a preference for tradition or a creative affection for a particular style 
of art, or purely an act of aesthetic rebellion.77 It addresses the practice of art that involves 
the perceiving viewer and evokes feelings. Its importance as cultural artifact, naturally 
enough, reflects contemporary society’s cultural realities. The attack by critics on Turner’s 
impressionistic paintings that raised young Ruskin’s ire and inspired him in protest to begin 
writing Modern Painters was consistent with the reaction against change, the anxiety of 
coming to terms with changing external and internal realities. Turner’s techniques visually 
echoed a changing and storm-tossed uncertain Victorian world, not the preferred picture-
perfect illusion.78 The movement to Turner’s and Ruskin’s philosophy of art capturing the 
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abundant sensory cavalcade of nature’s colors and moods came into its fullest artistic 
expression in the last decade of Ruskin’s life when Claude Monet, noted for his 
impressionistic series paintings —the Lilies at Giverny, for example— painted the 14th-
century Gothic Cathedral at Rouen, Normandy, (1892-1893).79 Working from morning light 
to sunset for six months over two years in different seasons and different light he completed 
thirty paintings. The show’s curator described the paintings as a demonstration of the world’s 
“instantaneousness."80 Monet’s close friend, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, had often 
spent time in the studio watching Monet paint, but something happened when he saw the 
exhibition.81 Experiencing the passing visions of light, the birth and death of the seasons, 
nature’s changing face and the nuanced expression of the painter’s emotional language 
expressed in the series of Rouen paintings made him  “watch, perceive and feel.” Those three 
verbs —watch, perceive, feel—are the motivations, actions, and feelings Clemenceau has 
identified as the emotions the Cathedral’s images evoked in him. He received from Monet’s 
work the gift of a different vision of the world and the insight of its importance in his life. 
Looking at those pictures changed his consciousness. In the future, he is unlikely to look and 
not see the world in front of his eyes.  Emotions, says neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, are 
triggered from images, “[w]hether live, reconstructed from memory, or created from scratch 
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in one’s imagination, the images create a chain of events when signals from the processed 
images” are relayed to regions of the brain. Damasio says that responses from different 
regions of the brain can lead to words to describe objects, stir up other images from memory 
that add to our understanding, and trigger emotions from memory, from the response to a 
beautiful object, or dismay at its ugliness.82 Clemenceau’s encounter with the series of 
painting that documented in one building, in one spot in his land, the fragile moments of life 
passing before him in its infinite temporal drama, provoked him perhaps through a sense of 
loss to watch in the future, and by watching, “see” for himself. Monet had achieved in grand 
scope the truth, beauty and greatness that Ruskin saw in Turner’s work. 
It is our habit to substitute the second, third, or fourth-hand kind of knowing we pull 
lazily from our image bank of previous sightings as if the world and every object in it was 
locked in immutability, instead of preferring the discovery of “fresh-knowing” that comes 
from “the child’s innocent eye.” Ruskin’s critics scoffed at his expression of “innocent eye” 
suggesting he literally calling for a vision of childish naivete, rather than the fresh 
observation of an object, with fascinated attention as if it had never been seen before. The 
innocent eye is the child’s sense of wonder captured by Walt Whitman's poem,“There was a 
child went forth every day/ And the first object he look’d upon, that object he became/And 
that object became part of him for the day or a certain part of the day/Or for many years or 
stretching cycles of years. 83 Whitman’s child’s seeing is a devouring act of visual 
experience, taking it inside himself to absorb the mysteries of its being, its purpose, essence, 
shape, color and extraordinary magical parts, imagining himself as it. He carries the image 
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home in his mind’s eye; he may keep it inside himself forever, knowing it as his.  It is a 
child’s galvanized visual enchantment with something other, something that he makes 
intimate to his own being.84 Knowing-like seeing is the product of a conscious act, a 
cognitive response to seeing stripped bare of what came before. This seeing-as-knowing 
neurobiological connection justifies our imprecise, but nonetheless accurate shorthand use of 
“sight” for “knowledge” when we say, “I see” when we mean, “I know.”  
 [It] is necessary to the existence of an idea of beauty, that the sensual pleasure 
that may be its basis should be accompanied first with joy, then with love of 
the object, then with the perception of kindness in a superior intelligence, 
finally with thankfulness and veneration towards the intelligence itself.85 
       John Ruskin Modern Painters 
It was Ruskin’s two greatest passions —for the power of visual perception and for 
beauty, perception’s “exulting, and reverent” gift of sensual pleasure—that drew Marcel 
Proust inexorably into his thrall as the 19th-century greatest cultural critic and author of 
Modern Painters lay dying at his home in the English Lake District. It was early October, 
1899. Twenty-eight-year-old Proust’s health was uncertain, his spirits were low, his writing 
career was stalled and he was “haunted by doubts of his vocation.” His protonovel Jean 
Santeuil had hit a narrative brick wall, not a typical writer’s creative block, but a collapse of 
faith—faith in his ability as a novelist. Proust was at Évian-les-Bâins, the spa town on the 
Rhône-Alps shore of Lake Geneva, seeking creative inspiration and trying to recover his 
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health. In this unsettled state, confronted by the indescribable grandeur of the mountains, his 
thoughts turned to John Ruskin whom he had never met, whose massive body of work he 
barely knew.86 Proust had discovered Ruskin through French scholar Robert de la 
Sizeranne’s John Ruskin and His Religion of Beauty (1897), an admiring study of Ruskin’s 
aesthetic vision, but now he needed it and the book was at his home in Paris. Proust wrote to 
his mother— twice—urging her to send Sizeranne’s book so that he would be able “to see 
mountains with the eyes of this great man.”87 Proust had already seen the Alps—it is not 
possible to be in Évian-les-Bâins without seeing the mountains—but he wanted to see with 
Ruskin’s eyes, not mediated through them. Seeing “with” Ruskin’s eyes would be an 
experience of perceptual transference, seeing as if he were inside Ruskin’s consciousness. By 
holding Sizeranne’s commentary on Ruskin’s philosophy of beauty and his memories of 
1833, the first time he saw the Alps, shouting his exultant — “Suddenly—behold—beyond,” 
and this description of the mountains — 
[Its clouds] were clear as crystal, sharp on the pure horizon sky, and already 
tinged with rose by the sinking sun. Infinitely beyond all we had ever thought 
or dreamed,—the seen walls of lost Eden could not have been more beautiful 
to us; not more awful, round heaven, the walls of sacred Death. It is not 
possible to imagine, in any time in the world, a more blessed entrance into 
life, for a child with a temperament such as mine . . . Thus in perfect health of 
life and fire of heart, not wanting to be anything but the boy I was, not 
wanting to have anything more than what I had;  and with so much of science 
mixed with feeling as to make the sight of the Alps not only the revelation of 
the beauty of the earth, but the opening of the first page of its volume, —I 
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went down that evening from the garden-terrace of Schaffhausen with my 
destiny fixed in all of it that was to be sacred and useful.88 
— would mean that John Ruskin would become a surrogate seer, his visual doppelganger: he 
wanted Ruskin to lend him his eyes, to gaze at the mountains on his behalf, to model for him 
how to cultivate his visual sensibility, to capture what he saw translated by his imagination, 
to teach him the inwardness of seeing, the cognitive and reflective complexities of 
perception, to share with him how to convey clearly in language the embodied experience of 
awe and beauty, of the visually affecting contingency of color, shape and movement of 
clouds, forests and a single blossom, and in this way to discover how to come close to 
understanding what Ruskin’s words meant when he wrote that: “the best thing a human soul 
ever does in this world is to see something, and tell what it saw in a plain way.”89    
This Ruskinian seeing-knowledge was the “the very essence of life . . . the truth” that 
Proust sought. In France Proust had been recognized as an emerging talent; his essays and his 
bold, psychologically insightful short stories were praised by the critics. His venture into 
novel-writing with Jean Santeuil was to satisfy his need to tackle long-form literature. He 
wanted to write about life, to capture the “very essence” of life, the truth,” of what he called 
the ‘laws’ that govern human behavior in all its passions and creativity.”90  What he lacked, 
though, Richard Mackesay explains, was the “ability to shape the fragmented Jean Santeuil 
into an intelligible, comprehensive narrative.”91  Proust recognized in Sizeranne’s awe of 
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Ruskin the possibility of a teacher-guide; he also understood that his own powers of 
observation and visual retention were not yet equal to his aspirations. He went up the 
mountain “to see” with Ruskin.  When a reinvented Proust returned, Ruskin’s vision of 
perception as the kind of seeing and knowing that pierces consciousness was already 
embodied in him, or in Richard Mackesy’s term, Ruskin was to him  “an instrumentality of 
sight.”92 With Ruskin’s vision of perception as a source of reflection and imagination 
“beginning to circulate in his veins,”93 Proust put aside his novel, and began a six-year-long 
apprenticeship to Ruskin, first as student, then translator, and then critic.94 On January 20, 
1900, four months after their ghostly bonding as teacher and student on the mountain, the 
man whom Proust later called “one of the greatest writers of all times and of all countries ”95 
died at age eighty at Brantwood, his home where he had descended into his last bout of 
madness and had lain silent for ten years. On that day Proust wrote his first essay on 
Ruskin—his obituary, published in the Gazette des beaux-arts. In the introduction to his 
translation of Ruskin’s The Bible of Amiens (1902)96 identifying “Ruskin’s greatest personal 
gift,” as his feeling for beauty Proust writes: 
[H] is feeling for beauty in nature and art, [was] a reality infinitely more 
important than life itself.  It was in beauty that his nature led him to seek 
reality, and his entire religious life received from it an entirely aesthetic use. 
My admiration for Ruskin gave such an importance to the things he had made 
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me love that they seem to be charged with a value greater even than that of 
life. It is the power of genius to make us love a beauty more real than 
ourselves in those things which in the eyes of others are as particular and as 
perishable as themselves. 97  
Proust seems to be almost bewildered that he has succumbed to the wiles of beauty to such 
an extent that it has become more real than himself.  Succombed, because in both references 
to his own sense of beauty he says Ruskin “made me love,”  “made us love,” suggesting as if 
impelled by a powerful force that he attributes to Ruskin’s “power of genius to make us love 
a beauty more real than ourselves,” a beauty in which others place no value. As for Proust’s 
belief that “It is the power of genius to make us love a beauty more than ourselves,” if 
Ruskin had been alive when Proust penned these words he would certainly have insisted that 
it is not the quality of the teacher, but the power of beauty flowing through the body, that 
unselves us, lifts us out of our fascination with selfish preoccupations, frees us from the state 
of narcissistic consciousness, decenters us, transports us outside our heavy concerns attached 
to the material body to the out-of-body experience of losing ourselves in a pure sensation of 
awe: this makes it possible to say that beauty has made us love something more than 
ourselves.   
If the pleasure of sight, and the beauty it reveals, ignites when the confluence of the 
desire and the essence of the thing desired meet as one within the human mind, then John 
Ruskin’s endowment of visual acuity to Marcel Proust is the legacy of  “poetry, prophecy 
and religion—all in one.” Three in one —a trinity of art, vision and the sacred, one linked by 
the categories of beauty and truth to the others, all component parts of a unified vision, all 
essential parts of the whole. All, more plainly told, the exquisite, out-of-body sensation of the 
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pleasure of ineffable beauty. Ruskin’s “all in one” is a chain reaction from cultivated sight to 
knowledge, insight, eloquence, and the wisdom to speak to other men like a Wordsworthian 
prophet seeking to awaken humanity to spiritual perception.  It makes possible an acute 
bodily sensibility to beauty that proffers joy, wonder and gratitude and the aura of 
transcendence. This Ruskin would call an encounter with the divine, what Sizerrane called 
the Religion of Beauty, what Proust suggests is in Ruskin the transformation of a religiously-
inclined nature into an Aesthetics of Beauty.  
Through his rereading of beauty, Ruskin moves the human to a place of agency, of 
owning those feelings which Ruskin describes as “awe, love and veneration”—all this from 
seeing clearly and telling plainly. More than fifty years after the publication of the first of 
five volumes of Modern Painters, (1843-1860), Ruskin’s message of the cognitive and 
sensual power of vision had reached Marcel Proust whose creative abilities Proustian 
scholars say reached its “deepest levels” when he fully absorbed Ruskin’s teaching about the 
“fundamental difference between seeing and knowing.” Theorizing the apprehension of 
beauty as a series of “necessary” higher-level, open-hearted feelings that should be a 
requisite response to sensual pleasure, Ruskin writes: 
[It] is necessary to the existence of an idea of beauty, that the sensual pleasure 
that may be its basis should be accompanied first with joy, then with love of 
the object, then with the perception of kindness in a superior intelligence, 
finally with thankfulness and veneration towards the intelligence itself; and as 
no idea can at all be considered as in any way an idea of beauty, until it is 
made up of these emotions, any more than than we can be said to have an idea 
of a letter of which we receive the perfume and the fair writing, without 
understanding the contents of it, or intent of it; . . . it is evident that the 
sensation of beauty is not sensual on one hand, nor is it intellectual on the 
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other, but is dependent on a pure, right and open state of the heart.  Dependent 
both for its truth and for its intensity. . . dependent on the acuteness of the 
heart-feeling about them.98 
There is in Ruskin’s definition of an idea of beauty, a state of receiving the delight of beauty, 
the clear admonition that thoughtful and generous moral and intellectual responses will 
accompany the gift of pleasure. This experience Ruskin wants to stabilize and convert from 
an entirely body-centered sensation to one other-centered, feelings of gratitude building to 
“veneration towards the intelligence” of beauty. Ruskin’s great contribution in this is his 
definition of responses and attitudes to the ecstatic experience of beauty that separates the 
self-centeredness of purely aesthetic pleasure from that of a reflection of one’s being in 
relation to the world. His is not a classically expressed theory of beauty. Ruskin dismisses 
other attempts to define the meaning of the word. The word beauty is too ambiguous, he 
writes, “it stands in different people’s minds for totally different sensations, for which there 
can be no common cause,” 99 His non-definition is that the definition of the experience of 
beauty is a subjective response, it is embodied: the feeling of beauty is what the receiver says 
it is. He will, however, define the errors of four popular theories of beauty. First, he is no 
Keatsian. For him, Beauty is not Truth and Truth is not Beauty. That’s tautological, he 
argues, “like asserting that propositions are matter and matter propositions . . . a stone looks 
as truly a stone as a rose looks like a rose, and yet it is not so beautiful.” Second, the Useful is 
not Beautiful. That “is the most degrading and dangerous proposition . . . to assert that the 
human creature has no ideas and no feelings except” those referring to his own needs and 
appetites. Third,  Beauty is not dependent on Familiarity. He finds the concept contradictory 
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since the habit of custom is two-fold: either to “deaden the force of repeated impressions or 
to endear the familiar object to the affections . . .but both take place in some degree with all 
men.” Fourth. Beauty is not dependent on the Association of Ideas. Again, the proposition is 
not universal. “I believe the eye cannot rest on a material form, in a moment of depression or 
exultation, without communicating to that form a spirit and a life,—a life which will make it 
afterwards in some degree loved or feared. “ 
Since beauty is not definable in Ruskin’s terms, no other theory, including proportion 
and countenance, finds intellectual favor with him. In Modern Painters at first Ruskin tends 
to generalize the felt-sensation with the vague word “pleasure,” but in his theory of the Idea 
of Beauty, he uses the more emotionally-warm sensuous “joy” which has a wide-enough 
range of feelings and synonyms—from intense and ecstatic or exultant happiness to light-
heartedness—to satisfy the multiple senses of the sensation that can rise from a visual 
encounter with something of beautiful. “Joy,” however, is not a casual choice. From the Latin 
gaudium (joy) and gaudere (to rejoice), it echoes the sacred anthems sung in Christian 
Cathedrals and churches thoughout Europe. There is an aura of purity in the word joy: it 
suggests something holy, a gift given, deserving of reverence. It is not surprising, then, that 
Ruskin’s expection is that “veneration” is the final appropriate response to beauty.   
Following the sensation of Joy should come Love of the beautiful object.  
How does one feel love for an alley of trees that we walk through, seek shade under, 
watch the sun shining off the leaves and rising over their tops, for we do love them in the 
sense that we cherish them, and that the greatest fear is that they might disappear from our 
sight? William Cowper, the 18th-Century poet who suffered from depression for much of his 
 49 
life, sought solace under a bank of poplar trees that whispered in the wind, and whose 
filagreed branches he loved to gaze at reflected in the flowing River Ouse. The wound from 
the loss of the tree, cut down for reasons unexplained, drew from his sorrow these lines from 
a love-poem for beauty lost: “The poplars are fell’d, farewell to the shade/ And the 
whispering sounds of the cool colonnade/The winds play no longer, and sing in the 
leaves/Nor Ouse on his bosom their image receives.”100 Gerard Manley Hopkins, a priest 
whose love of the beauty of nature inspired much of his genius, also wrote a poetic 
obituary—Binsey Poplars (felled 1879) —for the industrial destruction of a stand of slender 
aspen trees, a loss he compares to the unimaginable personal loss, “like this sleek and seeing 
ball/But a prick will make no eye at all.”  He feels at one with the trees; their loss is as a loss 
of sight to him. Another grief he expresses, as did Cowper, is the loss for those not yet 
born—“Aftercomers cannot guess the beauty been.” The primary dictionary description of 
love is: “. . . a deep, tender feeling of affection and solicitude for a person, such as that 
arising from kinship or a sense of oneness.” If the reference to person and kinship is 
removed, it serves as a fine description for the feeling of a human deeply attuned to beauty. 
The two examples in Cowper and Hopkins of the love of beauty for itself, for self, and 
others, both steeped in feelings of gratitude and reverence, links strongly to the Perception of 
Kindness in a Superior Intelligence, and Thankfulness and Veneration towards the 
Intelligence itself.  Ruskin’s call here is for man to develop a spiritual awareness, for him this 
means one that is religiously-based acknowledging gratitude and veneration for the bounty 
and beauty of God’s Creation. Ruskin often uses the term “moral” and some critics —Harold 
Bloom, for example—insist that moral values, not faith-based religiosity, were his main 
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concern.101  In either aspect, the encouragement of awareness of gratitude for a world that 
offers us great gifts of sustanence and the joys of nature and beauty, not only can ameliorate 
the expected portion of pain, but producing the firing of dopaminergic and endorphin action 
throughout the body it can transform our feeling about the world and our neighbors. Ruskin’s 
Idea of the Intelligence of Beauty initiates a loop of receiving and giving, symbolic of 
generosity, of unselfishness, of goodness.  His words on what beauty means to the body 
reminds me of passages in Elaine Scarry’s work On Beauty. Speaking of an encounter with 
beauty, she writes: “At the moment we see something beautiful, we undergo a radical 
decentering.”  Elsewhere she writes of the experience of “unselfing” which, according to 
[Simone] Weil requires us “to give up our imaginery position at the center . . . A 
transformation then takes place in the very roots of our sensibility, in our immediate 
reception of sense impressions and psychological impressions.”  Weil’s account of the 
experience of beauty, says Scarry, “is always deeply somatic: what happens, happens to our 
bodies. ”102 
At a time when religious orthodoxy is still considered Beauty as the gift of God to 
man, it is the particular genius of John Ruskin to apply the language of his religious heritage 
to transact a subtle reassignment of agency from God alone to a partnership between God and 
the human mind. He describes an embodied experience of beauty adapted to our desires that 
he intuits originates in the mind through perception and is transmitted in sensuous waves 
through the body. To beauty’s previously mysterious provenance Ruskin creates a narrative 
of partnership between the Diety and human biology —an authentic expression of the truth as 
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he understood it: “The pleasure of beauty,” he said,  which is adapted to our desires”  “is 
something of the divine” in a co-production “of [human] intellect, emotions and 
sensuality.”103 
The pleasures of sight . . . are given as gifts . . . [And as] they have no 
function to perform, there is no limit to their continuance in the 
accomplishment of their end, for they are an end in themselves, and so may be 
perpetual with all of us; being in no way destructive, but rather increasing in 
exquisiteness by repetition.  . . . in whatever may be infinitely and for itself 
desired, we may be sure there is something of divine . . . [and so] there is 
caused by them not only a feeling of strong affection towards the object in 
which they exist, but the perception of purpose and adaptation of it to our 
desires . . .  out of which arise Joy, Admiration, and Gratitude.  [T]his, and 
this only, is the full comprehension and contemplation of the Beautiful as a 
gift of God;  a gift not necessary to our being, but added to, and elevating it, 
and twofold: first of the desire, and secondly of the thing desired.104 
Engaging the patronage of the stern Victorian God as the giver of the “exquisite” pleasure of 
beauty, Ruskin then suggests that the delivery of the experience is through the body’s unseen 
pathways and networks, descending from the rational mind down to the earthy sensibility of 
the body. The generosity of the sensation of beauty in our bodies is endless, Ruskin says, its 
possibilities in perpetuity are offered expansively, “increasing in exquisiteness by repetition,” 
for if the sensation of beauty is “for itself desired,” if we appreciate the beauty, feel love, 
gratitude and joy for the experience, but do not long to possess the object, we are touched by 
an emanation of the divine. Ruskin also describes, in effect, the neurotransmission of “the 
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gift of beauty” when he says that it is “two-fold: first of the desire, and secondly of the thing 
desired.” We know this as the body’s desire and reward system.  It begins with a desire, a 
yearning for something one feels will bring pleasure or satisfaction: for instance to see the 
Alps. There are specific brain circuits linked to desire and its reward which is the feeling of 
pleasure.  The anticipation of seeing the Alps stimulates the limbic system which releases 
opiod-like neurotransmitters. (The first sense of pleasure.) One then walks to the viewing 
platform to see the mountains at sunset: Neurotransmitters then generously raise the levels of 
our circulating dopamine which courses in waves through the body. (The second experience 
of Ruskin’s “two-fold” pleasure.) 105  
 In this way Ruskin provides a 19th-century explanation of the mysteries of beauty as a 
product of the mind, an experience ranging from pleasure to ecstasy that centuries of 
philosophy and aesthetics have debated to a semantic standstill. In pursuit of beauty’s 
aesthetic source, one is (still) drawn into an endless chain of connections of the transcendent 
and the earth-bound— synonyms that double for but don’t capture the singularity of the 
meaning of beauty that philosophers and lexicographers have said is indescribable. Perhaps 
because the definition of beauty is considered indescribable the longing to express its precise 
quality is irresistible and the descriptives used to do so are multitudinous and luxurious 
enough to match the capaciousness of the word’s meaning and the abundance of the 
sensations that mark beauty’s presence. Synonyms such as: lovely, enchanting, gorgeous, 
divine, exquisite, resplendent, sensational, dazzling, radiant, shining, lustrous, captivating, 
enthralling, alluring, bewitching, enticing, breath-taking, ravishing, blissful, heavenly, 
paradisacal, transcendent, angelic, rapturous, enrapturing, glorious. For Ruskin, the pleasure 
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of beauty,  “not mere sensuous gratification, but cultivated by the higher senses [is] part of a 
scheme that is exquisitely adapted to our nature and our desires.”106 This last sentence was at 
the heart of Ruskin’s philosophy of the good society with art and culture as its crowning 
jewels: the appreciation of beauty through the cultivation of visual sensibility leads to 
superior art that inspires people  and elevates their minds to the finer qualities of virtue, love 
and charity, improves lives, and transforms society.  
If we think of the experience of beauty in nature and art as Ruskin did, as an 
embodied product of the brain/mind, traveling freely through the mind and body changing 
one’s perceptions of the world and our relations to it, we think of it being transmitted through 
the individual back into society affecting others and transforming institutions. If we think of 
beauty this way, we are thinking of it as a communications network circulating pleasure and 
delight and social enhancement—emotional, psychological, physical and moral 
enchancement moving as a personal gift to the soul of the community. Another way to 
understand this happy interchange would be as a neuro-hormone pleasure highway.  Ruskin, 
after all, proposes his own version of this when he imagined the idea of the undefinable thing 
called beauty, what science has since discovered as hormonal and chemical, distributing 
elixirs of pleasure from the mind through the body’s mapped highways of veins and arteries.  
Ruskin’s description of these sensations in reaction to beauty were based on his attention to 
his physiobiological processes. One hundred and fifty years later modern science put 
Ruskin’s theory to a neurological test . Semir Zeki—a founder of the field of neuroaesthetics 
and the first scientist to study the effect of beauty and romantic love on the brain— 
discovered through fMRI technology that the experience of “beauty is part of a continuum [at 
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the orbito-frontal cortex] representing a value attributed to it by the brain, a value that 
incidentally can change from one viewing to another and differs between individuals.”107 
Zeki’s research team at University College London, discovered to their surprise that 
judgments of beauty and ugliness in art —in categories of portraits, landscapes, still life and 
abstracts— are not found in separate areas of the brain, but are polar extremes of the same 
continuum: the “intensity of the neural activity reflects linearly the degree of beauty 
bestowed on the object by the viewer.”108 The emotional reward, the experience of the 
pleasure of beauty, increases with neural activity associated with the individual brain’s 
response. Zeki’s work confirms Ruskin’s deductions of the mysterious passage of beauty 
from the brain’s response to perception channeled through the body for our delight to be a 
close enough match. 
Ruskin was deeply religious, raised not on fairy tales but on the Holy Bible’s teaching 
that God created everything.109 Yet, in the early chapters of Modern Painters, it is 
extraordinary to observe his instinct to build a bridge linking beauty’s aesthetic divide 
between God’s creation and the biology of Man. He defty uses spiritual language to reaffirm 
the spiritual quality of beauty, creating a religion of beauty, while nevertheless retheorizing 
its value as residing in the mystery of the power of art through visual sensibility. In his 
conception of the experience of beauty as the result of biological processes in the human 
mind, Ruskin, in anticipation of Darwin, channeled the traditional God-given experience of 
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beauty down a path from the spiritual kingdom to the biological roots of the moral and 
emotional nature of the Victorian mind.  
An experience that begins with a commitment to sight as the hierarchy of the human 
senses, to perception’s cognitive power as the incubator of a fine mind, draws the perceiver 
towards beauty —and poetry, prophecy and religion. In the first volume of Modern Painters 
Ruskin takes his aesthetic belief system on vision and beauty an interesting step further—into 
the realm of the human psyche. His aim was to penetrate and alter his readers whole state of 
mind by legitimizing the intelligence of all their senses. He called his campaign for the 
supremacy of the sense of sight ‘The Education of the Senses,’ tenaciously attaching the idea 
of intelligence to the embodied feeling-responses of the senses, pushing them into an 
unacknowledged prominence in cognitive latitudes. 
Ruskin scholars liken the effect of his call for recognition of visual acuity as the 
source of knowledge and its elevation above language as “intellectually revolutionary” 
though they doubted that Ruskin’s readers had realized it at the time.110 Perhaps not, but 
those who had read Newton and Locke, or Addison on the power of the senses, or 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, or Keats  and Shelley on imagination and individual freedom 
could hardly have been surprised at the growing resistance to Victorian religious and cultural 
orthodoxy. Ruskin’s “Psychic Revolution” is an accurate description as far as it goes, for his 
Modern Painters campaign linking sight, knowledge and beauty as a cooperative sensual 
pathway of pleasure firing between the mind and the body is yet another kind of revolution— 
a neuroaesthetic revolution. More than a century before its time, without its scientific coming 
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of age, and without its terminology, Ruskin creates out of his powers of perception a theory 
of the seeable, knowable and the feelable. He writes of pleasure that it is “a gift not necessary 
to our being, but added to, and elevating it, and twofold: first of the desire, and secondly of 
the thing desired,”111  
When in the early 1840s Ruskin describes the body’s experience of beauty through 
perception as coming in two waves of pleasure, first the pleasure of desire and of anticipation 
of the beauty and then later the increased pleasure of seeing the object desired he is 
describing what we now know as the brain’s reward system in the neural reward system. The 
neurons in the dopamine-fired reward dash along pathways in the brain scouting out feel-
good opportunities to spark into full-blown desire for our pleasure. A thought—the idea of a 
sunset, a garden, a painting,—produces a mind’s eye image in the visual cortex to which the 
orbitofrontal complex responds by activating dopamine and the feeling of pleasure; the 
subsequent visual perception repeats the neural processes, confirmation of Ruskin’s claim of 
the similarity between what the eye sees and the brain’s subsequent imagery constructed 
from the original sighting.  What is a brain image? Does the visual cortex construct an image 
like a picture book? When we see a tree, is there a tree-like picture in the brain? Emphatically 
not, says Nobel Laureate scientist Eric Kandel. “The eye does not work like a camera. A 
digital camera captures an image, be it a landscape or a face, pixel by pixel as it appears 
before us. The eye can not do that.” 112 Kandel explains that the brain works from an 
hypothesis, “a symbolic representation—about a tree and other objects in the outside world.” 
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The brain creates an image, not like a photograph, but one rendered in the brain’s language 
— in a neurally-coded image. Kandel explains: 
All the sensory information that comes into the brain—vision, hearing, 
touch—is converted into neural codes; that is, patterns of action potentials 
generated by nerve cells. Seeing a baby’s face, watching it smile, looking at a 
great painting or out into the sunset—all these are the results of different 
firing patterns of neurons in different combinations of neural circuits in our 
brain. . . .  The data emerging from specialized cells in the retina resemble the 
visual world in the same way that the pixels in the image on your laptop 
resemble the actual image you see on the screen. The biological system 
processes the information, like the electronic system. The visual system, 
however, creates representations in the brain in the form of neural codes . . . 
Although the raw data taken in by the eyes are not sufficient to form the 
content-rich hypothesis called vision, the brain generates a hypothesis that is 
remarkably accurate. Each of us is able to create a rich, meaningful image of 
the external world that is remarkably similar to the image seen by others.113 
“Our perception of the world is a fantasy that coincides with reality,” says cognitive 
psychologist Chris Frith of the process of mind imagery. “ What I perceive are not the crude 
and ambiguous clues that impinge from the outside world onto my eyes, ears and fingers. I 
perceive something much richer—a picture that combines all these crude signals with a 
wealth of past experience [from memory].114  The topic of mental imagery —is there such a 
thing and if so, in what form does the image appear?—has been hotly debated since the mid-
19th century. Stephen Kosslyn’s 2006 book The Case for Mental Imagery (2006) a history of 
the scientific research on the neural mechanism underlying mental imagery seems to have 
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ended the debate by demonstrating that visual perception and visual imagery share 
underlying processes. Kosslyn’s research includes a review of 60 studies of other scientific 
teams dealing with various aspects of mental imagery that document overlapping brain 
activity in visual perception and mental imagery and  parallel defects in imagery and 
perception in patients with brain damage. It also demonstrates that patients with a condition 
that ignores half the space during perception, also only do see half the space during imagery, 
and evidence that patients with brain lesions who can’t recognize faces also can’t visualize 
them.115  
In 1843 when John Ruskin, then a 23-year-old Oxford University graduate, 
anonymously published the first volume of Modern Painters, his “highly original” thinking 
historians Eric Warner and Graham Hough write in Strangeness and Beauty (1983) “had 
effects on the aesthetic, social and even political thinking that are still experienced to this 
day” caused what amounted to a “Psychic Revolution” in Victorian England.”  
* Ruskin asserted that the scientific community’s understanding of the mind’s 
cognitive processes was seriously in error: Visual perception, the sense of sight, he insisted, 
was the principal organ of intelligence, thought, memory, reading, imagination and creativity. 
This proposition was at odds with nineteenth-century certainty that the eyes automatically 
sent its images along to the brain which did the hard cognitive work of thinking, extracting 
information and categorizing knowledge. The visual cortex—the back quarter of the brain 
consisting of seven different areas that receive, process, and combine information from the 
eyes into whole images—was not yet thought to be part of the brain. The new theory called 
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for a remapping of the brain to include its neighboring cortex as the primary organ of 
cognition. This suggested an entirely new way of looking, thinking, explaining and writing.  
* Further, Ruskin insisted that the rigidity of the English language governed by the 
centuries-old Adamic theory of God’s divine gift of the perfect language to Adam, limited 
intelligent discourse and should be overturned. His goal, considered heretical, was to elevate 
visual sensibility to its proper cognitive position superior to logos, thus releasing the 
cognitive stranglehold of language, in which “the relation between the signified and the 
signifier is not arbitrary; the linguistic sign is not double but unitary.” This would mean 
accepting a subjective view of knowledge that would dramatically alter the interpretation of 
power, objects, ideas and feeling, and thus impact language, literature, law, the arts, and 
every cultural institution, especially the sciences, philosophy and religion. 
 *In addition, Ruskin argued that the English language was moribund— dead or dying 
as the cognitive soul of the vigorously changing Victorian zietgeist. Language no longer was 
capable of accurately reflecting the life lived. He proposed a reimagined theory of expressive 
language suited to the powerful visuality of the mind and a fresh syntax flowing from 
individual experience would express the new experience of a society in the constant flux of 
political, social, economical and industrial change, and particularly of expanding scientific 
advancements that explored human psychology and the mind.  
Ruskin’s work was intended to accelerate the slow transition from deductive to inductive 
methods of reasoning. In 1690 John Locke’s empirical theories of knowledge in An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, ushered in the slow death of Rene Descartes’ rationalism 
based on innate knowledge. Prior to this Sir Isaac Newton had also struck a blow for the 
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senses and experience by attributing color to the visual senses, not as an inherent property of 
the object. Rationalism’s reign over the mind had dictated language as the expression of 
man’s true and absolute reality, and the words themselves, the carrier of truth, far beyond the 
possibility of experience, or what the eyes saw, or the ears heard, or the body felt. The senses 
were not to be trusted. Language was in the vice-lock of the 17th -century traditional belief 
wherein words corresponded exactly with the objects they denoted. Understanding is 
corrupted through words, declared Locke, caught between “our Understanding and the 
Truth.”  Locke insisted that word-signs are not natural, but arbitrary. “No one has the power 
to make others have the same ideas in their minds as he has, when they use the same word as 
he does.”116 Language for Locke, in substance, was a speaker’s personally considered 
expressions, flowing naturally from her life experiences and her interpretations of events 
especially in complicated areas of discourse such as philosophy and politics, and deeply 
private concerns of values and relationships. Given the fertility of the human mind, the 
assumption of similar realities in two speakers is a communications landmine. Lock-step 
understanding of meaning is fraught. Elsewhere in his argument for visuality and emotion in 
language Ruskin cited Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s and Johann Gottfried Herder’s writing on the 
nature and origin of language. Both philosophers “recognized language as a sine qua non, as 
the lifeblood of human culture and social demeanor in all forms.”117 It was not needs but 
passion that accounts for the origin of language, says Rousseau. “The natural effect of needs 
was to separate men, not to unite them. . . Whence, then, the origin? From moral needs, 
passions . . . It is neither hunger nor thirst but love, hatred, pity, anger, which drew from 
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them the first words. ”118 While still an animal, man already has a language, writes Herder, 
with overflowing feeling that reminds one of Ruskin’s preacherly tone.  
“It was, as it were, the last motherly touch of the formative hand of nature that 
gave to all to take out into the world, the law, “Feel not for yourself alone. But 
rather: your feeling resound!: The sound of your feeling be of one kind to your 
species and be perceived by all in compassion as by one!”  Do not touch this 
weak, this sentient being. However lonesome and alone it may seem to be, 
However exposed to every hostile storm of the universe, yet it is not alone: It 
stands allied with all nature!119 
 
Herder’s soundings on language as a moral vehicle of unification and compassion in the 18th 
century is the pulpit that Ruskin stands on in Modern Painters to unite his fractured nation. 
 
The readers of Modern Painters’ first volume had no idea who its author was. Ruskin 
did not want his youth and neophyte status in the art world to detract from his message. He 
describes himself simply as “A Graduate of Oxford University.” In this mysterious 
anonymity he launched himself boldly on to the startled art world as a critic of art, not only 
of the brilliant colorist Turner and his lesser contempories, but of the classical greats with 
whom he compared Turner’s work. In the opening pages he dives into his prime concern of 
nurturing intelligence, through sight and insight and feeling, beauty and truth, and explains 
the range of possible levels of intellectual response to the work of artists, writers, and 
preachers. How does one respond intellectually to “Don Quixote for example” he wonders, 
and answers:  
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The lowest mind would find in it perpetual and brutal amusement in the 
misfortunes of the knight, and perpetual sympathy with the squire. A mind of 
average feeling would perceive the satirical meaning and force of the book, would 
appreciate its wit, its elegance and its truth. But only elevated and peculiar minds 
discover, in addition to all this, the full moral beauty of the love and the truth 
which are the constant associates of all that is even most weak and erring in the 
character of the hero . . . 120 
 
One could think of this as intellectual class grading from a Victorian scold, but far from it—it 
is a Ruskinian teaching moment. He sincerely believes in the perfection of the mind through 
man’s own striving. He speaks like the evangelic preacher he refused to become, 
proselytizing for his philosophy of seeking beauty of the mind as an antidote for the soulless 
and mindless depradations of the Industrial Revolution. Ruskin was a “Wordsworthian from 
infancy, and throughout his life closer to Wordsworth than any other poet.”121 His  term the 
“Education of the Senses”  was a homage to Wordsworth, a campaign to urge Victorians to 
train and cultivate their higher senses not for utilitarian ends but to animate the desired ends 
of their good and true human nature. Modern Painters, intended to be a defence of Turner, 
was to be his instruction book on the power of sight and beauty. “[E]arly in his career we 
find him realizing that it is not his business to dispute about individual artists and their 
achievement; “it is to summon the moral energies of the nation to a forgotten duty, to display 
the use, force and function of a great body of neglected sympathies and desires.”122 The 
“forgotten duty” is visceral identification of the well-being of the nation and its people; the 
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“neglected sympathies and desires” are those qualities of moral character and feeling that 
have been quashed by spiraling materialism of the smokestacks and the growing loss of a 
spiritual connection to the green countryside.  
The publication event is described as one of “startling originality.” It was original in a 
way that startled the art world and its afficianados, because, as literary critics Eric Warner 
and Graham Hough explain in Strangeness and Beauty, nothing like it had happened before; 
never before had so much widespread attention been paid to the importance of art in English 
society.123 “Our culture has been so dominantly literary,” they write, “that when a man of 
first-rate intellectual powers devotes himself to a [an entire book on a] critique of the plastic 
and visual arts, the effect is one of startling originality.”124 Ruskin’s original motivation in 
writing Modern Painters, was “to move the arts of painting, [and later] sculpture and 
architecture” into the centre of  cultural awareness, a position long dominated by literature, 
most recently by the poetic works of the literary figures of the Romantic Revolution. Thus, 
bred on Wordsworth’s Romantic philosophy, but obsessed with nature and art, and in 
particular with Turner whose sketches he’d first discovered in Rogers’ Italy when he was 
thirteen, Ruskin began his campaign on behalf of the excellences of Turner, and with it, his 
philosophy of perception, knowledge, truth and the awareness of beauty as the centerpiece of 
his moral vision for the role of art in society. Frederic Harrison, who was a long time friend  
and fellow teacher of Ruskin’s at the Working Men’s College, at once a great admirer and a 
realistically tough critic, recalls the reaction to the publication: 
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“Sydney Smith, the acknowledged oracle of the “Edinburgh Review” and of cultured 
society is reported to have said that it was a work of transcendent talent, presented the most 
original views, and the most elegant and powerful language, and would work a complete 
revolation in the world of taste. And so it was,”  said Harrison.125 And . . .  
The appearace of volume 1 of Modern Painters produced a real sensation in the 
artistic, and even the literary world. The recognised organs of criticism were 
hostile and contemptuous.   . . . There was much in the outspoken heresy of the 
youthful reformer to scandalize the connoisseur, the veteran artist, the hack writer, 
and the Bible literalist. But men of insight saw in it a new idea. . . . Tennyson, 
who saw Nature so often in kindred ways, begged for the book. . . . Poets were the 
first to call into their company the prose poet of Nature who had placed the lasting 
crown on the head on [Turner] the color-poet of Nature.” 
 
Warner and Hough in Strangeness and Beauty describe Ruskin’s declarations about sight and 
the mind as “intellectually revolutionary.” The word for God’s spirit in the world was 
Logos—the Word — and it was Ruskin’s belief that the dominance of the word had caused  
an enormous imbalance. “It was time that other forms of symbolization should have their 
turn, bringing new insight and releasing new powers.” They claim Ruskin’s ideas about 
visual sensitivity’s impact on the quality of minds and the impact on arts had precipitated 
what almost amounted to “a psychic revolution,” a large claim, even in an Age of 
Revolution. Everything was changing in the revolution-wracked Victorian world —
industrial, political, economic, social, religious, and scientific change—all rightly considered 
historical revolutions because of the radical upheavals that swept through society. External 
upheavals do not exist in isolation. Socially disruptive, they are not siloed safely outside an 
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impervious body; these endemic stresses infiltrate the innards and the mind. What had 
Ruskin stirred up in the Victorian Psyche? “[Ruskin’s] mind,” they write, “soon to be 
followed by others of similar cast, had reached one of those turning points described in 
Jungian psychology in which a buried or undervalued faculty is brought to light, bringing 
with it new and unsuspecting energies.”126 Jung’s theory of  a “buried,”or  “undervalued” 
faculty “brought to light,” releasing “unsuspecting energies,”127 suggests Ruskin as cultural 
archaeologist, with Modern Painters as his pick axe, unearthing pent-up Newtonian and 
Lockean sensationalist wisdom from the 17th century.” 128 What was different in 1843? 
Echoing Locke and anticipating Jung on the emergence of previously neglected ideas, 
William James observes that we embrace new ideas when they “account satisfactorily for our 
sensible experience,” and appeal to our emotional, aesthetic and active needs.129  James is  
describing the ah-ha moment when driven by our senses, intelligence, values and latent 
desires, there comes a time, when change becomes inevitable. He reinforces the embodied 
knowledge of our sensibilities and the cognitive base of what we call common sense. “If we 
ask what feature all great periods of revival, of the expansion of the human mind,” have in 
common, he writes, “ each and all have said to the human being:“The inmost nature of the 
reality is congenial to powers you possess.”130  The event speaks, James says, coining an idea 
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for Guy Dubord, the Marxist philosopher,131 you are ready to exercise your power. Clearly, 
Ruskin’s assertion that men had immediate access to powers of mind through their senses, 
was not a new idea, though in 1843 it may have seemed so.  “[W]hat men immediately 
perceive and what they reason about are always particular ideas existing in their minds,” 
Locke writes in 1690.132  Nonetheless, those ideas were heard as if for the first time, listened 
to, acted on, and sparked a newly-discovered confidence in the subjective awareness of 
destiny as self determination in a world moving from the immutable past into an exciting but 
uncertain future. Thomas Carlyle attributes Ruskin’s influence to the exceptional public 
power of literature at that time. He writes: 
In the nineteenth century, the critic was a man of importance largely because 
literature promised solutions to problems that could not be solved by the religious, 
social or scientific  systems of the day . . . [literature] was deemed to be of 
functional importance for it balanced the deficiencies resulting from systems that 
all claimed universal validity. In contrast to the previous eras, when there had 
been a more or less stable hierarchy of thought systems, the Nineteenth Century 
was lacking in such stability, owing to the increasing complexity and number of 
such systems[ranging from theological to scientific] and the resulting clashes 
between them.   . . . It was only natural, then, for readers to seek messages in 
literature, for [it] could offer them precisely the orientation they felt they needed 
in view of the problems left behind by the various systems of the age.133 
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Ruskin’s “Revolution” was, as he said, about “the whole moral and emotional nature of 
man.” His aim is transformational. He is advocating for transformed subjectivity through the 
neglected human sense of perception. The development of visual power, for Ruskin, is the 
source of the well-being of the body, mind and soul through the natural pleasures of the 
senses —the experience of the world’s beauty. His idealistic goal was that the manifestation 
of that beauty in the mind, the expression of beauty in the arts would transfuse all aspects of 
the psychological and material culture with all things excellent and a full-hearted concern for 
the quality of the lives of their fellow men. 
Ruskin began the first draft of Modern Painters in Italy 1841 while on extended sick 
leave from Oxford. He came to the book with a concept that he had often discussed, of 
painting as simply another form of expression—in fact, a visual language. By the time he had 
finished the volume (1842) Ruskin has reached an equitable creative trade between the 
“sister arts” 134 by cross-pollinating the visual art of the painter with the language art of the 
poet. He explains: 
Painting, or art generally, as such, with all its technicalities, difficulties, and 
particular ends, is nothing but a noble and expressive language, invaluable as 
the vehicle of thought, but by itself nothing. He who has learned what is 
commonly considered the whole art of painting, that is, the art of representing 
any natural object faithfully, has as yet only learned the language by which his 
thoughts are to be expressed. He has done just as much towards being that 
which we ought to respect as a great painter, as a man who has learned to 
express himself grammatically and melodiously has towards being a great 
poet. . . It is not by the mode of representing and saying, but what is 
represented and said that the respective greatness of the painter is to be finally 
determined. . . . Therefore we should call a man a great painter only as he 
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excelled in precision or force in the language of words. A great poet would 
then be a term strictly, and precisely in the same sense applicable to both, if 
warranted by the character of the images or thoughts which each in their 
respective languages convey.135  
 
Painting is nothing but a language, though a distinguished and evocative language, he tells 
his audience of readers, as he sets out to explain what makes a great painter. While Ruskin 
appears to be focussing on the artist, he soon, predictably, introduces the writer as a fellow 
creator equally under scrutiny to show greatness.136 He begins, again in the role of teacher, 
separating the basic technical skills of the painter and writer artists—the proficient use of the 
materials of the art and the competence of their craft, exhibited in the faithful representation 
of the lines of the art, and the melodiously rendered meters of the poetry. What makes the 
competent artist a great painter, says Ruskin, are the ideas carried in the language of his art. 
The greatness of a poet is also recognized “in the same sense applicable to both”—the sense 
of language—“by the images or thoughts which each of their respective languages convey.”  
 Ruskin evolves his rule for the required elements of great art: the visual artist uses 
paint images that talk to the perceiver; the word artist uses words that make the reader create 
visual images. With that formula Ruskin has worked out the major problem he faces in 
writing Modern Painters. If a painting is a language, a form of visual communication in color 
and shapes that conveys important ideas, then, in addition to educating painters about the 
importance of developing visual sensibility, he will have to teach his reading audience how 
to “read” the ideas of a painting. And, if he is to do that, he has to make his readers see with 
his words, make them able to visualize a painting from words on a page.  The reader’s task is 
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thus two-fold: first to read, then to visualize. Visualization is a mental function, a function 
separate from reading. Now, he had another big problem— two problems in one, both 
concerning language.  
Ruskin is depending on words to carry his visual message. The challenge he faces in 
trying to write about the meaning of a painting, the relationships between space and shapes, 
color and mood, is to be able to manipulate language in a way that would express the 
inexpressible. If he could find the vocabulary to do that it would resolve the writer’s part of 
the task, but not the reader’s problem. While reading, the ideas in the text stir up neural 
activity which triggers the neural activity in the visual cortex which calls up neural images in 
the mind’s eye. Ruskin understood this process in its broad outlines. The problem he found 
insurmountable was that nineteenth-century language was governed by restrictive syntax, 
abstract language and the rigidly-framed composition of the rational mind. When he 
struggled to find the right detail, cadence and energy of language capable of describing the 
content of the art, of communicating the excitement, beauty, movement and mood of the art, 
and of analyzing the successes and failures of the painting, he felt that language in a word, 
was “moribund,” all meaning wrung out of it.  “Words are not accurate enough, nor delicate 
enough to express or trace the constant, all pervading influence of the finer and vaguer 
shadows, ” he writes. His frustration in the “expressive insufficiency” of language boiled 
over in a letter to an Oxford friend. The letter is astonishing, certainly because of his youth, 
but particularly because of the content. He discusses trying to use poetic metaphors to 
capture the precise sensation he is trying to express; he questions how one “would undertake 
to convey to another person a perfectly distinct idea of any single emotion passing in your 
own heart: 
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You cannot—you cannot fathom it yourself if have no actual expression for 
the simple idea . . . You can say . . . you feel depressed, delighted, dark, 
bright; are any of these expressions competent to illustrate the whole feeling? 
If you try to reach it you must heap metaphor after metaphor, and image after 
image, and you will feel that the most mysterious touch nearest and reach 
highest, but none will come up to the truth.137 
 
Ruskin’s frustration is palpable, somewhat equivalent to a painter wanting to paint a 
glorious sunset with only black and white paint in his paint box. With his close friend as a 
sounding board, he formulates his theories of an expressive language that will appear full-
fledged two years later in Modern Painters: a visual language of metaphors and images and 
word impressions that he hopes will transport the reader to “the whole feeling of the truth.” 
In this letter, 22-year-old Ruskin outlined his first rough draft of the theoretic elements of a 
rebirthed language. His two theoretical concerns expressed the relationship between the 
writer and the reader and the linguistic structure and energy that promoted mental images and 
emotional reactions in the reader. All this was bubbling up in Ruskin’s mind before he began 
to write. His solution was a linguistic mix of trained perception, vital ideas, visually 
imaginative language and lively expressive construction that made the reader see —and feel. 
In practice, Modern Painters becomes the laboratory in which he develops the manner of 
style and visuality of description that he hopes will help the readers of Modern Painters see 
the paintings and landscapes he was describing, and feel the beauty, energy and ideas of the 
art through the visual expressiveness of his language. For example, in one section, to 
illustrate the use of text that makes the reader see he compares the failures of some art with 
the greatness of Turner’s work. Alexandra Wettlaufer describes this in In the Mind’s Eye. In 
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his analysis of Turner’s execution in Upper Fall of the Tees . . . he does not present an 
overview of the composition or narrative of the scene, but instead submerges the reader 
within the motion of the waterfall.: 
Though they make you understand the swiftness of the water, they never make 
you feel the weight of it; the stream in their hands looks active, not supine, as 
if it leaped, not as if it fell. Now water will leap a little down a weir or over a 
stone, but it tumbles over a high fall like this, and it is when we have lost the 
parabolic line, and arrived at the catenary, that we have lost the spring of the 
fall, and arrived at the plunge of it, that we begin to really feel its weight and 
wildness.  
As the passage continues, Wettlaufer writes, Ruskin supresses the physical painting for a 
dramatic evocation of the power of water; 
It begins to writhe, and twist, and sweep out, zone after zone, in wilder 
stretching as it falls; and to send down the rocket-like, lance-pointed, 
whizzing shafts at its sides, sounding for the bottom. And it is this prostration, 
this hopeless abandonment of its ponderous power to the air, which is always 
expressed by Turner. 138 
It appears that the neural/biological demands of imagining a writing form that sparks the 
cortex to call up images resulted in a flash of cognitive magic for Ruskin. He replicates the 
biological rhythmic sensation of sight in the rhythmic meter of language.  His visual prose 
dances along the line in tiny phrases of perception, one after another, capturing small pieces 
of images, connecting them like a jigsaw puzzle, building together the multiple sensations in 
a picture—exactly the way that the retinal neurons dash around sending clips of information 
for the visual cortex to asemble in its last act of creating the big picture. He finds 
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physiological patterns as a way to mirror in words and narratives the mind’s experience. This 
technique creates an important building block for the new writer/ reader relationship he will 
create. His theory of writing is this:  
The object of all art, is not to inform, but to suggest, not to add to the 
knowledge but to kindle the imagination. . . . The best poet is the one who can 
by the fewest words touch the greatest number secret chords of thought in his 
readers’ mind and set them to work in their own way.” 139   
Ruskin’s vision is to make the reader a creative partner with the writer.  How? “He wants to 
put readers “to work in [their] own way,”  using their “secret  chords of thought.” Chords of 
thought? The non-musical meaning, the dictionary tells us is ‘Emotional feelings or 
responses.’ Ruskin’s idea is that a partnership of artistic imagination, driven by the writer’s 
visual language, and then further opened up by the reader’s imaginative capacities, is the key 
to a new kind of writing. It is a three-part process—a printed text that unites the imaginative 
labors of a creative artist and a creative, feeling reader. The text is suggestive, evocative, not 
representative. It stimulates the reader’s imagination and the brain’s irresistible impulse to 
fill in the gaps, to solve a cognitive puzzle, to complete the blanks in an empty scene with her 
ideas.  One of Ruskin’s most important concepts about writing is that the author should not 
hand out his wisdom on a platter. “Work is honorable, discovery is thrilling,” he says, let the 
reader participate. As readers engage they becomes co-creators. As Wolfgang Iser reminds 
us, “There is no literature without a reader.”140  
By intuitively linking language as an inevitable expression of cultural change, 
especially in a time of scientific advances in the knowledge of the brain and the mind, 
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Ruskin’s elevation of sight as the primary sense and thus the key to mind-conscious writing, 
helps vivify the sensual experience of a different world view. To make this happen, he must 
make his reader see pictures as she reads words. He wants the word-images of art and 
landscape to move off the page into the readers’ brains so they can feel their bodies’ 
emotional responses to the ideas in the text. This he believed would occur if the writing was 
vivid enough to prime the readers’ visual imagination. And since in Ruskin’s philosophy the 
senses were the primary source of beauty, the spirit of beauty was infused in the theory and 
practice of a new way of writing which was undoubtedly absorbed by the reader. Because 
Ruskin is learning to perform his own theoretical moves as he writes, an interesting dynamic 
evolves between Ruskin and the reader: as he is figuring out his visual strategies, he can’t 
resist sharing his writing processes. Ruskin’s tutoring is spontaneous. He’s caught in the 
moment of his inspiration, thinking, writing, and being Ruskin, always moving in the 
direction of his imagination. And in a pre-modern move, as he writes about visual sensibility, 
landscape and artistic techniques he makes the writing process of visual realization a part of 
the text— indirectly saying to the reader, this is what I am trying to do; here’s how I am 
doing it. He is teaching his reader to see and feel about art as an extraordinary calling. “The 
whole function of the artist in the world is to be a seeing and feeling creature,” he says. Since 
Ruskin has set up the intimacy of talking to the reader, the reader wonders where he stands in 
the reckoning and knows himself a lazy looker and as blindfold a seer as Charlotte Brontë, 
and decides to change that. Ruskin’s ideas on writing and reading evolve over the pages of a 
chapter of Modern Painters, tucked in here and there as they occur to him, then another piece 
later in another chapter or another volume, or a different book altogether, as he drops 
concepts like bread crumbs, or pieces of gold. He compares the act of reading to mining for 
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gold. He speaks of the meaning of truth: “There is a moral as well as a material truth—a truth 
of impression and thought as well as of matter; and the truth of impression is a thousand 
times the more important of the two.” If you suspect he’s leaving a trail for you to follow, 
like the reader he imagines you to be, you will have to provide your own map, dig into his 
meaning, dive into the deliberate gaps that lie in wait for your imagination to resolve for you 
the mystery of the writing journey. You will also learn that the lonely pastime of writing is 
not a one-person enterprise. It is a collaboration of two working minds— the person of the 
writer and the person of the reader —over a text that is created by the writer and passed into 
the reader’s hands for its full realization as a work of art. Literature is an inseparable 
imaginitive venture of writer-text-reader141  This concept of reading is by no means new. In 
the eighteenth century Laurence Sterne was already theorizing the writer/reader dyad: “The 
truest respect which you can pay to the reader’s understanding, is to halve this manner 
amicably, and leave him something to imagine in his turn. . . thus author and reader are to 
share the game of the imagination . . .  the reader’s enjoyment begins when he himself 
becomes productive, i.e. when the text allows him to bring his own faculties into play.”142  
As he writes, Ruskin constantly demonstrates how the writer can learn to see, to feel, 
to think in images and turn them into visual language. In wandering into the cascading 
sentences the reader gulps for air in the “visual overwhelm” that Herder worried about, 
though he was talking about the landscape, not words on a page. Then, the neurons in the 
curious brain kick in, and the imagery slows down as your imagination breathes freely in the 
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process of feeling the pictures in your mind and then seeing them.  Here’s a familiar word 
painting of Ruskin’s, one of the first he wrote in the visual writing learning curve in Modern 
Painters in which he takes the reader through the glories of one of nature’s “coloring fits.” 143 
 The noonday sun came slanting down the rocky slopes of La Riccia, and their 
masses of entangled and tall foliage, whose autumnal tints were mixed with 
the wet verdure of a thousand evergreens, were penetrated with it as if with 
rain. I cannot call it color, it was conflagration. Purple, and crimson, and 
scarlet, like the curtains of God’s tabernacle, the rejoicing trees sank into the 
valley in showers of light, every separate leaf quivering with bouyant and 
burning life; each, as it turned to reflect or to transmit the sunbeam, first a 
torch and then an emerald. Far up into the recesses of the valley, the green 
vistas arched like the hallows of mighty waves of some cristalline sea, with 
the arbutus flowers dashed along their banks for foam, and silver flakes of 
orange spray tossed into the air around them, breaking over the grey walls of 
rock into a thousand separate stars, fading and kindling alternately as the weak 
wind lifted and let them fall. Every blade of grass burned like the golden floor 
of heaven, opening in sudden gleams as the foliage broke and closed above it, 
as sheet-lightning opens in a cloud at sunset; the motionless masses of dark 
rock—dark though flushed with scarlet lichen, casting their quiet shadows 
across its restless radiance, the fountain underneath them filling its marble 
hollow with blue mist and fitful sound; and over all, the multitudinous bars of 
amber and rose, the sacred clouds that have no darkness, and only exist to 
illumine, were seen in fathomless intervals between the solemn orbed repose 
of the stone pines, passing to lose themselves in the last, white blinding lustre 
of the measureless line where the Campagna melted into the blaze of the 
sea.144 
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Ruskin’s writing imagery tool-kit holds all the basic tricks and tropes for descriptive work, as 
well as workaday words that punch above their weight because of their unexpected use. 
Every line says “imagine this,” think about this contrast, see it. Just as stopping to breathe is 
used as a dramatic break in poetry, an idea that stops you in your tracks, makes you stop to 
wonder. The metaphors are luxuriously considered and the mixed metaphors, too. Verbs with 
horse-power stutter thoughts between languid adjectives and the intended verbal action of 
driving the phrases on to keep up with the reader’s dashing thoughts. The alliteration pleases 
the silent tongue and the sounds in the senses. And, the unifying satisfaction of light images 
tightly wraps a wild visual dance to a safe place in the delighted mind.   
Here’s how the Ruskin student might see the master’s flashcards. 
 We meet the writer in the “Noonday sun,” at its highest, brightest, fiercest, in the sky, so 
fierce that it  “came” active mimicking the “slanting” angle of the “rocky slopes” of La 
Riccia. The sun is sharp, hot; the mountains are sharp because of their height, and ”rocky,” 
strewn with boulders, which means the earth has moved here.  
Switching in contrast from sun, bright, and rocks, hard, to soft foliage, we encounter a gentler 
image of, wait! — “Masses of entangled foliage”: sheer abundance, a profusion of 
intertwined ensnarled and tall foliage, different species, entangled together, contrasting the 
senuous intertwining with the tall, strong, straight, dominant “evergreens.” Now we 
understand it’s autumn, so we reinvisage the gleam of “autumnal sun” higher in the sky, 
more golden tints and hues, mixed with the “wet verdure,” glaucous gleaming, wavy verdure, 
luxurious green vegetation, plant-covered, of a host a “thousand evergreens” orange, yellow 
red . . .  lush shiny heavy thousands, penetrated active, fierce, as if penetrated by rain. The 
effect of the sun is “as if” rain. Sun and rain, although there is no rain.  
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“I can not call it color,” he writes.  What? Stop!  Go back and soak up the color. What am I 
missing? He has just hinted at autumnal tints, evergreens. It’s not enough.  It was a 
conflagration.  We imagine a sheet of flame. The mountainsides are on fire.  
Now he finds the flames of color in the fire. Purple, and crimson, and scarlet, mauve, plum, 
like the curtains of God’s tabernacle, the dwelling place of God, sacred, majestic, brilliant, 
radiant, resplendent. The simile stuns the senses. The curtains both contain and reveal God’s 
kingdom in the Cathedral of the mountain. The rejoicing trees sank into the valley in showers 
of light. The trees are worshippers rejoicing, their branches waving into the sky and then 
bowing in prayer-like devotion down into the valley in showers of light, the moving of the 
conflagration the firey coloring creates imagery of showers sprinkling not rain, to quench a 
fire, but the sparkling offspring of a fire. The mind captures Dante entering heaven, awaiting 
the light infused image of his beloved Beatrice. 
“Every separate leaf quivering,” a vibrating, convulsion, “with bouyant and burning life.”  
Quivering and bouyant? It’s contradictory, and fascinating to imagine the opposites existing 
in the same little leaf, but every separate leaf quivering, unimaginable in its universal 
enormity, makes an imaginer quiver all over, too. The following image of “each leaf as it 
turned to reflect or to transmit the sunbeam, first a torch and then an emerald,” also reflects 
Ruskin’s moral mission: The leaves, all small parts of the great edifice of the nation, being 
the torchbearers of light, the receivers and givers of the great gift. Or, without this allusion, 
each leaf moving as it quivered, the sunbeam—a minature part of the sun as the leaf is to the 
tree, reflecting, sending back, as a mirror, reproducing, returning back out to the world or 
acting as a conduit, carrying the sunbeam to another leaf. Far up into the recesses of the 
valley, “the green vistas arched like the hallows of mighty waves of some cristalline sea,” 
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green arched horizons, like the “hallows of waves,” a wave formation that we can imagine as 
the sanctified recesses of a revered holy place, those surging waves sparkle like diamonds.  
There’s even more to add to this fairytale, picture book scene:The sweet smelling “arbutus” 
lying along the banks of trees becomes Ruskin’s, and the readers’, foam dashed into the air 
around the flowers, breaking over the grey walls of rock into a thousand separate stars. The 
solid fragments of liquid against the grey rocks, have become the sky. Again, we are drawn 
to celestial imaginings. 
 Every blade of grass burned like the golden floor of heaven, opening in 
sudden gleams as the foliage broke and closed above it, as sheet-lightning 
electrifying, like a thunderbolt of Jove, opens in a cloud at sunset.  
 
This is what Elaine Scarry would describe as beauty’s “unselfing” moment. It is a 
transcendental experience for Ruskin. As he writes, he is reliving the ecstasy of one of the 
magnificent sunsets that marks nature’s greatest gifts. This scene is a clash of symbols for the 
eye. It has taken the writer all afternoon to “read” the landscape, now as he finishes word-
painting it, darkness is falling over the mountain and words lull us into a dreamscape . . . 
[A]nd over all, the multitudinous bars of amber and rose, the sacred clouds 
that have no darkness, and only exist to illumine, were seen in fathomless 
intervals between the solemn orbed repose of the stone pines, passing to lose 
themselves in the last, white blinding lustre of the measureless line where the 
Campagna melted into the blaze of the sea.145 
The only ways to count Ruskin’s perceptions of nature are multitudinous, fathomless and 
measureless. The last image he leaves is of illumined amber and rose striated clouds, passing 
                                                
 145 Ruskin. MP, Vol. 1, Part ll, Chapter ll. 
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across the sky as the outline of the land melts into the sun-blazed sea.  The eyes and the heart 
melts with the image of the land. 
 For John Ruskin to have pounced on the royalty of the English art world, a no-
one out of nowhere, to tell them how to paint up to his elevated standards was a stunning 
event. That his youthful genius was acknowledged by some of the nation’s great intellectuals; 
that he finished the five-volume work of Modern Painters to considerable acclaim, that 
surely could have accounted for a lifetime’s achievement. He went on to write 40 books and 
many hundreds of articles on practically every subject known to man. By way of definition, 
John Ruskin has been described as the nineteenth-century’s greatest cultural critic, one of his 
era’s greatest writers, a fine artist146 and a poet.147  A few of his other notable 
accomplishments are in botany, ornithology, geology, meterology and philology “and in all 
these studies, not far short of the foremost of his day.”148 A.H.R. Ball, editor of Ruskin as 
Literary Critic, expresses surprise at the “neglect [of Ruskin’s contributions]. . .  of so much 
of permanent literary value” —citing Ruskin’s survey of landscape in literature, study of the 
grotesque, the theory of the Pathetic Fallacy, analyses of writers’ style, and treatises on 
aesthetics—that “provide a general background of culture not accessible elsewhere in so 
small a compass.” Harold Bloom compares Ruskin’s achievement as a literary critic to that 
of William Yeats and  Northrop Frye: “There are three major areas of Ruskin’s 
achievement,” he writes, “art, social and literary criticism.” Ruskin, he declares, was a great 
                                                
 146 Gary Wills in NYRB, April, 2014 says Ruskin is “Probably the 19t-century’s greatest water colorist. 
 
 147 Newdigate Prize for Poetry at Oxford. Arthur Hugh Clough was second.  
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[and mostly unacknowledged] literary critic, one of the major critics of 19th-century England,  
whose “importance has been obscured by misapprehensions of him as a “moral critic.” 149 
My interest is in another unmentioned Ruskin literary legacy —overlooked, yes, but 
hardly surprising because Ruskin himself obscured it in the margins of his consuming focus 
on perception and painting: it lies in the gauzy shadows of his lifelong campaign to teach 
artists to see. Its effect on painters was monumental and has been analyzed in hundreds of 
books and  papers. What has not been studied, and what this dissertation addresses, are how 
his theories of language and writing evolved as the unintended consequence of his desire to 
defend Turner’s unappreciated genius. His goal was to put the eye of art on a pedestal above 
the word of literature. As Ruskin’s restless intelligence tackled the issues of how to tell the 
story of Turner’s poetic vision of art, he stumbled into the protracted intellectual problem of 
the ebbing efficacy of his language. Language the living, and always renewing spirit of a 
nation’s culture, had ceased to move with the times. He used his work on Turner’s visual 
genius to write a treatise on the visuality of the human brain in cognition, imagination and 
memory. He saw that visuality was also the solution to the expressive failure of language.150 
His creation of a language of the eyes, paired with impressionistic word patterns, and his 
emphasis on the societal benefits from the experience of beauty through perception spoke to 
the lost values of the age. It also influenced writers to write with fresh insights using their 
senses of sight and feeling.  
                                                
 149  Bloom. Intro.xvi-xviii. 
 
 150 Hough makes a claim in 1983 that Ruskin’s “revolutionary” influence on visual perception, the 
mind and imagination had incited an intellectual revolution.  It is interesting to find in 1995 a fascinating 
collection of sixteen essays in Victorian Literature and the Victorian Visual Imagination in which there are 
eleven references to Ruskin, none of which mentions the century’s most famous  critic’s preeminent role in 
elevating vision and literature to cultural importance. 
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  Through the power of sight, Ruskin envisoned a language that entered the 
reader’s body. Evidence of Ruskin’s influence is seen in an unusual flourishing of interest in 
beauty in the literature in this period —1845-1890— in which narratives of nature, character, 
minds, and ideas are founded in perceptions of beauty, broadly understood as a sensuous 
aesthetic experience. The aesthetic of beauty is matched by an evocative technique of writing 
that creates an emotional reality for the reader.  Novelists struggled, as did Ruskin, to find 
expression for the new age of the embodied mind.  His insight that language was exhausted 
and that verbal representation through images could revive it, burst open a vein of creative 
experimentation in British and American novelists. The genesis of Ruskin’s achievement, I 
claim, is his focus in the early volumes of Modern Painters in which he evolves and 
demonstrates theories of writing and reading and a visually imagined linguistic technique to 
discuss art through visual sensibility. In consequence, he showed how to convey the feeling 
of beauty from the text to the reader. In the chapters that follow I explore the different 
applications of the influence of Ruskin’s theories of perception, writing and beauty in the 
work of two of the century’s greatest novelists— Hawthorne and Eliot. Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter and George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda are particularly 
fascinating, because together they capture the inclusiveness of Ruskin’s focus on perception 
and beauty—the external and internal—the beauty we can see and the beauty that is hidden.
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III. The Devil and Hester Prynne: 
The Grace of Beauty over Sin and Shame  
The greatest art includes much that small art excludes; humor, 
pain and evil. Much that is repulsive when alone becomes 
beautiful in its relation.  To find the ennobling relation is the 
task of life and art.            
     Oscar W. Firkins151 
 
There are two contrary views of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s artistic daemon, which does 
not, of course, mean that either one is completely wrong. One is that he is compulsively 
drawn to life’s dark side. The other is that he has a sunny and tender sensibility. These two 
characterizations of Hawthorne’s disposition coalesce around the discussion of the creative 
force driving the novel he began writing in 1849 in his loft-study in Salem, Massachusetts. 
He was at work on The Scarlet Letter, the grim seventeenth-century Puritan morality tale of 
the adulterous love of Hester Prynne and the Reverend Arthur Dimmesdale.  
Although the trauma of the Salem witch trials has long passed, the psychic weight of 
ingrained belief in original sin lies heavily on Nathaniel Hawthorne’s mind.  For him, the 
Puritan past seems ever-present in its lurking sense of sin and shame; this springs from the 
legacy of devout Puritan ancestors. His great-great-great grandfather, William Hathorne, a 
Massachusetts Bay Colony magistrate and judge, was notorious for his harsh sentencing, and 
Magistrate Hathorne’s son, John, was one of the judges presiding over the Salem witch 
trials.152 Because of his lineage he, too, is personally infected with this shadowy ghost of 
                                                
 151 Firkins (1934) 266. Essayist, playwright and critic, Oscar Wilde.Firkins (1864-1932) was professor 
of comparative literature at the University of Minnesota. The epigraph comes from his notebooks on a year-long 
course on literary criticism. 
 
 152 The family name was later changed from Hathorne to Hawthorne perhaps, says Dan MaCall in 
Citizens of Nowhere Else, to distance the family from their notorious ancestors. 
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puritanical guilt that floats creepily over the purest soul. Fascinated by the roots of human 
behavior, Hawthorne bears witness to the deeply-inculcated text of the Fall of Man passed 
along in the evolutionary cultural chain. He fights its assumptions, but as a writer its darkness 
calls to him. “I wish that God had given me the faculty of writing a sunshiny book,”153  he 
says, implying that writing about what most galvanized his imagination  —a story of sin, 
pain and sorrow steeped in unbearable darkness— was his God-given literary fate. Although 
he thinks of himself as tender-hearted and compassionate, he admits that he was obsessed 
with the Calvinist-inspired “horror of what was created in my own brain.”154  
As he reflects on the secrets locked in the human mind, Hawthorne is philosophically 
at odds with the prevailing literary mood of transcendental lightness. While his neighbor 
Ralph Waldo Emerson exalts in “ecstasy” of life, Hawthorne gainsays the 
transcendentalism’s optimistic belief “in the perpetual openness of the human mind to a new 
influx of light and power.”155 Where Emerson imagines open minds and light, Hawthorne 
experiences disturbing echoes of yesteryear when evil was in the air, and adultery was 
punishable by death.156 And so, for the nineteenth-century’s historical consciousness he is 
writing a seventeenth-century tragedy exploring the aftermath of punitive overreaching in the 
adulterous love of a beautiful young married woman whose elderly husband is missing—
perhaps lost at sea— and her bachelor pastor. It is not a happy tale. As William James has 
                                                
 153 Qtd in McCall (1999) 43. 
 
 154 Ibid. 
 
 155 Emerson (1842). Ed.Jone Johnson Lewis © 1996-2001 
http://www.emersoncentral.com/transcendentalist.htm. 09/03/2009 18:36:29 
 
 The Price of Adultery in Puritan Massachusetts, 1641. www.eyewitnesstohistory.com (2005).  
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said, “no story of love was surely ever less of a love story.”157 This tale’s lack of romance is 
because Hawthorne’s concerns lie elsewhere, not in the tenderness of their love and the 
commitment of their passion.  
There is no reason that Hawthorne would romanticize adultery in nineteenth-century 
culture. His artistic quest is to pursue the human toll of guilt and shame. He begins in medias 
res, to examine the consequences of the sin, its corrosive toll of shame and retribution 
inspired by John Calvin’s soul-damning legacy of “natural depravity.” Calvin, the sixteenth-
century Swiss theologian, founder of what became the Presbyterian Church and whose 
religious philosophy was law in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, had a malignant view of the 
inner life of all human beings. In The Institutes of the Christian Religion— Calvin’s 1536 
blueprint for orthodox Protestanism—his description of man’s natural born 
“venom[ness],”and “rottenness,” the consequence of Adam and Eve’s expulsion from The 
Garden of Eden, is chilling. “Depravity is man’s natural state,” even goodness is sinful, he 
writes: 
[T]he  mind of man is so entirely alienated from the righteousness of God that 
he cannot conceive, desire, or design anything but what is wicked, distorted, 
foul, impure, and iniquitous; and his heart is so thoroughly envenomed by sin 
that it can breathe out nothing but corruption and rottenness 158 
 
To his followers— with the notable exception of Michael Servetus, a Spanish 
physician and theologian, who was burned at the stake in 1553 because he disagreed with 
Calvin about the meaning of the Trinity—his theological ideology is unquestioned and 
                                                
 157 James (1879) Hawthorne, Ch.V. 
 
 158 John Calvin (1536) Book Second: Chapter 3 Everything Proceeding from the Corrupt Nature of 
Man Damnable. Trans: Henry Beveridge. MA: Peabody, 2011. Print.   
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unquestionable159. Calvin’s thesaurus-like facility to connote evil is boundless, as this in The 
Institutes demonstrates.  “Wicked,” “distorted,” “foul,”” impure,” “depraved,” “iniquitous,” 
“envenomed,” “corruption,” “rottenness,” “deceit,”and more “wickedness” spills from his 
mouth, recited from his copious writings of man’s licenciousness from birth. Because of their 
natural depravity, Calvin declaims, human beings “are the authors of their own destruction.” 
Thus, if the adulteress Hester Prynne’s psyche should be destroyed by the cruelty of the 
magistrates’ edicts, and if her child, Pearl, the product of the adultery, should suffer as a 
result— so be it: the magistrates, the ministers and the Meeting House congregants are 
indemnified by religious edict. Their cruelty is not spawned by an evil nature, but by concern 
for her soul. After all, as Calvin says, she has written her fate—her alienation from God—by 
her own willful sexual desires on her wicked body. 
This sin-soaked environment is the narrative that engulfs Hawthorne’s story of Hester 
Prynne. He worries obsessively about the darkness of the tale he “must” tell, particularly of 
the painful aftermath of the anguish of guilt, shame  and social ostracism. Yet, as “author of 
her fate,” the adultress accepts the doctrine and her punishment. If Hester Prynne and her 
accusers—one matron who screams for the penalty of death, another for “the brand of a hot 
iron on Hester Prynne’s forehead”—embrace Calvin’s holy screed of their “foul, impure and 
iniquitous” selves—then perhaps Hawthorne’s fear that his novel would make intolerable 
reading, is not unreasonable.  For him, the seventeenth-century world of The Scarlet Letter is 
unhappily devoid of compassion,. and given the transcendentalist writers’ expansive 
“sunshiny” perspective of the human condition, this puts him at odds with the literary 
zeitgist. HIs fear of the novel’s failure and penury for his family sits on his shoulder, but 
                                                
  
 159 For background on Servetus see Gonzalez Echeverria, Francisco Javier. (2011) The Love of Truth: 
The Life and Work of Michael Servetus. http:// www.michaelservetusresearch.com/English/profile/html  
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stubbornly, he stares down the gloom and writes on. Even the wild enthusiasm of his 
publisher, James T. Fields, for the “germ” of the novel confounded him. In Yesterdays with 
Authors, Field reminisces about his delighted reaction to the early draft:  
On my way back to Boston I read the germ of The Scarlet Letter; before I 
slept that night I wrote him a note all aglow with admiration for the 
marvellous story he had put into my hands. . . I went on in such an amazing 
state of excitement, when we met again . . . he seemed to think I was beside 
myself, and laughed sadly at my enthusiam.160  
 
Hawthorne whose anxiety is not assuaged by Field’s reassurance responds that the darkness 
of his book will “ weary” many and “disgust” others:   
I found it impossible to relieve the shadows of the story with so much light as 
I would gladly have thrown in. Keeping so close to its point as the tale does, 
and diversified no otherwise than by turning different sides of the same dark 
idea to the reader’s eye, it will weary very many people and disgust some.161   
 
Nontheless, he is as compelled to explore the puritanical fervor of the seventeenth-century 
congregants, just as his own forefathers’ were compelled to wage war on the omnipresent 
devil and witches.162 The abhorrence of sexual sin drove the seventeenth-century Puritans to 
dispose of adulterers by inflicting the death sentence.163 In Hawthorne’s telling of Hester 
Prynne’s case, since her husband sent her alone to the New World two years before and 
                                                
 160 Fields. (1871) ch. 5. 
 
 161 Ibid. 
 
 162 See n.2 on Judge Hathorne and his son, John 
 
 163 Hawthorne (1850). Austin Warren’s introduction, vii. 1947 edition. NY: Rinehard, 13th edition. 
1947.; Governor Winthrop in a 1644 Journal chronicles the death of Mary Latham, 18, wife of “an ancient man” 
who committed adultery with “divers young men.”  
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nothing has been heard of him since, her punishment is ostracism—banishment from the 
tightly-knit community.  
At her public trial before a rubbernecking crowd, among them people once her friends 
and acquaintances, she suffers pitiless condemnation, public shame and psychological 
torment. She is stripped of every thread of privacy and dignity at the revelation of her moral 
and sexual sin. The brutal institutionalized expulsion from society will deny her access to 
fundamental human needs, the life-giving human connections of identity and belonging, and 
so doubly alienate her—externally and internally—from her sense of self, and this fractured 
self from the arms of the community. No end of Hester Prynne’s torment is in prospect. A 
victim of her youth and her desire, she is condemned as a marker of evil, and is cast out to 
carry the adultress’s sexual stain, the Letter “A” on her breast for the rest of her life. She is to 
be cast out. The physical violence implicit in the term is doubly met in the devastating 
consequences of ostracism—being cut out, like a cancer, from the social body. In Hester’s 
case, she is not like a cancer. Her sexual sin is a moral cancer. She is to be erased so that her 
sin will not be spread. Hers is a sentence of virtual social death. The psychic pain of 
ostracism is tormenting.We now know from scientific research that it is also “excruciating” 
in a physical sense. 164 Recent neurological studies show that social exclusion triggers the 
same neural network activated by physical pain. It also causes changes in the thalamus and 
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, areas in the cortex that are key triggers for serious 
painful neurological and physiological disruptions in the body, even if the period of 
exclusion from society is limited. 165  
                                                
 164 K.D. Williams, S.A. Nida. “Ostracism: Consequences and Coping.” Currrent Directions In 
Psychological Science, 2011; 20 (71) See also Louise C. Hawkley, Kiplinger D.Williams and John T. Cacioppo 
in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, Vol. 6, issue 2, 2011.234-243. 
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Hawthorne imagines Hester Prynne’s innermost thoughts in this bereft state, 
capturing her feeling as if being from another world, unacknowledged, wraith-like, as a shade 
from the underworld, a “repugnant” presence to her former friends and neighbors. 
Every gesture, every word, and even the silence of those with whom she came 
in contact, and often expressed, that she was banished, and as much alone as if 
she inhabited another sphere, or communicated with the common nature by 
other organs and senses than the rest of human kind. She stood apart from 
moral interests, yet close beside them, like a ghost that revisits the family 
fireside, and can no longer make itself seen or felt; no more smile with the 
household joy, nor mourn with the kindred sorrow; or, should it succeed in 
manifesting its forbidden sympathy, awakening only terror and horrible 
repugnace (78-79). 
 
To think of oneself as a ghost, the fearsome specteral presence of death, a bodyless, 
voiceless, social phantom, without physical or sensual substance, standing at the hearth, 
frozen out of society and longing for its recognition, is the explicitly planned torture of 
ostracism. To redouble the horror, her existence is a double-counscious hell: she is seen and 
not seen; she is present and not present; she is alive, and dead; she is of mankind, but from 
another sphere. Her taut body, frozen in shock, stretches out to connect to the comforting 
familiarity of the old belonging, longing for a silent token of a shared humanity, an 
acknowledgment that she still exists, that she shares in her friends’ pleasures and sorrows, 
that someone cares for her. All, in vain. She is an object of disgust and “regugnance.” 
The obliteration of the glorious expression of God’s creation of “beauty” and  
“elegance,” that Hawthorne sees as Hester Prynne walks to the scaffold, to her 
dehumanization as the cipher of adultery, is imagined with uncanny insight into female 
psychology in a state of numbed trauma.  He reveals her anguished mind, bravely disguised 
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from the public by her stoicism.  Haughtily dignified to her hostile accusers, to the narrator 
who inhabits her mind, she is a lost and wounded creature, struggling to hold together her 
fragmented spirit, though she dreads that she might collapse or succomb to madness. 
 The unhappy culprit sustained herself as best as a woman might, under the 
weight of a thousand unrelenting eyes, all fastened upon her, and concentrated 
at her bosom. Of an impulsive and passionate nature, she had fortified herself 
to endure the stings and venomous stabs of public contumel, wreaking itself in 
every variety of insult. . . But under the leaden infliction which was her doom 
to endure, she felt . . .  she must shriek out with the full power of her lungs, 
until she might sink beneath its weight and cast herself from the scaffold 
down upon the ground, or else go mad at once (53-54).  
 
Hawthorne’s descriptive powers are a testament to the depth of his capacity to feel another’s 
pain. We, his readers, reach into our experience, back into memory, to recent history and our 
own painful past, to reimagine this horror of screaming, prostrating ourselves, or going “mad 
at once.” We try to absorb the real possibility of meaning by the brain’s mental imagery of 
our own humiliating event, not comparable to Hester’s but evocative of its pain, until we feel 
our body’s intimate response. When we think about shame, the brain does not respond by 
spelling out the letters s-h-a-m-e; it flashes an image. We think in pictures. What we 
experience afresh in thinking about shame is a less severe version of the physiological 
conditions of a body in psychic trauma, the toxic mix of the affects of insult and repugnance 
in the body. 166 
                                                
 166 For full background on the debate on mental imagery, see Stephen M.Kosslyn et al (2006)  While 
outlining the neuroscientific data that confirms that depictive representations are used in imagery, Kosslyn 
writes:Visual processing can be divided into two general types, “sensory” and “perceptual.”Sensory visual 
processing is driven by primarily (if not purely) by sensory input, whereas perceptual processing makes use of 
stored information. . . . visual imagery evokes many of the same mechanisms used in visual perceptions.  
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 While reading, the brain’s neural networks seek out from various parts of the cortex 
objects, colors, shapes, sounds and emotions and assembles them like jigsaw puzzle pieces 
into a images we interpret as “seeing.”  More accurately, it is a sensual experience, a fuzzy 
film assembled from elements drawn from memory storage, not a replay of the an actual 
event, but an edited version of our visual and feeling perceptions of that event. For instance, 
in an attempt to imagine what Hester is going through, one might call up film images of Irish 
women seen during the “Troubles” their terrified eyes blinded by the stifling black tar 
covering their bodies, hair lying in severed chunks on the street, the crowds screaming 
“whore,” “whore.” The duration of the image is a blip, before it slips into an image seen 
years later in an exhibition in a Dublin museum of an adultress’s mummified body, like one 
described in Seamus Heaney’s Bog Poems— a girl pulled from an Irish bog where she’d 
been thrown in the long past. And those lines are heard, the images appear, and the body 
acknowledges the shock with tears:   
Her shaved head/like a stubble of black corn. . .  
Her noose a ring/to store/ the memories of love/ 
Little adulteress/before they punished you/ 
you were flaxen-haired/undernourished, 
and your tar-black face was beautiful.167  
 
This is the everyday contribution of the mind’s magic lantern we take with us to “see” 
literature and feel the life of a novel’s character who has donned the flesh, bones, and mind 
of an artist’s imagination. 
                                                
 167 Seamus Heaney. Bog Poems, Punishment (1975) Notes in the volume explain that “the naked, 
shaved and blindfolded girl is the so-called Windeby girl, who was found in 1952 in northern Germany – so-
called, because subsequent DNA analysis has confirmed that she was in fact a young man; But whatever its true 
identity, Heaney saw in this body an image of the Catholic girls who were shaved tarred and feathered by Irish 
women as punishment for consorting with British soldiers, accounts of which were published by the Irish press 
in 1971. Most likely drowned, this body too was held down with birch branches and a large stone.” 
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 Out of this empathy, this shared knowledge of another’s interior experience, the 
mirror neurons168 built into the human organism’s survival kit by evolution’s wily unfolding, 
comes this question: Is there anywhere a shred of compassion for Hester Prynne plight? 
George Bailey Loring who in 1850 reviewed The Scarlet Letter in the Massachusetts 
Quarterly Review, answers that question. “It would be hard to conceive of a greater outrage 
upon the freezing and self-denying doctrines of that day, than the sin for which Hester 
Prynne was damned by society, and for which Arthur Dimmesdale condemned himself.” 
Loring, a young surgeon, continues: 
There was no recognition of the intention or of the meaning of the sensuous 
element of human nature which, gilding life like a burnishing sunset, lays the 
foundation of all that beauty which seeks its expression in poetry and music 
and art . . . .He scorned his own flesh and blood.. . he had no sympathy, no 
tenderness, for any sinner, more especially for that hardened sinner who had 
failed to trample all his senses beneath his feet.169 
 
Elsewhere Hawthorne has described the absence of compassion and empathy for others as a 
sign of malevolence. He says:  “There are few uglier traits in human nature—which I now 
witness in men no worse than their selves.” Of Hester Prynne’s accusers, he adjudicates:  
“[O]ut of the whole human family, it would not have been easy to select the same number of 
wise and virtuous persons, who should be less capable of sitting in judgment on an erring 
woman’s heart, and disentangling its mesh of good and evil, than the sages of rigid aspect 
towards Hester Prynne now turned her face” (60). 
                                                
 
 169 George Bailey Loring. The Massachusetts Quarterly Review, 1850. 
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 Hawthorne’s nuanced view of human nature as a mesh of good and evil, is all but lost 
in a theology of unquestionable depravity. For sin, in the all-encompassing meaning of the 
category in the Puritan world, is a rejection of God.170  Given that it is impossible to be alive, 
to think one’s thoughts, to be in the world, in fact, as Calvin says, even to breathe the air 
without falling into sinfulness, sin and its consequences are inescapable. Nonetheless, this is 
the tale that this writer “must” tell, and he will not tell it by digging vicariously into the 
voluptuous passions of Hester Prynne and Arthur Dimmesdale.  For him, these details are not 
the crux of this novel, neither are they necessary to illuminate his ends. They are a vulgar 
distraction.171  The seeds of imagination are well-enough nurtured by the letter “A” 
embroidered on the breast of the sinner’s gown—a lifetime symbol of a private act of 
fobidden desire that has been made public, or as Hawthorne says, “a secret thing in 
public.”172 In an unintended perversion of the attempt to stamp out societal-threatening 
adultery, the advertising of the sin on Hester’s breast makes not just adultery, but the sexual 
act itself, an insistently provocative focus of attention and lurid imagination.  Its symbol, the 
otherwise inoffensive “A,” the first letter of the child’s alphabet, now transfuses the 
community as a symbol of erotica. One letter, the first seen and heard in many hundreds of 
words, now communicates the beginning of a purient narrative in a sin-flashing shorthand. 
When the adultress’s breast is branded, she becomes the brand; her brand is adultery. She 
becomes the walking, tantalizing embodiment of the act. It is neither Hawthorne’s desire nor 
intent to take his reader on the titallating arc of the act of this forbidden love story; nor is it to 
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 172 Dan McCall writes that  “The Puritan community has designed the letter to erase the sinner, to 
obliterate her individuality.” Hester stands as an emblem of sin. “In his notebook Hawthorne had written in 
capital letters: ‘A Secret Thing in Public.’ It is a perfect description of The Scarlet Letter.” 49. 
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explicitly condemn the lovers or to expose the Puritan past to his modern judgement. It is to 
expose the soul-corrosive humilation, the loss of human dignity and the accumulating toll of 
the wanton destruction of the sinner’s ethical connection to the life of the community.   
This final scene of three-grueling hours at the scaffold is emotionally brutal. What 
depths of religious self-righteousness, of disgust, of the fear of uncontrolled sexual desire on 
the close-knit community, is fueling the onslaught? Where is the pity for her pain, the 
forgiveness that Christ preached in the parable of the woman taken in adultery, that 
Hawthorne alludes to.?173  It is a condition of humanity writes Adam Smith in 1759 in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments that we feel pity or compassion for the misery of others. Smith 
explains the human doctrine of sympathy, the impulses that move a just and ethically correct 
society: When we see a fellow man suffering, he explains: 
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves 
enduring the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in 
some measure the same person as him, and hence form some idea of his 
sensations, and even feel something, which though weaker in degree, is not 
altogether unlike them. (4) 
 
Smith is describing two recently discovered brain functions what we know now as theory of 
mind— the mind’s ability to imagine the content of another’s mind; and mirror neurons— a 
evoluntionary brain development in which our body mimics the emotions we see, imagine, or 
sense in others so that we share their experience and emphathize with them. This increases 
our ability to bond with others and create supportive societies.  
                                                
 173 King James Bible. John 8:6 “Let he who is without sin cast the first stone,” Jesus said to the mob 
ready to stone the woman taken in adultery. And seeing no one come forward. Jesus, forgave he saying: “Go, 
and sin no more.” 
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 Under the onslaught of shaming at the scaffold,  exhausted after hours of standing 
holding her distressed child in her aching arms, Hester’s consciousness is fragmented, but 
she refuses to offer up her shredded being to their condemning eyes. There is no suggestion 
of public redemption, except in demands to know the name of the father, which Hester 
Prynne refuses to reveal; no defence to be heard, no compassion proferred, no opportunity for 
forgiveness offered except as a final bribe, but only a conditional one, if she were to expose 
her lover. Absent from this world is the ideal of “virtue and happiness” that were the hopes 
and dreams of the religious liberation that drove the Puritans from England’s tyranny. The 
tyranny of the powerful over the weak is now being played out in the Boston marketplace 
under the scaffold where Hester Prynne 
had borne that morning all that nature could endure; and as her temperament 
was not of the order that escapes from too intense suffering with a swoon, her 
spirit could only shelter itself beneath a stony crust of insensibility, while the 
animal faculties of animal life remained entire (65).  
 
Hawthorne’s says that Hester had been subjected to “all that nature could endure;” he did not 
say what “her nature could endure.”  He means that against all possible values, this is 
intolerable, to the extent that she is now “insensible” that she has been reduced to the 
condition of “animal,” a primitive organism without mind or sensibility. Eric Kandel calls 
this imaginative act “entering the private theater of another’s mind.”174 Hawthorne is trying 
to enter her “stony crust of insensibility,” (65) the massive wall she has built between the 
market-place and her mind and senses, to protect the primitive operations that sustain life. He 
looks at her as she stands on the scaffold the platform of the pillory, alone, an object of 
derision for a self-righteous crowd, abandonned by her guilt-wracked, faint-hearted lover, 
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Reverend Dimmesdale, and her squalling baby, Pearl, hugged tightly to her bosom, enduring 
hours of listening to the fervid recitals “touching the vileness and blackness of [her] sin(61).” 
Close to insensibility, she refuses, as her secret lover tells the crowd, to “lay open her heart’s 
secrets in such broad daylight and in the presence of so great a multitude” (61). The crowd 
now includes in its outskirts a stranger in the care of an Indian, a man who calls himself 
Roger Chillingworth and is known only to Hester Prynne as her husband.  Pushing back 
against pressure, she has refused to  divulge the name of the father of her child, who stands 
with other clergy on a balcony overlooking her.   
 Hawthorne captures the embodied nature of the pulsing cycle of emotions as a 
dynamic flood of affect. He feels it pouring out through the crowd, through the bodies of the 
stern-faced Bostonians. The hostile assault invades Hester Prynne’s wounded being, and 
since the body of a mother and her nursing child are as one, its vehemence pulsing through 
the mother’s body into the child swamping the tiny child’s fragile organs.  Hawthorne writes 
that the infant 
drawing its sustenance from the maternal bosom, seemed to have drank in 
with it all the turmoil, the anguish and despair, which pervaded the mother’s 
system. It now writhed in convulsions of pain, and was a forcible type in its 
little frame, of the moral agony which Hester Prynne had borne throughout the 
day (66). 
 
What Hawthorne describes is a well-known ninetenth-century psycho-physiological 
phenomenon resurrected a decade ago by the late Teresa Brennan in her study, The 
Tranmission of Affect. Brennan describes this as “a process wher. What Hawthorne imagines 
is Hester’s psychic pain penetrating the body of her child. Hester’s “moral agony” as a 
physical trauma violently reverberating in her child’s “pain[ful] convulsions”(60). Already 
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the child’s body is wrapped in The Scarlet Letter’s mantle of sin. Its trauma has entered her 
life. This is only the beginning of the the relentless sorrow passed from one generation to the 
innocent offspring that Nathaniel Hawthorne fears he can not overcome. 
It is odd that my own individual taste is for quite another class of novels than 
those I myself am able to write. If I were to meet such books as mine by 
another writer, I don’t believe I should be able to get through them.                
 
                                                                                      Nathaniel Hawthorne 175 
 
Emotionally swamped by hopelessness about the readability of The Scarlet Letter and 
with his typically hyper-critical assessments of his own work, Nathaniel Hawthorne fed his 
critics—and admirers— the dark and somber ephithets that characterized his work during his 
lifetime and still to this day. “It is odd,” he admits, that he is only able to write books he 
probably wouldn’t want to read. Henry Wardsworth Longfellow confessed that his friend’s 
books were not wholly congenial to him “because of the old dull pain that runs through them 
all.” Hawthorne’s diffidence about his work— despite his admired qualities as a writer, 
notably his psychological insights into the complicated humanity of his characters—might 
explain why he disparages his own work in the same sentence as he expresses in brilliantly 
powerful tropes his enthusiasm for Anthony Trollope’s work. Trollope’s books, he remarks, 
are “written on the strength of beef and through the inspiration of ale, just as real as if some 
giant had hewn a great lump out of the earth.” In a painful self-wounding admission, he says.  
“If I were to meet such books as mine by another writer, I don’t believe I should be able to 
get through them.”176 Trollope was frequently depressed beyond measure by Hawthorne’s 
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“weird” tales, and yet, in the act of reading them, he had become  “conscious of a certain 
grandeur of nature in being susceptible of such suffering.”  Almost three decades later in 
1879, by which time The Scarlet Letter was widely considered an artistic triumph —the first 
publishing run of ten thousand copies sold out immediately—the young ex-patriot Henry 
James, wrote: “[The Scarlet Letter] is densely dark, with a single spot of vivid color in it ; 
and it will probably long remain the most consistently gloomy of English novels of the first 
order.”177 The novel’s single spot of vivid color, we must assume, is James’s ironic reference 
to the novel’s symbol of adultery —Hester Prynne’s defiantly and gloriously embroidered 
scarlet and gold letter “A.”  
The critic F.O. Matthiessen also believed that Hawthorne was haunted by a dark 
sensibility. “The traits that dominate all [Hawthorne’s] work,” he writes in American 
Renaissance (1941) “are Sorrow, Hope, Disappointment, iron Fatality and Shame.” Those 
bleak mental states, according to Matthiessen, were the self-same images that floated through 
the imaginative semi-conscious dream-life that Hawthorne described in his six-page sketch, 
“The Haunted Mind.” However, rather than dismissing this as a fatal flaw, Matthiessen sees 
past the darkness in Hawthorne’s work to its creative source—an artistic drive that reached 
towards the emotional depth of the human condition. This pyschological curiosity, after all, 
made possible the rendering of three of literature’s most memorable characters—Hester 
Prynne, Arthur Dimmesdale and Roger Chillingworth—not to overlook the fourth character, 
the jewel-child of adultery, Pearl— even if we agree with James that their characters were 
not fully developed. 178  “[T]here was a desire [in Hawthorne],” Matthiessen explains, “to 
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record whatever he knew of human nature . . .  and not to allow himself to be distracted by 
the transcendentalists’ frequent confusions between what life was and what they hoped it to 
be.”179 It was the breadth of this awareness, after all, that drove Hawthorne to explore the 
effects of the toll of guilt and shame not only on the lovers, but also the attendant effects of 
the hypocrisy on those who felt compelled to condemn the sinner in stocks, even those whose 
own weaknesses breached the prohibitions of their faith in thought and deed, and who in their 
guilt turned icy and cruel, just as Hawthorne characterized those who condemned Hester 
Prynne. 
It is hardly surprising that in Main Currents of American Thought180 Vernon Louis 
Parrington wrote that Hawthorne was out of intellectual step with the Romantic and 
Transcendentalist tendencies of his times. He was—and openly so, as Matthiessen noted. 
Contrasted with the expansive, optimistic minds of fellow artists Emerson, Thoreau and 
Fuller, Parrington found Hawthorne’s work dark and brooding.  His enthusiasm The Hester’s 
psychic pain has penetrated the body of her child. for the transcendentalists’ new-found 
optimism, poured out in a paroxism of displeasure with Hawthorne’s gloomier alternative 
reality in The Scarlet Letter calling it “intellectually [impoverished].” Parrington thinks 
Hawthorne’s fixation with the Puritan world-view of his ancestors explains his obsession 
with the darkness of the human soul. However, as a renowned literary historian in the early 
1900s Parrington’s disparagement of Hawthorne’s artistic contributions, particularly his 
expertise in exploring the “furtive” recesses of the human mind, as he characterized it, is 
puzzling. Especially so, since the publication of The Scarlet Letter coincided with a period of 
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rapid scientific growth in studies of the mind.  With benefit of hindsight, accusing Hawthorne 
of obsessing on the mysterious unknown mind of man, particularly “the secret impulses of 
the soul . . . [to lay] bare its dark workings . . . the long introspective brooding over human 
motives,” 181 seems more like a tribute to the intellectual, scientific, artistic and cultural 
fellowship of minds for which the 19th-century was notable.  Of course, Hawthorne’s 
curiosity about “human motives,” and his ability to explicate his characters internally-lived 
lives anticipated the novelistic move by the authors who followed in his footsteps—Henry 
James, one prominent example-—to move inside the minds of their characters. That 
Hawthorne does lay bare the “mind’s dark workings,” making the private public in literature, 
thus revealing the clues to the processes that precipitated his characters’ behaviors, whether 
progressive or conservative, for evil ends or good, influenced western literary culture, a 
particular focus of Parrington’s research.  
It is certainly true that in The Scarlet Letter Hawthorne imagined a painfully dark 
tale, and with a few notable exceptions, it is also true most critics agreed with the meme of 
unrelenting Hawthornian darkness and gloom. It is true that The Scarlet Letter was, and still 
is, exceedlingly difficult to read because of the imagery and feelings of sorrow that fill the 
reader’s mind and body.  But, more importantly, it is also true that for this reader it is even 
more difficult to stop reading because of the “exquisite” quality of the writing that deepens 
the imagination and releases images we want to describe as beautifully-painful.  This 
paradox, the emotionally rich discordant unity that comes from a writer who offers us 
authentic experiencies of searing darkness and genuine beauty that hybridizes pain and 
pleasure ennobling both, is Hawthorne’s great gift. 
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 In Hawthorne, written almost thirty years after the publication of Hawthorne’s 
masterpiece, despite his lengthy criticism of the flaws to which he devoted more space than 
for praise, James used these words—“exquisite” and “beautiful”— as his characterization of 
Hawthorne’s work. “Exquisite,” is a word that mines the imagination for synonyms of beauty 
and perfection. He writes: 
It is beautiful, admirable, extraordinary; it has in the highest degree that merit 
which I have spoken of as the mark of Hawthorne’s best things—an 
indefinable purity and lightness of conception, a quality which in a work of art 
affects one in the same way as the absence of grossness does in a human 
being.. . . The book was the finest piece of imaginative writing yet put forth in 
the country. . . . Something might at last be sent to Europe as exquisite in a 
quality as anything that has been received, and the best of it was that the thing 
was absolutely American; it belonged to the soil, to the air; it came out of the 
very heart of New England.182 
 
Thus, according to Henry James, Hawthorne’s book is an “extraordinary” thing defined by its 
beautiful execution, excelling in artistic perfection of such beauty as to arouse the reader’s 
senses to feelings of pleasure.  This James first associates with the elements of earth, 
American earth, the heavy fundament of “the soil,” and the transcendent lightness  of New 
England’s “air.” He then places the sensation’s source at the metaphorical “heart” of New 
England thus connecting the book’s mind-originating beauty to the delicately misplaced 
organ of the human seat of passion — the heart—while glossing over the mind-generated 
location of the sexual desire and the beauty at the heart of the Hawthorne’s success.  
Who, in 1850, noticed the exquisite beauty in Hawthorne’s book-length rendering of 
pain? Who perceived that pain and beauty are not literary terms but descriptions of emotions 
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and subjective responses, the qualities of a reader’s intense neuronally-tiggered and 
physiologically-experienced reactions to the evocative nature of a text that meets the 
essential purpose of literature—to demonstrate with the fragility of powerful words what it 
means to be human? Few critiques have remarked on Hawthorne’s concern with beauty 
despite his exclusive focus on the obsession with beauty in two of his shorter works, “The 
Birthmark,” and “The Artist of the Beautiful. And, if the author himself in his over-attention 
to the painful did not feel the written beauty that softened and so often ameliorated the pain, 
the beauty that he wrote to satisfy his longing for tenderness in his art, who did notice that 
there was more, much more, than darknesses in Hawthorne’s writing  Not many. But those 
who did were prescient in their appreciation of what Hawthorne’s breakthrough work into the 
mind had accomplished. His wife, Sophia did, but only after much worrying about the sorrow 
which made her weep. His publisher James Fields did.  As we know, he  was “aglow with 
admiration” and “in an amazing state of excitement” about the “marvellous story.”183 Emily 
Dickinson did. In her coruscating, knife-sharp way, the poet summed up the narrative style of 
her fellow writer this way: “ Hawthorne appals, entices.”184  The sly comma— instead of 
“and”—that she uses as syntactical glue between” appals” and “entices” complicates 
meaning and introduces a poetic combination of opposing feelings bonded as unlikely 
components in a unified emotional response to Hawthorne’s writing.  There’s not much 
descriptive air between the poet’s “appals and entices,” and, after all, entice is a seductive 
word, a tempting, beguiling, invitation that something desirable, something that speaks to the 
chemical pleasure network, is close at hand.  Dickinson thought so. 
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Herman Melville did. Matthiessen tells us that as Melville—he was writing Moby 
Dick, at the time— became “fixed and fascinated by the haunting blackness in those tales. . . 
he became fully aware that there can be no authentic style unless it has been created by a 
meaning, by a close complexity of existence.” Melville is talking about the complications of 
experience, the openness, “the big-hearted” wide-reaching perceptiveness of Hawthorne’s 
connection to a perplexing world. Meaning, the negation of nothingness, comes from 
essential knowing, that which John Ruskin promised was the gift of true perception. 
Matthiessen writes that Melville understood that Hawthorne’s sketches “with their delicate 
revelations of human nature could not have been produced by pure technical skill” alone. 
And as Melville conceived it, ‘this power to sympathize with humanity could not exist 
[without] . . . a great, deep intellect which drops down into the universe like a plummet.’ 
What Melville was feeling his way towards here was to remain his touchstone for major 
literature. “Both for its creation and its appreciation there must be such a union of thought 
and emotion as in Hawthorne . . . which sends few thoughts into circulation, except they be 
arterialized at his large warm lungs and expanded in his honest heart.185  
Melville also understood the “great power of blackness” in Hawthorne’s work and he 
had no delusions about the human capacity for evil. “In some shape or other,” he said, no 
man “is always and wholly free from the darker “visitations “ of that “Calvinistic sense of 
Innate Depravity and Original Sin.”  The juxtaposition of the symbols of Darkness (evil) and 
Light (goodness and beauty) illustrates critic Oscar Firkin’s idea that in art and life “[m]uch 
that is repulsive when alone becomes beautiful in its relation.” 186  In its relationship with . . .  
what? That unfinished sentence, floating out there in search of a transformational relationship 
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that will “enoble” the repulsive making it beautiful, says Firkins, is the product of the 
writer’s heart and mind— “the range of beauty and art widens as the art grows in heart and 
mind.” 187  The antithetical proposition that something that is in and of itself repulsive to a 
reader can be transformed in its loathsomeness by being considered in relation to, rather than 
in contrast with something admirable, is a difficult ethical and aesthetic position to grasp; it 
offers the mystery of the deep truth in a paradoxical statement. That was beyond the 
puritanical mindset of The Scarlet Letter’s sin-obsessed community when they obliterated 
Hester Prynne’s multifold humanity, the co-existence of virtue and stain, and the reduction of 
her body to the definitive cipher of sexual degradation.  
The achievement of the enobling relationship between the repulsive and its anodyne 
that Firkins188 cites as “the task of life and art,” is there, everywhere, to be found in the 
spaces of the The Scarlet Letter’s sorrow and pain. Hawthorne, if we are to accept his 
protestations, is too close to the book’s darkness, too locked into his role of writer to be free 
to release his readerly-mind to find signs of his unconscious drive to make us feel beauty.  
The reader must do it for him. Literature’s power, the experience of the sensuous impact of 
words, John Ruskin says, does not exist without the reader. Thus begins the alliance: a 
consecutive imaginative interaction between the writer, the text, and the reader that John 
Ruskin theorized in 1843 is literature’s creative partnership, and the reader’s virtuous labor. 
(quote) It begins, with the artist’s deeply appreciative connection to man and nature, and a 
highly–tuned sense of the intricate unfolding of revelation in the practice of visual 
intelligence. From these sources, the writer’s imaginative powers call into existence word 
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images that spark a neural visual network response in the reader’s visual cortex, for each 
reader, a different fleeting image sensation from their visual memory bank.  
 Back in the sorrowful world of The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne is so compelled to 
produce compassion in his reader that he does an extraordinary thing: he steps outside his 
narration to connect ex-cathedra with his audience. Plaintively, he offers a gift of beauty, a 
rose from an ancient wild bush to ward off the reader’s ensuing sorrow. How, one wonders, 
could someone so sensitive to tender-heartedness somehow so attuned to the wonders of the 
mind, discount his own writing style and creative techniques as a communication system that 
delivers the body’s drive, and the human need, to give and receive compassion? 
 
Hawthorne’s sketches, with their delicate revelations of human nature . . .  
argue such a depth of tenderness, such boundless sympathy with all forms of 
beings, such an omnipresent love, that we needs say that this Hawthorne is 
here alone in his generation—at least, in the artistic manifestation of these 
things. 189 
        Herman Melville  
  
When Melville says that Hawthorne’s writing  “argue[s] such a depth of tenderness, 
such boundless sympathy with all forms of beings, such an omnipresent love . . .” we hear 
echoes of John Ruskin’s voice in Modern Painters.  Analyzing the qualities of the human 
spirit that nourish perception, the recognition of beauty, and the sensual joy that accompanies 
it, Ruskin writes:  
[I]t is necessary to the existence of an idea of beauty, that the sensual pleasure 
which may be its basis should be accompanied first with joy, then with love of 
the object, then with the perception of kindness in a superior Intelligence, 
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finally with thankfulness and veneration towards the Intelligence itself, and as 
no idea can be considered as in any way an idea of beauty until it be made up 
of these emotions.190        John Ruskin 
 
Melville is describing a man and his work. Ruskin is describing his theory of beauty and how 
it is manifested in the heart, senses, mind and soul. At the core of each is an emphasis on the 
idea of love and its emotional generations: omnipresent love, tenderness, compassion, 
boundless sympathy for all forms of beings, love of the object and gratitude. Both Ruskin 
and Hawthorne had moved past the classic philosophies of beauty and its religious origins as 
a God-given gift. They experience the transcendent feeling in the originating source of the 
body, in its flesh and blood organs and its networking arteries. Beauty’s prime sensually felt-
experience of beauty, Ruskin said, was not the result of “the sensual on one hand, nor is it 
intellectual on the other, but is dependent on a pure, right and open state of the heart. “191  
Melville, on the other hand, in is his viscerally vivid way decided that Hawthorne’s “large 
lungs” were beauty’s organ of generation. 
 [T] here must be such a union of thought and emotion as in Hawthorne . . . 
which sends few thoughts into circulation, except they be arterialized at his 
large warm lungs and expanded in his honest heart. 192 
 
Melville felt the beauty on Hawthorne’s pages, and believed that the written beauty 
reflected the qualities of the author’s mind breathed out through his body on to the page.  The 
idea of the mind’s beauty and the tender emotions it produces, pulsing, as Melville says, 
                                                
 190 Ruskin CW, vol. 111, 237 
 
 191 Ibid. 
 
 192 Qtd in Matthiessen, 190. 
  106 
through arteries into ‘warm lungs’ and ‘expanding in his honest heart’ is his informed 
understanding of art as the associated cadence of the brain, mind, and thought as a unified 
function embodied in the human. 193  “The great beauty in such a mind, “ writes Melville, “is 
but the product of its strength.” 194 It is this embrace of the idea of beauty as an emanation of 
a  contagious love for man and nature theorized by Ruskin and attested to by Melville, that 
gives the potency to the reader’s raw emotional responses to Hawthorne’s art.  
Obviously, the experience of beauty in Hawthorne’s work, can hardly be credited 
solely to the quality of Hawthorne’s compassion for his fellow man. When Ruskin said that 
the idea of beauty was dependent on “a pure, right and open state of the heart,” he was 
theorizing specifically on the unfettered cognitive, physiological and emotional processes 
involved in a biological experience of pleasure in the presence of beauty. However, when 
discussing the techniques of writing, Ruskin is clear that while an open state of the heart is 
necessary, it is not sufficient. Melville’s makes this point, too, in his comments on the artistic 
techniques that animated Hawthorne’s “delicate revelations of human nature.” There is 
another important feature—the writer’s language. Writing alive with imagination that 
conveys images to the reader is the other necessity that makes the artistic partnership 
sufficient. Language, the living expression of a culture, creates and carries the culture’s 
intellectual and emotional freight on the tracks of a writers imagination, ideas, vocabulary 
and syntax. Perception—deeply focussed visual attention— is the sine qua non of the vivid 
communication of ideas. The English language, as Ruskin claimed, was moribund—not 
expressively alive, not a living product of a dynamic culture. It was no longer capable of 
mirroring the culture’s lived experience.  
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It was in his struggle as a college student to define the elements of a language fit to 
convey contemporary 19th-century realities that Ruskin theorized a way of writing that made 
people see.195  What he urges writers towards is his new conception of sensually expressive 
composition that uses visual language— writing closely responsive to the brain’s neural 
functioning, its image-based thought processes and the seeing-feeling responses of the 
reader. Perception, he writes, is the artist’s greatest learned skill  Why? Because the sense of 
sight is by far the greatest source of knowledge—70 percent of the neuronal connections in 
the brain originate in the visual cortex. Ruskin’s campaign “to make people see,”was driven 
by his empirically-based conviction that we think in images. He was not wrong: modern 
neuroscience has confirmed it. The brain’s cognitive operations, especially memory on which 
our sense of identity rests, are dependent on the brain’s neural images. The writer’s acute 
perception —of an object, a scene, a person, is key to its evocative detail.  Attention paid to 
the relevance of choices, the consciousness of mood, the contrasts in weather and the skies, 
the shapes in flowers and foliage, the shades and variances of luminosity in colors and 
clouds, reveals an individual’s imaginative consciousness and its creative impact on the 
reading experience for the reader.   
 To consider Hawthorne’s art in this way— as a writer whose creative attention to the 
interior reality of the human mind, its emotionally dark experiences as well as its joyous and 
exhilarating moments—is to tap into the exposition of these extremities in The Scarlet Letter.  
(Quote) He creates in his writing, and facilitates in our reading, a profound experience of 
sorrow in its almost unbearable sensations, and of beauty in its transcendent qualities, the 
pain and joy, feeling as if our own, because it is, since we introduce our personal mental 
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associations onto the meaning of the text. Hawthorne’s imaginitive ability to dig into the 
labrynthian pathways of the mind in the complicated case of Hester Prynne— a woman, 
barely adult in a loveless marriage with an older man, an émigré-wife, mother, adultress, 
abandoned-lover and criminal— makes it possible to turn fiction and abstraction into a 
compelling reality that a reader associates with the human condition. The close engagement 
with a character’s circumstances (quote), our imaginative experience living through her 
woes, naturally triggers our associations, vague or vivid, in the past or presently occuring. 
This makes our experience of reading highly subjective— in fact unique. As Daniel Schacter 
reminds us, “our memories belong to us. They are uniquely ours . . . rooted in the ongoing 
series of episodes and incidents that uniquely constitute our everyday lives.” 196  He explains: 
What has happened to us in the past determines what we take out of our daily 
encounters in life; memories are records of how we have experienced events, 
not replicas of the events themselves. Experiences are coded by brain 
networks whose connections have already been shaped by previous 
encounters in the world. The preexisting knowledge powerfully influences 
how we encode and store new memories. Thus contributing to the nature, 
texture and quality of what we recall.197   
 
Although in the reader’s case the intense, memory-activated emotions come easily, the 
writer’s ability to create word pictures of of sorrow and a sense of beauty that incites an 
“ennobling” emotional metamorphosis does not come so easily; its sorcery is conjured up 
only in “the greatest art.” 198 It is important, then, to acknowledge the techniques that make 
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possible this cognitive complexity, especially considering the darkness that confounded 
Hawthorne’s desire for a “sunshiny” book  
Hawthorne employs two literary devices: one, is a narrator who is pushed into the 
role of a veritable deus ex machina in the narrative format;  the other, is the creation of a 
remarkable, type-defying character, a victim-heroine adulteress, whose physicality, gently-
fierce courage, and uncowed-aquiescence stuns, shocks, dazzles, dumbfounds, disorients, 
jolts, confounds, and delights in all the enticing complexity of her nature.  Out of these two 
strategic moves is built a relationship with the reader which suggests—and sustains—a 
counter narrative: one the degraded figure of sexual iniquity; the other a flawed young 
woman of classically-inspired beauty and essential goodness enveloped in a battle for 
personal redemption in the face of relentlessly punishing sorrows.  
Think of the scene in which the narrator steps in to appeal for compassion for Hester 
Prynne’s fate. Imagine her as a young and exotic, biblical female David with a few stones 
and a sling-shot facing down a gigantic mythology of human evil. Hawthorne’s descriptions 
of the grim faces, the dun and grey mudiness of the cloth-encased bodies, the steepled hats, 
the leering carnivality of uncouth-mouthed females agitating for violence against one of their 
own women-folk, feels panoramic, like being behind the eye of a movie camera on a track. 
The sober visuality of the colors in the thrumming crowd in uniforms of like-mindedness, 
instead of suggesting a people of quiescent spirit, stirs up a feeling if not exactly of menace, 
then of threat. Hawthorne’s perspective conveys the denial of beauty, the lack of nature’s 
aesthetic across the mess of weeds in the marketplace. As the depressing scene moves across 
the reader’s eye, its narrator moves forward, with hands outstretched in supplication, halting 
the flow of the narrative and, like a philosophizing member of a Greek chorus, he warns 
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readers of the painful darkness ahead—a mood he is privately certain will overwhelm their 
senses should they keep reading and is hoping to forestall.199  
The narrator becomes a character in the drama offering commentary on the morality 
of compassion, one of the drama’s burning issues.  He plucks a blossom from a wild rose 
bush. The rose is a gift of fragility and delicacy because of its beauty; it is a legacy of 
tenacity because of its survival against the run of brutal years; it is both vulnerable and 
resilient, an affecting quality we are yet to discover in the victim-heroine. Its full meaning—
in its Hawthornian symbolism—will become clear as we deep-breathe our way with Hester 
Prynne, as yet unknown to us, through a sorrow that is to become ours to share. But, 
strangely, for now, we are at this moment out of the novel, in a theatrical encounter with 
Hawthorne’s narrator, who says:  “Finding [the rose bush] so directly on the threshold of our 
narrative . . . we could hardly do otherwise than pluck one of its flowers, and present it to the 
reader.” Note the plural “we —[ author and narrator?]—could hardly do otherwise.” Before 
the next sentence is fully delivered, we (the readers) realize that we have been ensorcelled 
into participation as reader-players in an ordeal, not ours, affecting someone we know not, 
but one that we can’t simply abandon—because— as the the narrator continues:  “It may 
serve . . . to symbolize some sweet moral blossom that may be found along the track, or 
relieve the darkening close of a tale of human frailty and sorrow” (44-45). And, because we 
recognise our own frailties, he is no longer speaking to us, but for us, and about us. He makes 
the words, “Let us hope,” symbols of mutal aspirations—his and ours. He is enlisting us in an 
action which includes two morally irresistible possibilities— a “sweet moral blossom” or 
something to soothe the harrowing imaginings of  the “darkening close of a tale of human 
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frailty and sorrow.” 200  The tender inclinations of these ideas are antithetical to the threats of 
iron-spiked prison doors, allusions of doom and the ghost of Anne Hutchison, the most 
famous woman in colonial history, mother of fifteen, and a popular preacher, who was 
imprisoned and excommunicated  from the Massachussetts Bay Colony because she fought 
for more religious freedom.  
What Hawthorne is creating at this early stage of the work is a sympathetic 
partnership with his readers to help us envision alternative responses to the unfolding story. 
Envisioning the inner vision operation of the visual cortex-—is the operating intelligence he 
taps into—an act of contemplation, imagination, visualization, an engagement with our visual 
powers through the inward eye. This we imagine as the Puritan throng awaits Hester Prynne 
and her jailer’s emergence from between the rusty doors of the prison. We are standing on a 
plot of land that in the first idealistic flush of religious freedom Puritan immigrants had 
dedicated to the future as a “Utopia of human virtue and happiness” Between the “building 
and the wheel-track of the street, was a grass plot, much overgrown with burdock, pigweed, 
apple peru, and such unsightly vegetation” that “had found something congenial in the soil 
that had so early borne the black flower of civilized society, a prison.” It is a wild rose bush, 
a lone witness to the power of survival in unnourished soil. Hawthorne asks us to imagine the 
delicate blooms, their perfume, their fragility.  He goes no further to describe the wild rose. Is 
it white? Pink?  D.H. Lawrence wonderfully imagines his purple anemones for us: “purple 
anemones/Caverns/Little hells of color/caves of darkness” and Walt Whitman his lilacs, 
“delicate-color’d blossoms and heart-shaped leaves of rich green.” But as Elaine Scarry tells 
us in Dreaming by the Book when a poet mentions a flower without fulsomely describing it, 
“it is offered as something which, after a brief stop in front of the face, can immediately pass 
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through the resisting bone and lodge itself and light up the inside of the brain.”201  What 
Scarry is pointing to here is that our rapt observation of flowers, most particularly the rose, 
initiates us, as von Balthasar says, into the “mysteries” of nature because we are part of 
nature and “all the expressive laws of the macrocosm are at work in ourselves.” 202  
How more likely that the brain will light up at the suggestion of a rose with no 
resistance from the mind than after the depressing images of the Puritan scene-setting. 
Instead of filling out the image of color and shape, Hawthorne leaves those details to our 
imagination. Our imagination comes alive in the mind’s eye, the neural image bank that feeds 
our mind. First we see the rose’s fragility, then we smell a waft of fragrance from the pale-
pink heart, lying open-faced, like a tiny saucer composed of five petals, their saw-toothed 
edges barely attached to each other almost ready to fall to the earth. When we anticipate 
holding the bloom, touching its pink loveliness and its fuzzy underside which conceals the 
sharp thorny stalk, it is a warning that in the unity of nature where there is beauty, there can 
also be pain. So invited to pause, we are there, seeing the scene, feeling the scene, what he 
has written and has not written, and it unlocks in us questions of imaginative possibilities that 
we own in the process of inhabiting the experience of reading.  
Since Hawthorne equates beauty with humanity and tenderness, delivering his 
narrator to pluck the only evidence of loveliness in sight, the ancient surviving rose-bloom 
from another century is his marker of the essential beauty of nature, of human nature.  Now 
the reader’s sensibilities are being guided from the bloom’s fragile manifestation to 
consideration of the concepts of pity, kindness and beauty—human qualities missing from 
the “grim rigidity” of the crowd waiting on the same barren soil where the feet of the 
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beautiful-souled Anne Hutchinson had earlier stood at the threshold of  ”the black flower of 
civilized society, a prison.” As Ruskin shows us, descriptive contrast pushes the mind into 
visual overdrive. From the shock of ”the black flower of civilized society,” (44) we rebound 
to the beauty of the pink bloom, which Hawthorne makes material in an astonishing way. In 
this literary act, he personally walks into the page, across the portal, plucks a rose and gives it 
to me, the reader. We imagine this rose, “offer[ing its] fragrance and fragile beauty to the 
prisoner as he went in, and to the condemned criminal as he came forth to his doom, in token 
that the deep heart of nature could pity and be kind to him” (45). It is the expression of 
nature’s pity and kindness that is otherwise to be denied. Now the reader is transformed into 
nature’s agent. The rose is now in the reader’s hand, not just in her imagination, and in this 
strange reality of seeing and holding this beautiful gift, her brain’s neurotransmitters are 
activated to spread the chemicals which transform the fictional “sweet moral blossom” into 
tender feeling, the felt relief from the approaching sorrow he wishes to soften for us.  I read 
this  intervention as an authorial expectation that the symbolic beauty of the rose has inherent 
anodyne qualities that will  “relieve” the literary experience of “ human frailty and sorrow” 
throughout, and to the end of the dark and sorrowful tale.   
Surely, this is Hawthorne’s confident expression of the effect on a human of the 
lasting memory of the beauty of a flower and the penetrating solace of its spiritually-
elevating symbolism. The pull on the imagination of the power that Hawthorne ascribes to 
the plucked rose is breathtaking. As you absorb the poetry of the idea, for a breathless instant 
thought becomes emotion— it halts the steady pumping of the lungs. This is an intriguing 
narrative strategy in its assumptions of psychological mediation by what we can now 
understand as sensual neurology. It is as if the author is trying desperately, and as it happens, 
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brilliantly, to take control of the story’s emotional gears to steady the ride to sorrow with a 
countervailing balance of the ennobling complexity of human nature. Yet, the narrator walks 
a fine line of reserve, as a sensitive, morally-anchored observer, neither overtly condemning 
nor sympathizing with Hester Prynne, nor demonizing the ministers and magistrates, but all 
the time speaking through his open-heartedness with a sympathy that is inescapable.  
 
Hawthorne’s next task is the construction of the extraordinary character of Hester 
Prynne. She is about to leave the dungeon that has held her and her child in its unholy 
darkness.  The narrator could have told us how long she had languished there, that she 
suffered stoicly through labor pangs, that her minister had come there to vist, praying for her 
soul, for the baby’s safe delivery. But he does not tell us. This narrative deprivation causes us 
to create our own, to fill it the gaps. No doubt, we surmise, the Puritan throng, scarcely 
disguising their schaudenfreude, know more than we do, but we can make up for that by 
taking seriously our role as creative partner in the story.  The crowd have their expectations 
of seeing the gloriously beautiful woman properly-reduced to a contrite, grey-faced, shamed 
shell of her former self with the letter “A” of her sin stitched abjectly onto her colorless 
gown.  As the first-order imaginer and creator of the intended object of everyone’s eyes, 
Hawthorne plays with those expectations. And then . . .  
On the breast of her gown, in fine red cloth, surrounded with an elaborate 
embroidery and fantastic flourishes of gold-thread appeared the letter “A”. It 
was so artistically and with so much fertility and gorgeous luxuriance of 
fancy, that it had all the effect of a last and fitting decoration to the apparel 
which she wore; and which was of a splendor in accordance with the taste of 
the age, but greatly beyond what was allowed by the sumptuary regulations of 
the colony (49).  
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Since the body of Hester Prynne is by fiat to be reduced to a symbol of her sin, the 
eyes in the sea of repressed browns and greys are stunned, the reader astonished, by the red, 
artistic “gorgeous[ness]” of the Letter “A” she has embroidered on the breast of her dress.  
The “luxuriance” of the art of the Letter “A” is a striking revelation of the mind-altering 
significance of the beauty of art. Prynne with the art of her own hand has created visual 
enticements and incitements that hold the crowd as if “spell[bound].” She makes of the 
intended unveiling of her debased status a glorious emblem of transfiguration. Hawthorne 
writes: 
 
[T]he point which drew all eyes, and, as it were, transfigured the wearer, —so 
that both men and women, who had been familiarly acquainted with Hester 
Prynne, were now impressed as if they beheld her for the first time— was that 
SCARLET LETTER, so fantastically embroidered and illuminated upon her 
bosom. It had the effect of a spell, taking her out of the ordinary relations with 
humanity, and enclosing her in a sphere all by herself. (49-50)  
 
We have not, yet “seen” Hester Prynne’s face and body. That she should be “from 
another sphere,” as Hawthorne suggests, is at first an unfathomable concept. If “another 
sphere” means out of this world, the temptation is to imagine what is unimaginable in this 
world, but not in the world of the fertile mind. The wildest image that comes is Dante’s 
Empyrean where he meets his beloved Beatrice. Try to imagine seeing the face of God;  it 
feels like that at first—so terrifyingly bright, that you only dare peek through fingers. 
Beatrice is not God. She is of the earth, transformed in a glow of even greater heavenly 
beauty than held in Dante’s beatified childhood memory. She stands in golden glory 
surrounded by a host of angels in a plaza-size rose —the symbol of divine love; what 
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pleasure: imaginative serendipity has offered up the a heavenly version of Hawthorne’s 
symbol of compassion for Hester Prynne.  And then, it is gone.  
From yet “another sphere,” comes Cleopatra, in the imagery of Shakespeare’s lines:  
The barge she sat in, like a burnished throne, 
Burned on the water, the poop was beaten gold; 
Purple the sails, and so perfumed that 
The winds were lovesick with them; the oars were silver 
Which to the tune of flutes kept stroke, and made 
The watrer, which they beat, to follow faster, 
As amorous as their strokes. For her own person, 
It beggared all description: she die lie 
In her pavilion (cloth-of-gold of tissue), 
O’er picturing that Venus, where we see 
The fancy outwork nature; 
 
What takes minutes to tell flashes by in split seconds in the mind’s eye. Hoping to turn back 
the mind’s neural “pages,” our senses call up another encounter with Cleopatra’s barge; the 
alliterative pleasure of the “burnished” and “burned;” the luxury of the gold” and “silver” for 
our eyes; the sensuous combination of color, perfume and gentle motion of the “purple” sails 
and the“perfumed” “winds;” and the “vision” of Cleopatra/Hester Prynne, “a vision “o’er-
picturing” Venus. The extravagance of the description is a delight to the imaginative mind. 
Even anticipating the pleasure of the image is enough to activate the dopaminergic system, 
the brain’s key to reward—in this case, the expectation of the pleasure of beauty. 203 
We tend to think of the brain’s images as exact pictures of the visual world. They are 
not. “The brain is not a picture book,” says Francis Crick, the co-discover of the structure of 
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DNA who spent several decades studying visual perception.  204“The image the brain 
produces,” Kandel explains, “ is a symbolic representation—a hypothesis—of the world.205 
This hypothesis is constructed from the brain’s analysis of information it receives from all 
the senses —sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch—converted into neural codes and stored in 
memory. The visual memories of Cleopatra and Hester Prynne, for example, miraculously 
appear “as a result of different firing patterns of neurons in different combinations of neural 
circuits in the brain,”206 accessed from the images we imagined and reimagined when we 
read the text.  
Every reader will experience his or her own unique responses to Hawthorne’s image 
of the “fantastically embroidered” scarlet and gold letter A. One might see, feel and think: A 
Puritan? no!  this can’t be happening, as the emotionally intense red flashes into 
consciousness milli-seconds after it has announced itself in the brain. How can we ever 
define the experience of redness with words? The subjective nature of redness, like all 
emotional feelings can be explained only by neuroanatomical, neurochemical and 
neurophysiological actions and reactions in the brain. Redness, like all other subjective 
experiences is the nervous system’s evolutionary-built automation to make us want 
nourishment when the organism’s chemicals are depleted. The color red is is the perceptive, 
instinctual, prompt of the primal drives—for hunger, the ripeness of fruit, for reproduction, 
the redness of sexuality, for survival, the terror and danger of blood. For a second or two it 
sweeps us up in a red zone of affect, having read, no longer reading, now seeing a wall of 
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red, and reacting and feeling. The effect of the red A is a psychological jolt into the reality of 
our own responses: our sense of sorrow with its depleted bodily effect of a run-down battery, 
is now charged up.  We are alive to action, more energetic; the color red, the color of blood, 
of life, is an alarm bell in the brain: it stimulates adrenal glands and makes neurons dance 
together, ready for connection, for action. Red? It triggers emotional intensity, raises 
metabolism, increases respiration rate, raises blood pressure. Surely, we think, Hester would 
prefer to disappear into the grey and dun crowds? Red? Gold? It’s a provocation, a defiance 
of the sumptuary regulations. There’s no such thing as a subdued red. In heraldry red 
indicates power: courage, vigor, willpower, rage, defiance. Unconsciously, the potency of 
those words sets off an emotional reaction that ripples away from a mere descriptive to 
define the essential qualities of the character to Hester Prynne. 
The gold embroidery is not only fantastic; its threads are alive with affect. Hawthorne 
says it is fertile. Fertility. Sexuality. The word produces multiple images of fecundity: 
nature’s exhuberant rebirth, human reproduction—that evidence of new life that exposed 
Hester’s adultery—and prolific creativity.  The creativity of the letter A in our mind is an 
expression of Hester Prynne’s artful imagination and sense of beauty. We want to imagine it. 
The image that arrives is so red, whimsical, extravagant, bouyant, sensuous. The idea of 
fertility is attached to her art, the image under observation, but the suggestiveness of fertility 
returns as do the thought processes that William James describes as like a bird flying from 
branch to branch.  
Instinctively, the idea of reproductive ripeness, female potency and lush forbidden 
sexuality screams out for recognition in the presence of a young mother holding a new-born. 
The splendor detailed in the creation of the Letter A spreads like a luminous cloak over the 
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as-yet-faceless woman whose presence transcends diminution. It elevates her above all. We 
have seen the symbol of the Letter A, which is meant to capture the eyes and make her 
faceless. Instead, her art, its statement of her potency, performs a different branding than 
intended: it “had the effect of a spell, taking her out of the ordinary relations with humanity, 
and enclosing her in a sphere all by herself” (50). Before we see her face we are engulfed in 
the recognition that we are in awe of this fiercely-independent woman.   
In the Musée du Louvre there is a portrait by the French romantic painter Théodore 
Chassériau of his two beautiful dark-haired sisters, Adèle and Aline. Chassériau, famed for 
his historical and religious themes, painted the portrait in 1843, the year that John Ruskin, the 
anonymous Oxford graduate, published the first volume of Modern Painters and seven years 
before Hawthorne published The Scarlet Letter. Adèle and Aline have lustrous black hair, 
parted sedately, and pulled back out of sight behind their matching gold, shirred gowns. Over 
the gold fabric, their shoulders are draped in scarlet shawls, finely embroidered around the 
edges. Dark eyebrows draw attention to their large, intelligent eyes and the somber dignity of 
their beauty.  They are 19th-century doppelgangers for Hawthorne’s Hester Prynne. Here’s 
Hawthorne: 
She had dark and abundant hair, so glossy that it threw off the sunshine with a 
gleam, and a face which, besides being beautiful from regularity of features 
and richness of complexion, had the impressiveness belonging to a marked 
brow and deep black eyes. She was ladylike, too, after the manner of the 
feminine gentility of those days; . . . Those who had before known her, and 
had expected to behold her dimmed and obscured by a disastrous cloud, were 
astonished, and even startled, to perceive how her beauty shone out, and made 
a halo of the misfortune and ignominy in which she was enveloped. It may be 
true, that, to a sensible observer, there was something exquisitely painful in it. 
Her attire, which indeed she had wrought for the occasion, in prison, and had 
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modelled much after her own fancy, seemed to express the attitude of her 
spirit, the desperate recklessness of her mood, by its wild and picturesque 
peculiarity (49-50).  
 
What a powerful image. If beauty is a state of perfection, Hawthorne has imagined it. 
A woman whose crowning glory is so lustrous that it disarms the sun, “throw[ing] it off,”  
just as she did the hand of her jailer who tried to assert control over her walk to the scaffold; 
a woman whose shining beauty, perfect features, and “richness of complexion,” alchemizes 
“misfortune and ignominy’ into an “[enveloping] halo.” Assuming then, some susceptibility 
to beauty in the deep brain recesses of the Puritan throng, and of feelings of empathy 
activated in the mirror neurons at the plight of the lovely young woman with the wailing 
three-month-old baby at her breast, how do we account for the pitiless cries from women for 
the “brand of a hot iron on Hester Prynne’s forehead.” and for the penalty of the new 
Puritanic code of law—her death for adultery”? (48) Hawthorne has warned us that Puritans 
consider the pursuit of beauty to be evil, and the adornment of the body to be “heathenish.” 
Therefore, with the exception of spiritual experience, the beautiful is despised for the very 
reason that it is beautiful. Before he describes the compelling picture of Hester Prynne, 
Hawthorne soaks us in an ugly environment—a historic culture of punitive excess, peopled 
by course-featured, broad-shouldered country women whose “moral diet [was] not a whit 
more refined “ than the beer and ale of their native land, ” who could not forbear to get their 
hands on “such a malefactress as Hester Prynne” (47). The contrast between the cruel 
sanctimoniousness of the judges and the elegance of their victim is designed to stun our 
senses. 
The halo around Hester is a foretoken of the portrait of Divine Maternity to follow.  
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Had there been a papist among the crowd of Puritans, he might have seen 
in this beautiful woman, so picturesque in her attire and mien, and with the 
infant at her bosom, an object to remind him of the Divine Maternity, which 
so many illustrious painters have vyed with one another to represent; 
something which should remind him, indeed, only by contrast, of the sacred 
image of sinless motherhood, whose infant was to redeem the world. Here was 
the taint of the deepest sin in the most sacred quality of human life, working 
such effect, that the world was only darker for this woman’s beauty, and the 
more lost for the infant she had borne. 207 
 
Hawthorne’s word-portrait of Hester Prynne in the novel’s early pages is this: She is 
beautiful, is haughty, desperate, dignified, reckless, defiant, ladylike, bold, fanciful, wild, 
gentle, voluptuous, pictureque, tainted, a picture of sinless motherhood, an adulteress, a piece 
of iconic art, an image of Divine Maternity and a dark shadow on the face of the world. In 
the brilliant paragraph of “papist” fantasy, surely anathema to Puritan sensibilities, he finds it 
possible to see in her both a vision of the “Divine Maternity,” and on the other hand  “a 
woman taint[ed] of the deepest sin.” In this portrait of  sin and purity, Hester as Adulteress 
and Madonna, Hawthorne has created a wonder of opposites, contraries and paradoxes—a 
literary concoction of fascination and awe.  Given the penalties for her reckless lack of sexual 
control and the jealousy, anxiety and desire triggered in women and men by her highly 
sensual beauty, Hester Prynne’s body carries the repressed desires of the community. Her 
dignified refusal to accept assumptions about her female nature and her courage to defy 
tradition is role-breaking for one so young and so alone in the New World.  Hawthorne has 
spared no effort in transforming Hester’s beauty in our consciousness into something sacred, 
all the while suggesting the prevailing view of the opposite. He notes the contrast between 
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the moral state of Hester Prynne and the Virgin Mary, but the power of the imagination he 
has called into play has done its work, we think of spell-binding Hester’s martyred beauty 
and the desire that led to it and, “the experience of human beauty opens to our vision another 
realm—divine but no less human—in which beauty lies above and beyond desire, a symbol 
of redemption.” 208 
 The complexity Hawthorne embraces betokens his open-hearted acceptance of the 
profusion of family and societal influences, desires, anxieties, motivations, self-concepts, 
observations, ambitions, ideals, reactions, biases, and defences that define a single human 
being. Hawthorne did not claim to understand the chemistry of the brain. But his awareness 
of the complexity of the mind, his pre-Freudian move into psychoanalytical reading of his 
characters, and especially his aesthetic concern for love and beauty and his artistry of writing 
it into sensation, of understanding its value in illuminating and balancing the complications 
of human truth led Hawthorne to discover  “an essential truth about the mind that 
[aesthetic]neuroscience is only now discovering.” 209 Now, in our age of advances in 
neuroscientific research, we are gradually understanding how the expressions of our 
individual humanity emerges, especially the experiences of the pleasure and pain of being 
alive, through the brain’s management of several billions of neurons and several trillion 
neuronal connections under our skulls. The brain’s primary task is to help the human 
organism survive, which in evolutionary terms means to keep it alive and reproductive.  One 
of the ways it does this is with reordained dispensing of carrot-and-stick chemicals that dole 
out pleasure and pain. The brain is motivated (rewarded) to pursue (seek) what enhances 
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survival and motivated to avoid the unpleasant consequences of actions that disrupt the 
organism’s healthy state of health —the condition of homeostasis. Bad would be eating 
putrid food or staying in the path of a rampaging bear; to avoid this the brain wires us to feel 
disgust and terror. Good would be feeling happy and staying healthy; to ensure this the brain 
provides copious supplies of the body’s pleasure chemicals so that we feel elated when we 
experience beauty, ecstasy when we fall in love, joy when we have a child, comfort and 
connection in our friendships—all experiences that promote survival.  
The philosophic theories of the human ecstatic response to what we call beauty has 
preoccupied philosophers for many centuries. Theories of beauty’s form and essence are 
abundant; questions of its source are more focused. Is beauty a property of the beautiful 
person or of the beautiful object? Is beauty an interior condition—in the mind of the 
perceiver? Or does the experience of beauty come from the Supreme Deity, as a sign of 
God’s presence in the world? Or, as John Ruskin believed, that all the theories of beauty 
from Plato on were flawed, because the apprehension of beauty comes from the receptive 
quality of the human loving spirit, through the body and mind of the person experiencing the 
joy.210 We can now answer these questions definitively. Although knowledge of brain 
functioning is still in its infancy, the age-old search for the source of beauty was answered at 
a very basic level in 2003 in a functional MRI (fMRI) scanner study.211 Visual neuroscientist 
Semir Zeki confirmed that beauty is in the eye (the mind) of the beholder. Zeki and his 
research team were the first scientists to watch how the the brain responds to beauty. The 
aesthetic judgment of beauty is recorded in the activity of neurotransmitters in the brain’s 
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orbito-frontal cortex and in the motor cortex. When we see a landscape, a painting, a person, 
or an object that we find beautiful and when we hear music, or a poem, or words that we find 
beautiful or even when we remember or imagine a beautiful sunset, our orbito-frontal cortex 
kicks in with full-reality intensity that activates the brain’s reward system. The brain floods 
our bodies with neuro modulators—dopamine and serotonin—chemicals that produce 
emotions such as delight, pleasure, joy and ecstasy.  
In The Splendors and Miseries of the Brain, Zeki describes the “evolutionary triumph 
of neural engineering” by which the brain produces the sensations of desire, love and beauty. 
The brain’s central primordial function, he explains, is to collect knowledge about the world, 
which it does in the most efficient way by reducing categories to their essentials—by forming 
concepts. Our experiences in a complex world are managed by two different kinds of 
conceptual functions “supported by a neurological machinery of immense complexity”—
inherited concepts and acquired concepts. The inherited concept arrives with the new-born 
baby, pre-installed and ready to power up in tune with the developing brain. It provides fixed 
knowledge. It applies to “simple perceptual experiences such as . . . a house, or a car, as well 
as to more abstract entities such as love and beauty.” It makes it possible for a toddler to 
understand that a cat is a cat, no matter its color, size, or breed., or whether he sees from the 
head or the tail-end, even when it is the tail-less Manx. The acquired concept is a much more 
adventurous teacher. It seems to understand that human beings get excited about change, and 
so in the case of a car, for instance, it will pick up on all the things you love in the new car 
roll-outs —the color, the wheels, the sleek body, the design of the lights, the m.p.g. the 4-
year-warrantee, the leather upholstery— and will create a composite of everything you must 
have. Of course, that car doesn’t exist; It’s an unattainable longing. The brain plays the same 
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trick in our concept of the ideal mate. The concept of beautiful or handsome, kind and witty 
formed by the brain is a synthesis of all our experiences over years and influences of family, 
culture and education. The brain concept of the perfect face, the perfect house, the perfect 
painting, since it is synthetic, does not bear much relation to reality. That’s why desire for 
perfection results in disappointment or, as the title of Professor Zeki’s book fore warns, 
“leads more often to misery.” This must be why every actress playing the role of Hester in a 
movie version of The Scarlet Letter can’t measure up to Hawthorne’s imagination. 
 
Her mother in contriving the child’s garb, had allowed the gorgeous 
tendencies of her imagination their full play; arraying her in a crimson velvet 
tunic, of a peculiar cut, abundantly embroidered with fantasies and flourishes 
of gold-thread.. . . was admirably adapted to Pearl’s beauty, and made her the 
very brightest little jet of flame that every danced upon the earth.  (95) 
       The Scarlet Letter 
  
There is so much evidence in this novel of Hawthorne’s awareness of beauty and his 
fabulist imaginings of the “very brightest little jet of flame that every danced upon the earth” 
that one could dwell endlessly on the richly created scenes that ignite pleasure as we recreate 
them in our minds. Think of the Elizabethan delight in the geometrical perfection of the 
circle passed along to scientifically sophisticated generations like our own; it is perfection in 
its completeness and its flawlessness. 212  Is it only by chance that Hawthorne in his 
introductions of Hester and her child, Pearl, presents each of them encircled by a form that 
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symbolizes perfection? There are many pages between the transfigurement of Hester that 
took “her out of the ordinary relations with humanity . . .  enclosing her in a sphere all by 
herself” (50) and the image of her child surrounded by “the absolute circle of radiance 
around her on the cottage floor” (86). In imagining the child’s beauty vivid in velvet of red 
and lustrous embroidery of gold, he links the genetic and creative genius to the “gorgeous 
tendencies of Hester’s imagination.” The sphere that Hester inhabits alone and the radiant 
circle that encompasses only Pearl come together in our minds fusing the exotic and the 
radiant in an excess of verbal hyperbole that carries a perceptive truth. He prompts in us what 
we understand as the brain’s capablity to generate a wide range of conscious experiences, 
including some that alter our perceptions and emotions to such an extent that the world seems 
dramatically different —an altered state, or an out of body experience, for instance, that 
imagines breathtaking beauty in the way that Hawthorne describes.  
Here is another example in which Hawthorne captures Hester’s sensuous beauty 
newly awakened from the torpor of shame and loss. Its initial power comes in her rebound 
from sorrow: 
There played around her mouth, and beamed out of her eyes, a radiant and 
tender smile, that seemed gushing from the very heart of womanhood. A 
crimson flush was glowing on her cheek, that had been so long pale.  Her sex, 
her youth, and the whole richness of her beauty, came back from what men 
call the irrevocable past, and clustered themselves with her maiden hope, and 
a happiness before unknown, within the magic circle of this hour (193).   
           
Hawthorne’s description of the resurrection of Hester Prynne’s playful, incandescent, 
loving, flushing and overflowing womanhood collapses another perfect circle, the “magic 
circle” of Cinderella’s childlike joy in her reunion with Arthur Dimmesdale into the religio-
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sexual ecstasy of Bernini’s Saint Teresa. Like Hawthorne’s conception of Hester, it is a 
word-picture filled with innocence and voluptuousness. The first sentence’s images of 
Hester’s mouth and eyes, the faces expressive openings into the steate of her body, the 
effusion of her cheek’s “flush,” and the generosity of love “gushing” from the core of her 
female soul seem to deliver an instant exchange of powerful words leading to powerful 
feelings. The author’s choice of evocative words stir up emotions that transfuse the meaning 
of the text— as if the symbol was not arbitrary after all. However, it is more complicated 
than that. According to Ruskin, it is the imaginative processes that writers evoke in the reader 
that trigger those feelings. The philosopher, John Dewey, suggests that the emotional 
response in our aesthetic reactions is a dynamic experience: emotions are not  “as simple and 
compact as are the words by which we name them.” “Emotion is not an entity that enters full-
made upon the scene.” An emotion —joy, sorrow, fear or anger —is a responsive activity 
tuned to milli-second fluctuations in an organism in which billion of neurons are always at 
play; an emotion as Dewey defines it “is a quality . . . of a complex experience that moves 
and changes.”213  This suggests that the neural dynamics of the experience of dread, for 
example, changed by new circumstances that bring relief will not be felt as dread switched 
off and relief switched on, but as a sliding scale of affect.  
The brain’s neural nimbleness in recording emotions and the conscious bodily 
feelings that emanate from them—this unstoppable process of the brain’s movement and 
change in response to human experience—is a useful insight into how Hawthorne’s writing 
will affect us, biologically move us, to feel the glow of beauty from the sweet moral blossom 
with which he plans to “relieve the darkening close of a tale of human frailty and sorrow” 
(45). To wit, Hawthorne is faced with an unfolding series of grim relationships:  How does 
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he overcome the incesssant gloom of Hester’s painful relationships with the clergy, the 
community, her revenging husband, and her fractured relationship with her self-abnegating 
lover Arthur Dimmesdale? In gloom sinking into the blackest evil, Reverend Dimmesdale is 
snared in a fateful connection with the sadistic cuckold Roger Chillingworth. Chillingworth’s 
revenge plot plays out in excruciating malevalence as he orchestrates his hapless patient’s 
descent into moral madness.  
Where is the beauty in the Roger Chillingworth that Hawthorne has created?  Can we 
perhaps find a scrap of decency in his admission that he was deluded to think that a beautiful 
girl in “her budding youth”—in other words, barely out of puberty— would “fantasi[ze]” 
being in the embrace of the “decaying” body of a physically deformed, scholarly man? 
Unlikely. When Hester admits she wronged him by her adultery, Chillingworth says, “we 
have wronged each other. Mine was the first wrong when I betrayed thy budding youth into a 
false and unnatural relation with my decay.” Not only has he stolen her “budding youth,” her 
ripening womanhood, but he took— in the venial sense of the word—for his wife a girl who 
neither loved him nor pretended to, a dutiful daughter who had no agency to rebel against her 
parents. What he has admitted to is a flame-red sin, an appalling fracture in a covenant of 
love. To make good on his pretensions of shame for inflicting his selfish desires on Hester, 
he could have walked out of the colony and disappeared quietly from her life. Instead, 
dismissing all moral values as inconsequential to his ends whether right or wrong” of 
motivated by “love or hate.” He vowed that he would “prove the ruin” of her lover’s soul. 
D.H. Lawrence called The Scarlet Letter a “sort of parable, an earthly story with a hellish 
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meaning.”214 Hawthorne’s assessment of Chillingworth is sufficient: After creating hell on 
earth for Hester and Dimmesdale, Chillingworth is “positively withered up, shrivelled away, 
and almost vanished from mortal sight, like an uprooted weed that lies wilting in the sun.” 
 
This unhappy man had made the very principle of his life to consist in the 
pursuit and systemic exercise of revenge; and when by its completest triumph 
and consummation, that evil principal was left with no further material to 
support it, when there was no more Devil’s work on earth for him to do, it 
only remained for the unhumanized mortal to betake himself whether his 
Master would find him tasks enough, and pay him his wages duly.” (247)  
There’s something quite pleasant in the judicial sophistication of Chillingworth’s 
sentence to hell, but not all pleasure comes in response to an aesthetic experience; 
schadenfreude— literally harm-joy in German—is its dark-side. Perhaps, knowing that a 
reader would feel this, Hawthorne waits paitiently to the end of the book to demonstrate that 
beauty can come from the unlikeliest sources, that even an evil person like Chillingworth can 
make a beautiful atonement. In his last will and testament, Chillingworth reaches out from 
the grave and changes Pearl’s life. He “bequeathed a considerable amount of property” in 
England and America to Pearl. And so, reports Hawthorne’s narrator, manufacturing a fairy-
tale ending for Hester’s elf-child, Pearl. . .became the richest heiress of her day in the New 
World” (248).  
What of Pastor Dimmesdale, of his character in general, and more significantly on the 
state of his soul with which the reader must grapple? We have a choice to weigh in favor of  
the ecstatic effect of his “very striking affect . . . large brown, meloncholy eyes, and a mouth 
                                                
 214 Lawrence (1972). Studies in Classic American Literature.  New York: The Viking Press, 1972. p. 
83. 
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which . . . apt to be tremulous . . . expressed both nervous sensibility and a vast opower of 
restraint” (62). We can lose ourselves in the those soulful eyes that fill young female 
parishioners with guilty longing or in the image of the pusillanimus and falsest of false souls 
who hides his relationship with Hester Prynne and refuses to stand hand-in-hand with the 
child who needs his love? We can acknowledge the soul connection felt by his adoring 
congregation who see him as at “the very proudest eminence of superiority, to which the gifts 
of intellect, rich lore, prevailing eloquence and are a reputation of the whitest sanctity” (237). 
We can honor the depth of Hester Prynne’s commitment to him as a judgment of the 
worthinesss she saw in him and  wants to regenerate. This Dimmesdale is the fine man 
Hawthorne revealed by delving into the young cleric’s “dim interior,” and finding there 
“many precious materials, in the shape of high aspirations for the welfare of his race, warm 
love of souls, pure sentiment and natural piety” (122). We could try to be like Hester and 
exhibit the compassion so absent in the Puritan throng’s condemnation of her sin. We can 
feel anguish in his fear of accepting responsibility, as Hester does. We do feel pathos at his 
childlike helplessness in pleading with Hester:“Think of me, Hester! Thou are strong. 
Resolve for me. . . . Be thou strong for me. Advise me what to do”? (187). In truth, in 
thinking this way, it is easy to feel sorrow and pity, but difficult to experience a surge of 
beauty in the company of this Dimmesdale. To apply to him the words he uses to describe 
Pearl’s effect on her mother—Dimmesdale’s presence is a “torture . . . an ever recurring 
agony” (107). He has assigned that miserable role to a child whose being promises to be, as 
do all children raised in a secure world, the essence of delight and beauty. Hawthorne seems 
to be sighing in sorrow as he speaks of the anguish Dimmesdale felt “in his inmost soul” as 
all that gave him “real existence in the world. Of his hidden penance, Hawthorne writes: “ 
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[He] began his penance,—which he afterwards, in so many futile methods, followed out,—by 
inflecting a hideous torture on himself” (245).  
Among Dimmesdale’s many sins of omission is his crippling inability to make 
decisions. In bracing contrast, there is in Hester Prynne’s purposeful nature a more expansive 
vision—her unsuspected willingness to accept that resistance and retribution would not serve 
her desire to overcome her shame. And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Hester 
Prynne arrived on the shores of the New World as self-directed as the dignified young 
woman who faced the hostile crowd in the market-place. Something happened to Hester 
Prynne. It was Arthur Dimmesdale that happened to her. In that time they were together of 
which we know nothing, Hester Prynne found, at great risk, what had been denied in her 
arranged loveless marriage to an old man — she found the self-affirming gift of passionate 
love, given and returned. It changed her, in much the same way as love transformed the 
author of her life. When Nathaniel Hawthorne fell in love with Sophia (in his middle thirties) 
he said this: “We are not endowed with real life . . . until the heart is touched. That touch 
creates us,—then we begin to be.”215 The love of and for Dimmesdale we can argue was the 
“beginning to be” of Hester Prynne’s own self and she became a warrior against its denial. 
That makes the idea of Dimmesdale a beautiful thing. An idea of beauty that materializes out 
of Hawthorne’s “boundless sympathy with all forms of beings” when he can not fail to make 
visible the magic of Dimmesdale the preacher: “Were there not the brilliant particles of the 
halo in the air about his head? So etherealized by spirits as he was, and so apotheosized by 
worshipping admirers, did his footsteps, in the procesion, really tread upon the dust of 
earth?” (238-9). 
                                                
 215 Qtd in Matthiessen , 345. 
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In search of more certain beauty, we turn back to the mother and child. On the day 
Hester Prynne is released from prison, her heart “sick and morbid,” she faces the 
interminably bleak future, day after day, year after year, “the very same that was now so 
unutterably grievous to be borne” (72-73 ). Ahead is a battle with the Puritan clergy who plan 
to take away her rambuctious child, her joyous reconnection in the woods with her erstwhile 
lover, and the hallucinating dream and nightmarish collapse of their escape with their child to 
a new life. This feels authentic, although given the tenacity of the woman Hawthorne has 
created, the grief to be borne is simply a condition to be faced in search of a resolution. 
Changing from defensive haughtiness to disarming humility, she enacts a resolution to work, 
of necessity—to feed her child—and to labor by choice —in the service of others. The latter, 
she thinks, may “purge her soul and work out another purity than that which she had lost;” 
the work will purify her and redefine her life (75). In its combination of self-definition and 
community spirit, Hester’s decision introduces a definition of beauty beyond the obvious 
allure of face and body. In each aspect of this beauty is a biological compulsion: one, the 
empathetic concern for another’s pain; the other, a mother’s love for her child, “[t]he little 
creature whose innocent life had sprung, by the inscrutable degree of Providence, a lovely 
and immortal flower out of the rank luxuriance of a guilty passsion (83). Reflecting the 
Puritan focus on the sin that led to Pearl’s birth, zeroing in on the assumption that the 
ugliness, the “rank luxuriance” of her conception would likewise be reflected on the little 
body, Hawthorne interrogates the “inscrutable” power of God over man and the indivisible 
categories of evil and innocence. Using the Christian concept of Providence —the will of 
God—Hawthorne shows that a providential act is a blessing from God. Heaven has blessed 
Pearl with brilliant beauty and a joyous temperament. The fore-ordained curse of Adam 
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preoccupies Hester “who knew her deed was evil,” but, nevertheless, she is puzzled, 
Hawthorne notes : 
How strange it seemed to the sad woman [that while] [m]an had marked 
[her] sin by a scarlet letter . . . God, as a direct consequence of the sin that 
Man had thus punished, had given her a lovely child . . . Day after day, she 
looked fearfully into the child’s expanding nature, ever dreading to detect 
some dark and wild peculiarity, that should correspond with the guiltiness to 
which she owed her being. Certainly there was no physical defect. By its 
perfect shape, its vigor, and it natural dexterity in the use of all it suntried 
limbs, the infant was worthy to have been brought forth in Eden; worthy to 
have been left there to be the plaything of angels, after the world’s first 
parents were driven out (83-4).  
 
“How strange it seemed to the sad woman,” begins Hawthorne, offering entry into a private 
mind state that in a few words illuminates an emotional state of sadness, indirectly conjures 
Hester’s growing apprehension of an ambiguity, a “strangeness” in her world, and a sense of 
the familiar quiet contemplation that takes us to a place of knowledge. The ambiguity is not 
subtle. It shakes the belief in uniformity between God’s law and the Puritan regulation of His 
law over their people. There is no correspondence between the one and the other.We knew 
that, but Hester did not. It’s interesting to catch the beginning awareness of a “strangeness,” a 
cognitive discrepancy that plays the debate out with a cast of imagined voices in the mind. 
The fear of a child marked by parental evil is swept away with the sheer pleasure of the 
images Hawthorne draws for us of Pearl’s heavenly provenance with her playmates, the 
angels. No matter that the cherubs of my imaginings always have golden curls, they are 
immediately dyed into Pearl’s lustrous brown. 
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 We visualize the babe birthed in the verdant foliage of the Garden of Eden —an 
image that lights up the brain—a babe so beautiful that even the angels are mesmerized by 
her and become her playful, childlike versions. This suggestive description of the gaiety of 
the beautiful offspring of passionately erring parents, driven out of paradise, soothes one to 
believe, as Hester worries, that the child will not be marked by the sins of her parents. 
Hawthorne continues to attach the idea of “grace,” a quality of goodness, to Pearl’s beauty, a 
beauty that is “faultless,” an adjective that describes one innocent of sin as well as a beauty 
that is perfection itself. And perfection? George Santayana in his outline of aesthetic theory, 
The Sense of Beauty,  endorses the classic connection between beauty and goodness that 
echoes Hawthorne’s own philosophy. According to James Fields’ distillation of Hawthorne’s 
view, “Beauty always captivated him. Where there was beauty he fancied other good gifts 
must naturally be in possession.“216 However, whenever Hawthorne unwraps the truth of a 
noble soul, as he sees it, its effect, as is Santayana’s, is the consummation of an ideal: 
 If perfection is, as it should be, the ultimate justification of being, we may 
understand the moral dignity of beauty. Beauty is a pledge of the possible 
conformity between the soul and nature, and consequently a ground of faith in 
the supremacy of the good. 217 
 
As Hawthorne layers beauty over the constant stain of sin, it inevitably leads to the concept 
of the sacred, and of necessity in the story of Hester Prynne’s adultery, the violation of the 
sacred. The living reproduction, the replication of that sexual violation was little Pearl in her 
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red velvet tunic embroidered with fantasies and flourishes of gold. This causes Hawthorne to 
remark: 
Her mother in contriving the child’s garb, had allowed the gorgeous 
tendencies of her imagination their full play; arraying her in a crimson velvet. 
it irresistibly and inevitably reminded the beholder of the token that Hester 
was doomed to wear upon her bosom. It was the scarlet letter in another form: 
the scarlet letter endowed with life (95).  
`  
Scarry’s delightful reminder that “beauty brings copies of itself into being,”218 is true twice 
and thrice over in Hester and Pearl. In addition to applying this happy “replication” to a 
beautiful small copy of Hester, Hawthone replicates our images of Hester’s gorgeous 
imagination in the wearable works of art she produces and reproduces in Pearl’s outfit the 
glorious artistry of scarlet letter that marked her infamy and is to make her that Puritan 
phenomenon, the colony’s first artist of the beautiful.219 This Hawthorne wittily suggests will 
happen as he quotes an outraged matron, “[D]id ever a woman before this brazen hussy 
contrive” this display of her needlecraft “to laugh in the faces of the godly magistratres and 
make a pride out of what they, worthy gentleman, meant for a punishment” (50). And, then, 
when the beadle, in his overwheeming authority, bellows out: “Come along, Madam Hester, 
and show your scarlet letter in the market-place!” he is ushering Hester on stage as an artist-
merchant. The letter “A”, the symbol of her adultery, in its “fantastically” embroidered 
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219  In Hawthorne’s 1844 story titled “The Artist of the Beautiful” a young watch-repairer, with a great 
sensitivity for exquisite objects, devotes his life to the creation of beauty. His passion for beauty is not much 
admired by his employer or by his employer’s daughter, Annie. After long and meticulous labor he gives Annie 
a beautiful tiny metal butterfly that perches on the hand, flies away, and then returns. Owen felt he had created 
nature’s  “ideal butterfly . . . .in all it’s perfection.” Annie’s child excitedly grabs the butterfly in his fist and 
destroys it.  Owen’s creative soul is tortured by the destruction. When he deals with his disappointment, Owen 
comes to believe that though he suffers some mockery, what matters most is that he has a vision of beauty  
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beauty becomes an advertisement for an occupation as the matron forecast (51). Before long 
Hester’s artistic talent —“which the dames of a court might gladly have availed themselves, 
to add the richer and more spiritual adornment of human ingenuity to their fabric of silk and 
gold”—is in demand in the market-place with Hawthorne’s imprimatur of “spiritual 
adornment”220 and another visual flight of fancy to see Hester’s “creative ingenuity” as the 
ladies dance in the baronial hall in their silk and gold embroidered finery.  
And by degrees . . . her handiwork became what would now be termed the 
fashion. . . . her needlework was seen on the ruff of the Governor; military 
men wore it on their scarves, and the minister on his band; it decked the 
babies little cap; it was shut up to be mildewed and moulder away, in the 
coffins of the dead. But it is not recorded that, in a single instance, her skill 
was called in aid to embroider the white veil that was to cover the pure 
blushes of a bride (76-77). 
Hawthorne’s genius in envisioning the Letter “A”, the sign of adultery, as a piece of 
iconic Puritan art doubles its function as a transgressive aesthetic object. The seductive 
beauty of the embroidered “A” coyly refuses to acknowledge the sin it is meant to represent. 
How extraordinary that Hester Prynne’s art, whose genesis is the sign of adultery, should add 
dignity to the apparel of the most powerful and wealthy Puritan families. The hand they have 
refused to hold in friendship, has held their clothes, has pushed a sharp needle through and 
under the fabric that now holds the sweat of her hand next to their bodies. Art has brought 
them together because “art breaks through barriers that divide human beings,” says Dewey. 
That union is “the source of the rituals that from the time of archaic man to the present have 
commemorated” the important ceremonies of human life —birth, death and marriage” (282). 
                                                
 220 See Theresa Ann Starkey’s Doctoral Dissertation (2010) “The Woman on the Scaffold,” a study of 
how the lives of criminalized women are represented in popular culture. Hester Prynne’s rare ability to earn a 
living in the 17th-century market-place is noted. http:///pid/emory.edu/ark:/25593/7zc4v    
https://etd.library.emory.edu/view/record/pid/emory:7zc4v 
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Art becomes the aesthetic memory of those rites. The language of its images slip silently into 
the beauty–aware neurons in the brain’s frontal cortex and onwards into the region of the 
mind that welcomes beauty and creates joy, the mysterious place we call “soul.” The 
expressive art of Hester’s voluptuous and rich nature has become the alpha sign, what 
Hawthorne calls “the fashion” for religious dignitaries and on the community celebrations of  
birth, death, and —not marriage, though, the institution most wounded by Hester’s adultery.  
To this point in the novel Hawthorne has continued to embroider a narrative that 
embeds in our imagination, enters us, embroidering into our minds the details of the beauty 
of Hester Prynne’s aura, the phenomenon of the art of her needlecraft, and the heavenly 
charm and elf-like mischieviousness of her child, Pearl. It is clear from his earlier 
intervention at the prison door that his philosophy of beauty includes the human moral, 
ethical, and compassionate life, and in the Ruskinian sense, a joyous commitment to 
connection in the aesthetic enterprise of art and civilization, including wild nature—all of 
which is in us, and we in it. In this endeavor, Hawthorne opens avenues of pleasure that run 
parallel with painful reminders of Hester’s plight, renewed memories of her strength, and the 
idea that beauty is too persuasively shiny to be blotted out forever. He brings that generosity 
to the Puritan crowd who took long years to overcome the inflammation of the scarlet letter 
on Hester’s breast and see the “blameless purity” that lay beneath it: 
It is a credit to human nature, that, except where its selfishness is brought into 
play, it loves more readily than it hates. Hatred, by a gradual and quiet 
process, will even be transformed in love . . . [Hester] never battled with the 
public, but submitted, uncomplainingly, to its worst usage; she made no claim 
upon it, in requital of what she suffered; she did not weigh upon its 
sympathies. Then, also, the blameless purity of her life during all these years 
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in which she had been set apart to infamy, was reckoned largely in her favor.  
(151-2) 
 
In Hawthorne’s telling of Hester Prynne’s journey from haughty “hussy” to a woman 
of loving suffering and “blameless purity,” there are countless paragraphs, different in 
narrative aim but similar in character development, that elicit heart-felt response to the 
generosity of a nature that reflects a sweet saintliness, but not an unpleasant martyrdom. All 
have elements of sorrow and beauty, as this does, despite its dependence on so many 
categories of abstract qualities in a list of behavoirs that seldom are exhibited en masse in the 
“sphere of human nature.” Semir Zeki’s assurance that the brain categorizes abstract ideas, 
which means that they have visual and especially emotional resonance for us, explains the 
heft of words like “selfishsness,” “love,” “suffer,” “sympathy,” “blameless,” “purity,” and 
“infamy.” We reach the last sentence in awe of Hester Prynne, to be flattened by this: “Then, 
also, the blameless purity of Hester’s life during all these years in which she had been set 
apart to infamy, was reckoned largely in her favor.” The ironic reminder of the harsh 
judgmentalism that trudged every step with her makes her goodness all the more exceptional. 
The following excerpt of a description of Hester soothing the sorrows, and healing the ills of 
those who disdained her is a chiaroscuro word painting— a darkened room, glimmering 
embroidery, unearthly ray, a sick-chamber taper, light of the earth becoming dim: 
None so ready as she to give of her little substance to every demand of 
poverty; even though the bitter-hearted pauper threw back a gibe . . .  or 
garments wrought for him by the fingers that could have embroidered a 
monarch’s robe; None so self-devoted as Hester when pestilence stalked 
through the town. . . . in all seasons of calamity . . . [s]he came]    into the 
household that was darkened by trouble; . . . There glimmered the 
  139 
embroidered letter, with comfort in its unearthly ray. Elsewhere the token of 
sin, it was the taper of the sick chamber. . . .  
shown [the sufferer] where to set his foot, while the light of earth was fast 
becoming dim. . .  Hester’s nature showed itself warm and rich; a well-spring 
of human tenderness unfailing in every real demand . . . Such helpfulness was 
found in her—so much power to do, and power to sympathize so that many 
people refused to interpret the scarlet A by its original signification. They said 
it mean Able; so strong was Hester Prynne, with a woman’s strength. (153) 
 
“A” for Adultress, “A” for Artist, “A” for Able. “A” for Dimmesdale’s  better Angel 
and “A” for the grateful townsfolks’ Angel of Mercy. In the Puritan discourse, Hester’s role 
as “An Angel of Mercy” is quietly transforming the interpretation of Hawthorne’s ingenius 
moral communication system—the Letter  “A”. Hester could be blamed for being haughty 
and defiant, and a victim of her passions, but the “blameless purity” of her nature—the nature 
that sought only to produce beauty—that same nature that governed her way of relating to 
others “showed itself , . . a well-spring of human tenderness” (153). This beautiful 
descriptive phrase of few words is abundantly rich in its evocation of beauty. The words 
mean not only a capacity for human tenderness, but its wellspring—the very source itself. 
This positions Hester as not so much the recipient of her neighbors’ new-found love, but the 
reason for it—its source of communal redemption. 
The idea of redemption is repeated in Hawthorne’s lyrical depiction of Pearl’s 
sublime unification with the “kindred wilderness” of the forest: 
[The] mother-forest, and those wild things which it nourished, all 
recognized a kindred wilderness in the human child. And she was gentler here 
than in the . . . streets of the settlement.  The flowers appeared to know it; and 
one and another whispered as she passed, “Adorn thyself with me, thou 
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beautiful child, adorn thyself with me!” —and to please them, Pearl gathered 
the violets, the anemones, the columbines, and some twigs of the freshest 
green, which the old trees held down before her eyes. With these she 
decorated her hair, and her young waist, and became a nymph-child, or an 
infant dryad (196). 
 
Pearl, a child of nature, is in the lulling embrace of “mother-forest.” The “wild” little creature 
is now free from the anxiety-provoking stresses of the hostile settlement. The forest 
“nourishe[s]” her, quiets her agitation and fills her up with uncomplicated childish delight. 
She is a blossom, kin with the the wild and beautiful blossoms she wraps around her body 
and disappears inside.  What Hawthorne imaginatively observes through the green 
bower of his mind reverbrates in its tenderness and love for the imagined child with the 
essence of Herman Melville’s appreciation that “there must be such a union of thought and 
emotion as in Hawthorne . . . which sends few thoughts into circulation, except they be 
arterialized at his large warm lungs and expanded in his honest heart”.221   The union of 
thought and emotion in Melville’s expression suggests a mental and physiological space of 
peace, an equilibrium of intelligence and feeling that mirrors Antonio Damasio’s descriptive 
for the organism’s perfected regulation for survival — homeostasis. Hawthorne takes up this 
idea in finding a corrective for the turmoil in Pearl’s life. The distress and social deprivation 
in the child’s life is acting out in predictable ways that her mother’s Puritan foes decode as 
evil. In a setting of acceptance —“all recognized the kindred wilderness in the human 
child”—we find a “gentler” even more beautiful child than the beleaguered imp who shared 
her mother’s shame on the settlement’s streets. Sophia Hawthorne has referred to her 
husband as an “affable angel.” “I ever found him, like Milton's Raphael, an "affable" angel,” 
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she said, “and inclined to converse on whatever was human and good in life.”222 This puts 
Hawthorne as one with the nymph-child who earlier played with the angels in the Garden of 
Eden. He cannot resist any gorgeously visual grandiloquence to transport his reader-partner 
into Pearl’s fairy-tale world of talking violets, anemones and columbines which he mixes 
with florist-like design into bouquet of pinks and purples with “twigs of the freshest green 
that old trees held down before her eyes.” Why does Hawthorne choose old trees to hold 
down the branches for his nymph-child? Is it meant to suggest the ancient origins of mother-
forest? Is it for the visual effect it conjures of the gnarled old life of nature and the dewey 
freshness of childhood? Is it the pleasure to help the child at play complete her perfect piece 
of art? Who knows. The imagining is everything.   
 As Pearl adorns her hair with the a crown of flowers and twigs, Hawthorne tells us, 
“she heard her mother’s voice, and came back slowly. Slowly; for she saw the clergyman” 
(196). As the nature-gentled Pearl played in the forest that was “the playmate of the lonely 
child,” (195) the great romantic drama that Henry James says he missed had begun to unfold. 
Arthur Dimmesdale and Hester Prynne had met in private for the first time in seven years. In 
this work, which Hawthorne has said is so dark that it will be unbearable to readers, he gives 
over three chapters, close to 7,000 words, to exquisitely beautiful writing that carries the 
recurrent pain and transport of the tragic love affair that Hawthorne breathes into his tale. 
The languorous pace of these chapters allows a deeply felt connection to the characters at the 
most emotionally heightened moments of separation and connection. Since “they were so 
long estranged by fate and circumstances,” they felt like” disembodied beings. Each a 
ghost”(181). The process of dragging their consciously-relating selves out to breathe free in 
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each others presence begins as “Arthur Dimmesdale put forth his hand, chill as death, and 
touched the chill hand of Hester Prynne”(181). A hand chill as death reaches towards another 
waiting chill hand. Hawthorne’s sensory acuity, exaggerates a condition of bone-chilling 
weather into a metaphoric scene of deadened ghost souls awaiting a remembered warmth. In 
time, when their blood flows again, they weep, they hold each other. “Do I feel joy again? 
cried he, wondering at himself. Methought the germ of it was dead in me! O Hester, thou are 
my better angel! (192). All the tenderness in the great empty chasm Hawthorne left to be 
filled only by our romantic fantasies is now here—sorrow, fear, indecision and a crushing 
sense of the inevitability of more sorrow. As eavesdroppers and sensation-invaders of their 
most holy intimacies, we are initiated into the sacred rites of their union, their love’s 
consecration.  
In one of literature’s most tragic, painfully beautiful love scenes Arthur Dimmesdale, 
“out of an abyss of sadness, and no anger,” forgives Hester for withholding that his tormentor 
is her husband:  
‘That old man’s revenge has been blacker than my sin, He has violated, in 
cold blood, the sanctity of the human heart, Thou and I, Hester, never did so!’ 
‘Never, never,’ whispered she. “What we did had a consecration of its own. 
We felt it so. We said so to each other. Have thou forgotten it?’ 
‘Hush, Hester!’ said Arthur Dimmesdale, rising from the ground.  
‘No. I have not forgotten!’ (186). 
 
Hester reframes the meaning of their relationship as a purification of their sin: it was a 
consecretion, their “marriage” consecration before God. Its reinterpretation is fitted to the 
liberating spirit of the forest in which the acts of man are of nature.  “What we did had a 
consecretation of its own, ” Hester said, and paused. But there was no affirmation from him. 
  143 
She seems distressed: “We felt it so,” she urges. “We said so to each other.”  Hester 
remembers their love as first  “felt” — the feeling that arises from deep within the brain to 
the viscera, calling its truth to the mind —and then “expressed,” the discovery shared in the 
world with another in search of confirmation of a new reality.  She raises the question again: 
“Have thou forgotten it?” Dimmesdale responds to the beauty of her affirmation: “Hush.” 
Hawthorne could have written anything he pleased. Dimmesdale could have said: “Yes, 
Hester, what we did was sacred. I felt it, too. I feel it so.” But he first said. “Hush.” And the 
next word out in his mouth was “No.”  Nothing that comes after “No” really matters.  
 The rumblings of blackness in The Scarlet Letter are never far-off, though Hawthorne 
always coaxes out the sunbeams with sensory detail to spark beautiful visions that erase the 
gloom with its “ethereal medium of joy,” (250) the otherworldly, unearthly state he calls up 
out of the darkness of beauty. 
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lV. Gwendolen Harleth’s Dangerous Beauty: 
The Mind Behind the Beautiful Face 
 
 
Beauty is a sacred thing . . . [it] springs from God and is like a circle in the 
centre of which is goodness. . . . one cannot have beauty without goodness, so 
outward beauty is a true sign of inner goodness.                                     
                                Baldessare Castiglione The Book of the Courtier223 
 
Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.’ 
                         John Keats “Ode on a Grecian Urn”224 
 
Beauty is the mark God sets upon virtue.  
                              Ralph Waldo Emerson. Nature225 
  
 The wisdom of Castiglione, Emerson and Keats notwithstanding, the neurosensory 
truth is that the brain loves beauty. It has its reasons. What our eyes tell us is beautiful— 
what is “essentially symmetrical,” Plotinus writes, and likewise St. Augustine who says 
“geometric form and balance” is the key to beauty—is biologically synonymous with 
fertility, reproduction, and the survival of species. The human organism has rigged the 
system by evolving a winning scheme using hormones and chemicals to eroticize symmetry 
into a beautiful mating dance of love— and an over-crowded planet. The incessant call of 
                                                
 223 Castiglione. The Book of the Courtier. Bk 1V, 342  In this translation by Charles S. Singleton of 
The Book of the Courtier, first published in 1528 in Venice, Castiglione, the Duke of Urbino, explains what 
“constitutes the perfect Courtier and his ideal counterpart, the Court Lady . . .  [and the] social life, ethics, 
politics, humor, sports and relations between the sexes.” In consequence of these views on beauty and goodness 
Castiglione writes, “only rare does an evil soul dwell in a beautiful body.” 
 
 224 Keats. “Ode on a Grecian Urn”, 853. Norton Anthology of English Literature Vol. 2. 7th Edition. 
NewYork, NY; Norton, 2000. 
 
 225 Emerson. Nature, Ch. 3. Emerson continues: “There is still another aspect under which the beauty 
of the world may be viewed, namely, as it becomes an object of the intellect. 
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this primitive and eternal passion for fertility is the brain’s undiscriminating commitment to 
send out sensations that alert the body with a chemical announcement when our idealized 
version of male or female beauty is nearby.226 These hormonal prompts entice our senses 
with longing and desire for mates and lovers. The attraction to what we find physically 
appealing in a non-romantic form also biases our choice of friends, workmates, business and 
political leaders towards those who happen to be handsomely privileged by their genes.  
For George Eliot, whose literary creation of Gwendolen Harleth’s physical beauty 
and its intoxicating effect on others is on record throughout Daniel Deronda, the narrative 
development of her beautiful heroine’s eventual misery is driven, paradoxically, by an 
absence of beauty. What is missing is not physical loveliness, but a different kind of beauty. 
What is this beauty? Eliot simply calls it “that other beauty, too.”227 Her vagueness is apt, 
especially for a beauty which is equally important yet so different that it is not often seen: a 
private beauty, hidden from sight, its intrinsic sum and substance is embedded in the words 
of Eliot’s parallel description—that “other beauty, too.” Its beauty is there in the difference 
suggested in “other,” the appreciation felt in “beauty,” and the connection made in “too.” 
The embrace of recognition found in difference, appreciation, and connection to the other is 
in the other beauty, the inner beauty that she defines as “deep human sympathy.” She writes: 
All honor and reverence to the divine beauty of form! Let us 
cultivate it to the utmost in men and women and children—in 
our gardens and in our houses. But let us love that other beauty 
                                                
226 See Neurobiologist Semir Zeki’s The Splendors and Miseries of the Brain, Ch, 15. “The Brain’s 
Concepts of Love” and Ch. 16 “The Neural Correlates of Love.” Zeki who is credited by Nobel Laureate Eric 
Kandel in The Age of Insight as the pioneer of the modern study of visual perception, opened up the new field of 
neuroaesthetics in an exploration of biology and the human response to art. 
 
 227 Eliot, Adam Bede, Ch. 17, 2-3. 
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too, which lies in no secret proportion but in the secret of deep 
human sympathy. 
Eliot introduced this concept of human beauty in her first novel, Adam Bede (1859), 
and explores it extensively in Daniel Deronda, the last novel before her death. This 
expression of Eliot’s interest in the philosophical underpinings of beauty meets with the 
contemporary Victorian fascination with all things visually beautiful, especially the beautiful 
face and its symbolic connection to goodness and virtue. Not surprisingly then, Emerson’s 
words, “Beauty is the mark God sets upon virtue,” echoing that moral certitude some 300 
years after Castiglione wrote “outward beauty is a true sign of inner goodness,”228 suggests it 
is time for a discussion around the presumption. 
The character Gwendolen Harleth’s storied beauty and her imperious treatment of 
others—what is lovely about her and what is ugly in her— is the subject under Eliot’s 
incisive narrative excavation.229 The task of unearthing the how and why of Gwendolen’s life 
involves Eliot in a mining beneath the beautiful exterior into the mind of a character whose 
public adoration and social privilege co-exists undiminished by social criticism and the 
bemused toleration of her self-importance tolerated as if arrogance is only to be expected in 
one so beautiful. Eliot’s narrator wonders why the importance of inner beauty pales in 
comparison to the insatiable attention given to the beautiful face and body. This questioning 
of the deeper meanings of human beauty and the mysteries of human character in Daniel 
Deronda moves the discussion of beauty and goodness into the Victorian world of the 
                                                
     228 Ibid. 
 
     229 The interlocking narrative in the novel is that of the character Daniel Deronda’s, raised by his 
aristocratic guardian as an English gentleman. Deronda’s life changes dramatically with his discovery of his 
own obscured birth into a Jewish family in Italy. 
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Sciences of the Mind, of biology and behavioral studies that supply some early clues to the 
neglected realm of “that other beauty, too.”  
Despite its copious cognates, the common preference for the word “beautiful” 
suggests a commonplace acceptance of its meaning. But, how can the measure of perfection 
recognized across unlimited categories of things concrete and abstract be thought of as 
commonplace? How do we wrestle cognitive precision from a word that becomes code for 
the experience of exciting sensations, responses, and actions ignited by the beautiful face of 
Helen of Troy when the same word denotes the selfless legacy of a beautiful soul, or the 
mathematical perfection of a beautiful proof?  
 If this is a dilemma for some, it does not perplex George Eliot. She finds beauty as 
common, as ubiquitous as it is paradoxical because beauty, as Ruskin taught, is a production 
of the mind, a quality of open-hearted imagination that can transfigure the commonplace into 
the exceptional. That is what Eliot is claiming when she argues for sympathy as the act of 
unearthing and illuminating unnoticed beauty.230 Insisting that this is the artist’s 
responsibility, she writes in Adam Bede: “Therefore, let Art always remind us of . . . . men. 
who see beauty in these commonplace things, and delight in showing how kindly the light of 
heaven falls on them.” (17: 2-3)  
 Who better than Ruskin to give testimony to Eliot’s commitment to the mundane 
truths of the common folks whose description of their “blotches, burrs and pimples” we 
recognized because “they resemble our own”231 faults and imperfections. Implicit in Ruskin’s 
observation, is that the upper class pay so little attention to the commonplace folks that it 
                                                
      230 Sympathy and sympathize were the commonly used words from 1579 and 1588 to express “to suffer 
with or like an other empathy. In 1912 the word empathy was introduced as a psychological term defined as “a 
feeling or frame of mind evoked by or responsive to some external influence.” Oxford Universal Dictionary. 
 
       231Ruskin. “Fair and Foul” 
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takes a mediated description of their physiognomy or social practices —in a novel or 
painting—to break through the class barrier to recognize the flaws and frailties, “blotches, 
burrs and pimples” common to all humanity. Eliot’s “The Mill on the Floss,” says Ruskin, “is 
perhaps the most striking instance extant of this,” in contrast to Sir Walter Scott in whose 
“total method of conception, only lofty character is worth describing at all.”232 Here’s Ruskin 
writing in his essay Fair and Foul: 
There is not a single person in the book of the smallest importance to anyone 
in the world but themselves, or whose qualities deserved so much as a line of 
printer’s type in their description. There is no girl alive, fairly clever, half 
educated and unluckily related, whose life has not as much in it as Maggie’s 
to be described and to be pitied. Tom is a clumsy and cruel lout, with the 
makings of better things in him (and the same may be said of nearly every 
Englishman at present smoking and elbowing his way through the ugly world 
his blunders have contributed to the making of);233  
 
Eliot’s genius, Ruskin recognizes, is in her humanity, her sympathy for others. She elevates 
the common and democratizes the elevated. She finds joy in art that demonstrates the 
perception that leads to the pleasure, the “delight” in being able to “show” what others fail to 
see —the glow of goodness on the commonplace faces which she calls the “light of heaven.” 
Her appreciation of that “other beauty” is one that cultivates a different kind of perception 
than the casually, wandering eye. It is another way of seeing, seeing as contemplation that 
grows out of thoughtful observation, a gateway to knowledge that enables movement away 
from ingrained assumptions to a richer awareness of the beauty that exists in the ordinary. 
                                                
 232 Ruskin’s observation here of Scott’s class consciousness is no more than an affectionate 
observation of one of his literary idols. As a boy, Ruskin recalls in Praeterita, he had to read the Bible for hours 
every morning, but he recalls with delight the regular family gatherings after supper when his father read Sir 
Walter Scott’s novels to him and his mother..  
 
 233Ruskin. Fair and Foul. Ibid. 
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The new perception that Eliot speaks of is the sine qua non of another kind of beauty that is 
the driving cause of John Ruskin’s life—to teach artists to see. “The greatest thing a human 
soul ever does in this world,” says Ruskin, is to see. ”234 By seeing he means looking, 
observing, witnessing, perceiving, examining, apprehending, discerning—knowing. Seeing is 
an act of consummate brain engagement—a covenant with the world that is the key to rich 
experience, what Ruskin famously calls “poetry, prophecy and religion—all in one.” 235 
In relationships with others, the “deep secret of sympathy” that leads to enlightened 
perception lies in the private, mostly unnoticed emotional transactions of recognition and 
identification between one person and another. It is the “big-heartedness tenderness” that 
Eliot recognized in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s work that made him one of her favorite writers. 
As a student and follower of Ruskin’s theories of the all-encompassing, transforming 
nature of beauty—nothing in Ruskin’s world-view is untouched by beauty—here’s how Eliot 
expresses her personal experience of its power:  
Our caresses, our tender words, our still rapture under the influence of autumn 
sunsets, or pillared vistas, or calm majestic statues, or Beethoven symphonies, 
all bring with them the consciousness that they are mere waves and ripples in 
an unfathomable ocean of love and beauty; our emotion in its keenest moment 
passes from expression to silence, our love at its highest flood rushes beyond 
its object, and loses itself in the sense of divine mystery.  (Adam Bede, xx) 
 
Eliot slowly drowns metaphorically and literally in an oceanic experience of beauty. As she 
looks skywards at an “autumn sunset,” she is first lulled in the pleasureable consciousness of 
the ocean’s “mere waves and ripples,” then carried away in a deluge of a pure sensation, 
                                                
 234 Ruskin. MP. Vol 3, Ch. 16 
 
 235 Ruskin. Ibid 
  150 
“love” no longer located in the the sunset, the objectified source of pleasure, but replaced 
with awe and wonder “in the inexpressible sense of a divine mystery.” Her cognitive 
expression of the source of beauty is numbed into inchoate astonishment as the sweeping 
sensation of joy expands beyond the boundary of mind and body, beyond the marked space 
of her physical presence and its connection to the setting sun. The feeling that she describes, 
as she translates it, is not of this earthly world.  
Ruskin has said in Modern Painters that beauty is always available to us for it is 
“inexhaustible.” Eliot captures its limitlessness as an “unfathomable ocean of love.” As a 
follower of Ruskin’s aesthetic theories, beauty for Eliot seems to be what Ruskin calls “an 
eternal and inexhaustible . . . object of life” (MP Vol 2:3.) It penetrates every part of the 
sensual experience of her being: seeing, touching, listening, imagining, speaking, feeling, 
thinking. The beauty of sunsets, landscapes, statuary, symphonies and the love of that beauty 
passes through Eliot in what she describes as a rapture, the transport of her mind to a place 
outside the body, detached from the self, attached to the “eternal.” 
Ruskin has written that the experience of beauty comes only when the love of the 
object and our awe and gratitude for its presence moves us to a  state of “exultant, reverent 
and grateful perception” of the beautiful. Ruskin explains: 
[T]he higher estimation of these delights first in their being eternal and 
inexhaustible, and secondly in their being evidently no means or instrument of 
life but an object of life . . infinitely and for itself desired, we may be sure 
there is something of the divine; . . . And so, though we were to regard the 
pleasures of sight merely as the highest of sensual pleasures, and though they 
were of a rare occurrence. . .  there would still be a supernatural character 
about them, owing to their self-sufficiency. But when . . . they are gathered 
together, and so arranged to enhance each other . . . is caused . . . not only a 
  151 
feeling of strong affection towards the object in which they exist, but a 
perception of purpose and adaptation of it to our desires. . . out of which 
perception arise Joy, Admiration and Gratitude.236 
  
Eliot’s way of expressing this is that “our love at its highest flood rushes beyond its object, 
and loses itself in the sense of divine mystery.” Finding beauty, she tells us, means losing 
yourself in the sublime aesthetic celebration of a human in intense connection with nature.  
Our emotion in its keenest moment passes from expression to silence, our love at its highest 
flood rushes beyond its object, “ and looses itself in the sense of divine mystery.” 
Free of historical religiously-weighted speculations, Ruskin liberated the divine 
experience of beauty from its heavenly categorization and humanized the complicated 
intellectualized theorizing to declare it a human sensation, a property of the body delivered 
by the brain’s networks thoughout the body to rest there as an embodied sensation of joy. If 
we think of beauty as a physical experience, Ruskin’s theory of the stirrings of beauty come 
in an undulating wave of pleasure that soars free, changing, moving through different 
registers of affect, bringing with it the experience of joy (in), love (for), gratitude (for), and 
awe (of) the beautiful object. It transports us outside the narrow concerns of the self, Ruskin 
tells us, into elevated connections with the noblest qualities of the mind and spirit. The 
refining experience, he suggests, is as close to heaven as a human comes. Without these 
introspective experiences pleasure is not beauty, says Ruskin, but “mere animal 
consciousness of pleasant sensations” (236). 
 Because the question of Gwendolen Harleth’s’s beauty is Eliot’s entry into the 
novel—“Is she beautiful or not beautiful?” are the narrator’s first words— we are drawn by 
                                                
236 Ruskin. MP. Vol. 2. Part 111. Sect. 1. Ch. 2. p.237 
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Eliot to ask, what is the function of beauty in this narrative? What does beauty do to us, for 
us? And so, what does beauty do for Gwendolen?  If beauty transforms, in what way? What 
mysterious energy passes over the aesthetic bridge between the public and private human 
worlds? What lies beyond the threshold of the sub rosa world of mental life that holds the 
key to Gwendolen’s consciousness in relation to her external world and others in it. What is 
the key? How will Eliot use it to imagine her way into the capricious pathways of the mind. 
Eliot believes that artists must remind us of the “other” beauty, too. Is the “other beauty” an 
aesthetic experience? If it is, how does she create for us the experience, thought processes, 
motivations, and affects of the short-circuited consciousness of a beautiful character whose 
visual presence evokes awe and desire and whose awareness of feelings and concerns of 
others in her world is confined to its consequences for herself? Eliot becomes artist as human 
bio-archeologist, an artist of the psyche. See this scene at the novel’s opening: 
  Daniel Deronda, a thoughtful young man, watches Gwendolen at the roulette table at 
the Leubrunn spa in Germany where she has fled to escape the marriage proposal of Mr. 
Henleigh Grandcourt, an aristocrat of unquestionable wealth and questionable morality. As 
Deronda gazes at her, his thoughts—the opening lines of the novel—pose this question: 
Was she beautiful or not beautiful? And what was the secret of 
form or expression which gave the dynamic quality to her 
glance? Was the good or the evil genius dominant in those 
beams? Probably the evil; else why was the effect that of unrest 
rather than of undisturbed charm?    (7)  
 
 “Was she beautiful or not beautiful?” The doubt implicit in the question plunges the reader 
into an untimely confrontation with the text. How are we to engage with this question 
without a shred of evidence? To make a judgment about beauty we either have to see the 
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object under discussion, or be able to imagine it. Eliot, a keen student of visual perception, 
knows this, and no doubt, has her reasons for provoking us by asking a question we cannot 
answer, and we immediately understand that this is not about visual acuity or our aesthetic 
taste. Before Eliot’s accustomed vivid scene-setter, before the beginnings of her incisive 
detection of human dispositions —interior significations analysed through external signs—
comes the first either/or question and then another more intriguing one: “What was the secret 
of form or expression that gave the dynamic quality to her glance?” Before the possibility of 
an “aha” moment when the reader can ace the reading game by decoding the writer’s clues, 
Eliot’s narrator reveals what is bothering the character Daniel Deronda about the undefinable 
meaning of beauty that causes him to wonder: if the face is beautiful how deep does that 
beauty go?  What he asks is this: “Was the good or the evil genius dominant in those 
beams?” His answer? “Probably the Evil.” Fifty-one words into the novel — Eliot says in her 
introduction ( xxxi) that “everything is connected to everything else” — she has put us on 
notice that the question of beauty will permeate this work. Her question: Is there a relation 
between beauty and goodness? 
 Gwendolen Harleth, the young woman whose presence raised these questions in 
Daniel Deronda’s mind was jubilantly winning at roulette in the crowded, smoke-filled 
room.237 At first, the object of his question appears to be, or we assume it to be, the relative 
beauty of Gwendolen’s face and the body seen through Deronda’s eyes. It is; and it is not. 
What significantly interests him is something other than her physical charms— and all the 
                                                
 237 In his introduction to Eliot’s novel, Terence Cave, writes that “the genesis of Daniel Deronda is 
often traced back” to an episode in 1872 when George Eliot and George Lewes witnessed Lord Byron’s grand-
niece gambling at Homburg. “The saddest thing to be witnessed,” wrote Eliot in a letter to her publisher John 
Blackwood,”is the play of Miss Leigh, who is only 26 years old, and is completely in the grip of this mean, 
money-raking demon. It made me cry to see her fresh young face among the hags and brutally stupid men 
around her.” The George Eliot Lettters, 1955. Ed. Gordon. S. Haight, Vol. V. London: Oxford UP., 314.  
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more interesting for us because of that. His gaze is not one of heightened longing; it is a 
lingering look in search of what lies beneath the surface of her skin—her ethical life.  
  Looking past the alluring face, he wants to know what drives her disturbingly 
assertive presentation and the nature of the intense inclinations that dominate her thoughts.  
A sense of discomfort creeps over Deronda’s body. He feels a strange dis-ease. It comes 
from something outside of himself he believes—an emanation, perhaps, of the woman’s 
energy. “Probably evil,” he thinks, otherwise if it were good “he would be experiencing the 
relaxed sense of pleasure or “undisturbed charm” rather than the disquiet of agitation.” This 
thought disturbs him. Seeking confirmation of his embodied reaction that “the evil genius” 
was in her, he finds it in another question: “Why was the wish to look again felt as a coercion 
and not as a longing in which the whole being consents”(7). 
  Even as he is struggles with his ambivalence, Deronda is operating in full conscious 
awareness of his own conflicting responses to desire. He admits implicitly that he is no 
stranger to the impulse of fixing his eyes on a beautiful face, for as Roger Scruton write in 
Beauty, “beauty invites us to focus on the beautiful object, so as to relish his or her presence. 
But, Scruton also points out that “ beauty in not just an invitation to desire, but also a call to 
renounce it” (45). Deronda is caught in this tangle of responses. This sense of “coercion” in 
him is unfamiliar—a compulsion to look, a struggle against his will—the insistent activity of 
his body response to beauty almost overriding his more disciplined instincts. A disquieting 
voice of conscience has stepped in to influence the struggle over the irrestible power of 
beauty. 
 Deronda’s mental questioning and his awareness of his body absorbing Gwendolen’s 
emotional energy carries him across the invisible barrier from the public to the into the 
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private world of the mind.. His speculation takes him away from the visible body over a 
threshold into the processes of the woman’s consciousness to imagine the qualities of her 
mind, “to think [himself]imaginatively into [her] experience,” to probe the reality of a beauty 
that is based so uncritically on a superficial glance. He has noticed her compelling 
physicality, of course, but he questions whether it is a philosopher’s signifier of her “soul’s” 
beauty. Deronda is typical of well-educated Victorians in the last quarter of the century at the 
cultural intersection where the religious idea of soul and the scientific mind meets. The 
soulfulness of her mind is on his questing mind—the nature of her character and 
consciousness interests him. He feels uneasy. His body has connected energetically with an 
unsettling darkness in her. For Daniel Deronda this darkness is not an act of imagination, it 
comes from the “dynamic energy,” the emotion he saw in her face, emanating from her body 
and experienced in his body as “unrest.”   
 Teresa Brennan has called this experience “the transmission of affect.” The 
phenomonology of group and crowd psychology claims that feelings such as anger and 
anxiety, exhilaration and sadness, are carried from individuals into the atmosphere. “In other 
words,” writes Brennan, “the transmission of affect is social in origin” and even if only for an 
instant,”alters the biochemistry and neurology of the subject.”238 In describing Deronda’s 
stream of consciousness, Eliot is anticipating science by formulating what we now recognize 
as theory of mind (TofM). This process of imagining and speculating on the thoughts, 
feelings, motivations, and possible actions of others –friends, strangers or enemies—is the 
brain’s survival adaptation to aid bonding, build supportive communities and avoid hostile 
encounters. Eliot‘s natural empathetic response to people and her elevated artistic practice of 
mind theory in building authentically-minded characters allows her to use the twin 
                                                
 238 Brennan (2004). The Transmission of Affect, 1.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2004 
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intelligences of the mind and the body to open richer possibilities of exploring and unfolding 
nature. In this case, her interest in opening a discussion of the two human beauties: the 
exultation of the beautiful face and body, in contrast to the cultivation and admiration of 
sympathy, the beauty within, a topic that has long been on her mind.  
 There is great poignancy in Eliot’s statement of  giving “reverence to the divine 
beauty of form!” Here is her response to a man who dismisses the importance of the effort in 
painting the truth in the “homely,” “irregular “ faces of Dutch peasants at a wedding, who 
says: “Foh! What good is there in taking all these pains to give an exact likeness of old 
women and clowns?” Eliot argues that there is good in Adam Bede: 
But bless us, things may be lovable that are not altogether handsome, I hope? . 
I am not at all sure that the majority of the human race have not been ugly, 
and even among those “lords of their kind,” the British, squat figures, ill-
shapen nostrils, and dingy complexions are not startling exceptions. Yet there 
is a great deal of family love amongst us. Thank God; human feeling is like 
the mighty rivers that bless the earth: it does not wait for beauty—it flows 
with resistless force and brings beauty with it. 
All honor and reverence to the divine beauty of form! Let us cultivate it to the 
utmost in men and women and children—in our gardens and in our houses.. . .  
But let us love that other beauty too, which lies in no secret of proportion but 
in the secret of deep human sympathy. (Ch.17. 2-3)  
 
When she uses the inclusive “us” and the personal “I” she speaks from the heart. Moving 
from the practical argument that we all know people who are not physically beautiful but 
whom we love because they are good and lovable, Eliot makes short work of the flawed  and 
fanciful philosophy that is the crux of pernitious injustice. Turning again to the life-force of 
primordial waters to capture generative power of shared human feeling, Eliot writes:  
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“[Human feeling] is like the mighty rivers that bless the earth: It does not wait for beauty—it 
flows with resistless force and brings beauty with it.” Whichever mighty river comes to 
mind, we understand with awe its unstoppable power to carry anything along on its mighty 
moving back until is carries it into the ocean leaving it free to move where it will.  Eliot so 
believes in the distributive algorithm of human sympathy she sees it coursing through the 
body that creates it, carrying it on from one to another, endlessly propagating seeds of 
compassion in life after life. 
 In the nature of this call for this other beauty, Eliot is demanding attention be paid to 
what is beautiful in a human other than the sensually dazzling, publicly conscious display of 
face and body. Look instead on the quiet love and generosity of “delicious” human sympathy 
for others, she urges, see the beauty of “contentment” and the spirit of “goodwill” between 
common folks and regard it with the same “honor and reverence” given to the beautiful face. 
Eliot is not discounting the brain’s hard-wired delight of visual and physical beauty; she 
urges that we fool the beauty-idolators by “cultivating” beauty in ourselves, in the same way 
that we can tranform a weedy patch of earth —like the one outside Hester Prynne’s prison—
into something beautiful to look at.  Eliot is trying to expand the effect of beauty by 
campaigning for the “honor and reverence” of the beauty of human sympathy, as a first 
among beauty’s equals. If for the ancients Beauty is goodness and virtue, for Eliot, Deep 
Sympathy is a beautiful soul and a better world. 
 The relationship of physical beauty’s secular advantages in social, career and sexual 
relationships is a topic that was painfully familiar to Eliot. She was not so privileged. She 
was shy, thought herself socially awkward and lacking in beauty. Herbert Spencer, the 
polymath, who relished her brilliant intellectual companionship and with whom she was in 
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love in 1852, broke her heart when he could not return her passion.239 “Marian showed . . . 
that innocence of conventionalities . . . and embarassed Spencer with her ardour,” writes 
Rosemary Ashton, “ In reponse to a note send by Spencer which had clearly been intended to 
dampen her ardour,” she replied: “I felt disappointed rather than ‘hurt’ that you should not 
have sufficiently divined my character to perceive how remote it is from my habitual state of 
mind to imagine that anyone was falling in love with me (98). 
 Eliot loves generously but says she is too circumspect to expect love in return. 
Because of her homeliness, she does not even “imagine that anyone (italics added) was 
falling in love” with her. All Spencer’s letters to her have disappeared,240 but it seems that as 
Ashton suggests, she waves off Spencer’s concerns that  she imagined he was in love with 
her  She chides Spencer for this lack of awareness of her “habitual state of mind,” which is a 
denial of herself as an object of any man’s erotic interest. She seems more concerned with 
losing his friendship and companionship than wooing him. In a later startlingly brave letter 
she begs him not to forsake her, and asks that: 
 
[Y]ou will always be with me as much as you can and share your thoughts and 
feelings with me. If you become attached  to some on else, then I must die . . . 
Those who have known me best have said that if ever I love anyone 
thoroughly  my whole life must turn upon that feeling, and I find they said 
truly. You curse the destiny which has made that feeling concentrate itself on 
you—but if you will only have patience with me you . . . will find that I can 
be satisfied by very little, if I am delivered from the dread of losing it. 
I suppose that no woman ever before wrote such a letter as this —but I am not 
ashamed of it, for I am conscious that in the light of reason and true 
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refinement I am worthy of your respect and tenderness, whatever gross men or 
vulgar-minded women might think of me. (100)  
 
While modest about her romantic prospects, she has a healthy sense of self-esteem.  
 In an essay in the Times Literary Supplement in 1919, Virginia Woolf notes that the 
unpleasant descriptions of Eliot’s face came mostly from “the opposite sex, [who] have 
resented half consciously perhaps, her deficiency in a quality which is held to be supremely 
desirable in women.”241  Woolf’s idea that men might resent women who are not lovely to 
look at—they disappoint the male expectation, or rather the desire for the heightened erotic 
sensation that comes with the male gaze—suggests the perversely disordered male/ female 
order. Reduced to a face and a body, both prize and quarry, the womanly function is to 
provide delight and fantasy for the consuming eye, every male gaze that chooses or discards 
with resentment, she who is, or is not ,“supremely desirable.” What is “supremely desirable” 
is the supreme desire of the male. This comes, as John Berger says, in Ways of Seeing “at the 
cost of the woman’s self being split into two, in contrast to the male’s unified sense of self”: 
A man’s presence is dependent upon the promise of power which he embodies 
. . . The promised power may be moral, physical, temperamental, economoic, 
social, sexual—but the object is always exterior to the man. A man’s presence 
suggests what he is capable of doing to you or for you. . . .By contrast a 
woman’s presence expresses her attitude to herself, and defines what can and 
what cannot be done to her. Her presence is manifest in her gestures, voice, 
opinions, expressions, clothes, chosen surroundings, taste —indeed there is 
nothing she can do that does not contribute to her presence. Presence for a 
woman is so intrinsic to her person that men tend to think of it as an almost 
physical emanation, a kind of heat or smell, or aura. A woman must 
continually watch herself. . . . She is almost continually accompanied by her 
                                                
 241 Woolf’s essay on George Eliot appeared in the series  “A Celebration of Women Writers.” 
  160 
own image of herself. . . . And so she comes to consider the surveyor and the 
surveyed within her as the two constituents yet always as distinct elements of 
her identity as a woman. (45-6) 
 
One such man was Henry James. In a note to his father after meeting George Eliot, drops all 
pretense of upper-class British manners and describes her as: ‘[M]agnificently ugly—
deliciously hideous. She has a low forehead, a dull grey eye, a vast pendulous nose, a huge 
mouth full of uneven teeth and a chin and jaw-bone qui n’en finissent pas. 242 But, he admits 
to falling in love with her. Because . .  .“ [I]n this vast ugliness resides a powerful beauty, 
which in a very few minutes steals forth and charms the mind, so that you end as I ended, in 
falling in love with her.”243 After all the ugly words, he is smitten with George Eliot’s 
appealing beauty. But in the impact of first appearances, she is: Magnificently ugly”—
“deliciously hideous,” a “vast pendulous nose, a huge mouth . . .  and a jaw-bone” that (in the 
English translation) never ends. Fantasizing these features into a cohesive image requires a 
monstrously imaginative mind-set. One wonders what psychological pathology the more 
mature critic Henry James might have ascribed to a writer who so described a woman whose 
only offence was her terrifying brilliance and her undisputed homeliness. His description of 
the “powerful beauty” of her being, the “other beauty” of her presence, the beauty of her 
shining intelligence, can be considered an expression of awe, but it is a compliment delivered 
with what must be unconscious irony, for Henry James is no stranger to the ironic. He 
experiences her “powerful beauty” as “steal[ing] forth.” Why he considers that the “power” 
of Eliot’s otherwise noble attributes should have to sneak out like a intruder from behind a 
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wall to ”steal” his unwillingly given attention and “charm” away, like a snake handler, his 
perceptions of the vastness of her ugliness, suggests one of two interpretations: Eliot’s 
reticence or James’s imperiousness. Portraits and drawings of Eliot in her twenties, thirties 
and forties show James’s description of “vast ugliness” as a grotesque caricature of someone 
who according to Leslie Stephens (Virginia Woolf’s father) was “intensely feminine, ”244 and 
whose gentle deep-set eyes, strong chin and nose— certainly prominent in profile—
dominated her serious face when she was observed in deep thought.245 If Henry James’s 
thoughts are typical of the attitudes of Eliot’s male contemporaries how could she remain 
unconscious of the heavy significance of the male glance? How could she respond to the sour 
rejection of the male practicing his patriarchal right to consider the female charms presented 
for his delight and delectation?  
 Imagine if this description from James represents even a smattering of what Eliot 
experienced in her day. Think about what it might mean to be painfully conscious that you 
are an object of conspicuous attention because you are seen as physically unusual in some 
way— a woman with a nose too large, or a man whose nose is blasted away by a war. Each 
pitying or appraising eye fixed on your face becomes an assault to defend against by looking 
neither left or right, but straight ahead. Even then the stare pierces your peripheral vision and 
your consciousness. If you think of yourself as ugly, as Eliot did herself, you already know 
what they are thinking. For every time you look in a mirror you think it, too. You agree. This 
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 245 Woolf quotes another passage from Edmund Gosse. Many years after Eliot’s death, he recalls her 
“driving through London in a victoria.” What he remembers was: [A] large, thick-set sybil, dreamy and 
immobile, whose massive features, somewhat grim when seen in profile, were incongruously bordered by a hat, 
always in the height of Paris fashion . . .”245 At least, Gosse acknowledges her oracular literary status by naming 
her a “sybil,” but sybils—even those “thick-set” ones— are not made to appear ludicrous for the wearing of a 
fashionable chapeau.  
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means you join with them in demeaning yourself and thus are doubly diminished. Being 
made smaller is one of this metaphor’s body-based analogies that captures a physical and 
psychological reality to diminish: to lessen, reduce, shrink, truncate, cut down, crop, lop, 
curtail, fade away, contract, belittle. Perversely, as the defences disintegrate, you internalize 
your literal relation to the metaphoric meaning. The experience? You feel shamed, writes 
Léon Wurzer. Shame is the “intense consciousness of being the object of severe and 
universal observation.”246 You might try to camouflage your flaws under a large hat like 
George Eliot’s. Or you might shrink away from the world and become reclusive as some 
critics have proposed that Eliot did. However, that is not so.  
According to Kathleen McCormack’s recent revisionist account of Eliot’s social life, 
”after a period of social ostracism in reaction to their non-marital union, Eliot and George 
Lewes were very socially active, in and out of their home. The Lewes’s were sought-after 
guests at “concerts, opera, dinners, weekends, recitals, excusions and salons. And in the 
summer months they hosted a weekly salon “famously known as Sundays at the Priory,” 
which were “crowded with many of the most important and respected of Victorian 
Contemporaries.” 247 Referring back to Adam Bede, Eliot’s words on physical appearance 
and lovability captures her warmth and affection for her many friends—men and women—
“my every-day fellow-men whose faces I know.” And for whom she reserved “a great deal of  
[those feelings of] love and reverence for whose hands” she held as they sat chatting on 
Sunday afternoons at The Priory. Of course, these details contradict the promulgated portrait 
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of Eliot (and Lewes) as unlovely and socially ostracized and replace it with a warm and 
loving woman who nurtures her friends and is cherished by them. 
  Or instead, imagine the experience of a young woman like Gwendolen Harleth, a 
“sylph” who has a “graceful figure”[and] . . . could hardly be passed with indifference (10). 
She is “intensely conscious” that she was the object of Daniel Deronda’s “severe . . . 
observation,” she returned his stare. This is how Eliot imagines what Harleth imagines 
Deronda’s “severe” look implies: 
Her eyes met Deronda’s. . . The darting sense that he was measuring her, and 
looking down on her as an inferior, that he was of a different quality from the 
human dross around her, that he felt himself in a region outside and above her, 
and was examining her as a specimen of a lower order, roused a tingling 
resentment which stretched the moment with conflict. It did not bring the 
blood to her cheeks, but sent it away from her lips. She controlled herself by 
the help of an inward defiance . . . But Deronda’s gaze seemed to have acted 
as an evil eye. (12) 
 
She feels judged. She thinks “he [is] measuring her,” “look[ing] down on her, and finding her 
“inferior.” She decides that he sees her as one among the lower class, the “dross” around the 
table, a nonentity, beneath him. The imagined intensity of his scrutiny traps the flow of her 
breath, tightening her face and draining the blood “from her lips.” She tries to hide her 
distress by appearing equal to him—“defiant” before his gaze. But, she is unnerved by its 
penetration: it has the effect of paralysis —an “evil eye.” Each sees evil in the other’s eye. 
Gwendolen Harleth is imagining what he thinks of her and  she is unnerved by the startling 
experience of discomfort. Deronda’s gaze is a painful experience for her; it has the force of 
blackness —as if a malevolent power has overtaken her.  
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 Why her reflected response to a stranger’s look should take her so quickly into a dark 
hole of doubt is strange. She had been seen a few minutes before as having “an air of firm 
choice” (10) but suddenly she seems undone. At this point in the novel we know little about 
her. It is as if Eliot were using Gwendolen as a “blank slate” to demonstrate the power of the 
first impressions on the visual brain, the chemical jolt of a beautiful face, and what beauty 
translates to in the personal and social blendings of significance in late nineteenth-century 
life.  Eliot is writing at a time when the institution of aristocracy is crumbling in irrelevance, 
and with it the calcified English regimes of class, gender, religion, education and the 
repressive political, economic and social apparatus that limits the expansion of the 
individual’s development as agents of their own aspirations.248 
 Out of the 19th century world of philosopy and the sciences, the fascinations of the 
mechanism of the human organism and the mysteries of the brain and the mind comes 
George Eliot who, writes Terence Cave, “combined a formidable intelligence with 
imaginative sympathy, and acute powers of observation.”249 Eliot’s interests in the mind 
sciences, he adds, “widened the horizons of the novel and her psychological insights 
radically influenced the novelist’s approach to characterization.” Following Ruskin’s 
criterion of truthfulness of representation in the arts, Eliot sees her task as an author in 
capturing, as in a “portrait,” her characters’ true nature by close observation of their 
expressions, and by making that truth alive to the reader through the descriptive mastery of 
images, the visual language Ruskin modeled in Modern Painters. “Examine your words 
well,” Eliot warned,”and you will find that even when you have no motive to be false, it is a 
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hard thing to say the exact truth.” Eliot wrote of the quality of truthfulness in the 
representation in the faces of the “homely” villagers in Dutch genre painting as a “rare, 
precious quality of truthfulness I delight in.” “There is,” she wrote, 
[A] source of delicious sympathy in these faithful pictures of a monotonous 
homely existence, which has been the fate of so many more among my fellow 
mortals or I turn to the village wedding . . .  where an awkward bridegroom 
opens the dance with a high-shouldered, broad-faced bride, while elderly and 
middle-aged folk look on, with very irregular noses and lips . . .   
And: 
There are few prophets in the world; few sublimely beautiful women; few 
heroes. I can’t afford to give all my love and reverence to such rarities: I want 
a great deal of those feeling for my every-day fellow-men whose faces I 
know, whose hands I touch, for whom I make way with kindly courtesy. 
        Adam Bede  
Eliot’s expression of “delicious” in her sympathetic connection to the “precious quality of 
truthfulness” in the Dutch artists’ honest appreciation of the common lives of their subjects 
suggests it is a nourishing experience. She is filled up with the pleasure felt in the 
acknowledged significance of their ordinary lives. Sympathy clearly is not unidirectional. It 
is first felt at its source, then by the receiver, and also by an observer such as Eliot, whose 
perceptive acuity for human sympathy is emotionally intuitive. The intimacy of Eliot’s 
imaginative connection reflects her authentic response to the reception and representation of 
the different other. Eliot makes clear her view that the artist has a responsibility to mirror in 
art the real human experience. The carefully studied face speaks volumes. Hugh Witemeyer 
observes in George Eliot and the Visual Arts the influence of Ruskin’s expressive theories in 
Eliot’s writing: 
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To her nineteenth-century eyes, expression was the gateway to the soul, the 
mind, the passions, the sentiments, transmitting the invisible life through a 
visible language of facial and corporal signs. 250 
This is true to Ruskin’s teaching that “the expression of the thoughts of persons represented 
will always be the first thing considered” by an artist.251 “Considered” is a gigantically 
important word in Ruskin’s language of artistic morality. Atttaching the word “morality” to a 
discussion of Ruskin’s views is irresistible because of his preacherly voice, and associating 
the morality to his evangelical Christian religious belief is commonplace. But, Harold Bloom 
argues that is a mistaken assumption. Ruskin’s morality is integrity —fairness, justness, 
honest dealing—the right way for any human being to behave. When Ruskin says  “the 
expression of the thoughts will always be the first thing considered” by an artist, he means 
that it is first, not a “should,” it is a priority, that it must be paid attention to and reflected on. 
When Ruskin says “considered” it is not a euphemism.  His “considered” means that 
thoughtful, sympathetic attention must be paid. This is the same kind of sympathetic 
consideration of the commonplace that Eliot insists fulfills the true promise of art, a truth 
which “is the nearest thing to life.” Art, she continues, “is a mode of amplifying experience 
and extending our contract with our fellow man beyond the bonds of our personal lot.” 
Introducing the concept of a “contract with our fellow man,” elevates the consideration of 
treating others with “dignity” as a human right, not a personal courtesy:   
All the more sacred is the task of the artist when he undertakes to paint the life 
of the people. Falsification here is far more pernicious than in the more 
artifiicial aspects of life. It is not so very serious that we should have false 
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ideas about evanescent fashions—about the manners and conversation of 
beaux and duchesses; but it is serious that our sympathy with the perennial 
joys and struggles, the toil, the tragedy, and the humour in life of our more 
heavily-laden fellow men, should be perverted, and turned towards a false 
object instead of a true one. (Adam Bede, 445)  
 
 Eliot’s vehement language in condemning as “perverted” the false represention of life so 
vividly expressed on the faces and the hard-worked bodies of “heavily-laden fellow men” 
and women reaches deeply into the belief in the sacredness of every human life. For an artist 
to reduce a fellow man to insignificance by obliterating his essential being Eliot believes is in 
effect, a moral lapse, the willful desecration of truth.  
 p—and frustration— of Eliot’s cautiousness in writing “the exact truth,” is the 
carefulness of her characterization of her heroine, Gwendolen Harleth. This scrupulous 
gentleness, a definite reserve of judgment, is in some ways typical of Eliot’s preference to 
allow the reader to join her in her process of absorbing and weighing the import of scattered 
character vignettes before reaching conclusions. Not that Eliot might have had a motive to be 
false to the character she created—why would she?— but rather that (from this reader’s point 
of view) Gwendolen’s behavior is often so intolerable that it argues against the restraint a 
reader might want to use to make sense of the beautiful girl’s ugly behavior. But one feels 
there is something more definitive in Eliot’s reticence, perhaps, a yet unstated sympathetic 
attachment to the young woman—a step beyond sympathetic observation. When we pause to 
ponder this, we recall that now significant clue —the title Eliot gives to Book 1 of the 
novel:The Spoiled Child— and you wonder why she calls a 20-year-old a child, and who or 
what spoiled her?  Spoiled is a quagmire of a word, not an innocent adjective, as it suggests 
posed next to “child.” Objectively, its meaning stretches endlessly from a small flaw to utter 
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despoliation. What does this mean about Gwendolen?  It becomes clear that the story is in 
Eliot’s hands and that truth sometimes has to be unearthed, even though what seems like the 
truth has erupted on the page with a shocking jolt. Echoing Ruskin, Eliot biographer 
Rosemary Ashton, throws light on this technique: 
We are to be brought by the artist into sympathy with flawed, sometimes 
stupid characters because we are made to see . . . that we belong to the same 
species, share our humanity with them. George Eliot’s early fiction sets out to 
achieve such an extension of our sympathies by imaginitively involving us in 
the difficulties if the lives she creates for her characters.  (156) 
 
If this analysis holds up, we may recognize some of the “just like me” in Gwendolen’s 
character —since we all are flawed— and may find ourselves understanding and feeling 
empathy for the “Spoiled Child.”  
With centuries-old preconceptions of the physical beauty firmly in place, the author is taking 
us on a journey to an interior encounter with Gwendolen Harleth. In ironic coincidence, 
Gwendolen is coming along on the same journey: she will eventually discover herself 
through her relationships with the vastly different characters Eliot has created to be part of 
her world, and the agents of her torment and enlightenment. As Eliot begins to color in the 
picture of Gwendolen Harleth from the outside in, we experience the process from three 
perspectives—the narrator’s, Gwendolen’s and our own—a process of triple insight. Eliot 
makes some surprising revelations.  
Gwendolen’s private thoughts suggest a fragile self-esteem. Her fearful imaginings of 
Daniel Deronda’s thoughts, her construction of his mind, reveals her own self-consciousness 
in contrast to her usual preening self-confidence. She is hyper-sensitive, easily offended. Part 
of her insecurity relates to social status by which she measures others—and especially 
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herself: superior or inferior, or worse, a nonentity, the squirming, “dross,” like insects pinned 
and trapped on a lab table, specimen[s] of a lower order. ” These images are conjured out of 
Harleth’s fertile imagination. But their chilling effect on her, her humiliation, which she 
projects onto Deronda as his audacity in reducing her to this commonplace status, halts her 
body’s systemic life-giving flow of blood, bleaching the rosiness from her lips. Meanwhile, 
gazing at the “problematic sylph,” (10) Deronda’s thoughts are elsewhere —not on her class 
or status, but analyzing her “cold and neutral look,” an attempt he imagines she is making to 
“conceal an inward exultation” at her winning streak at the table. While his perception is of 
her imagined triumph at the table; her imagined humiliation is in her interpretation of the 
message she sees in his gaze. Here’s Eliot’s interpretation of Gwendolen’s interior struggle to 
understand: 
[I]t was at least better that he should have kept his attention fixed on her than 
he should have disregarded her as one of an insect swarm that had no 
individual physiognomy. Beside, in spite of his superciliousness and irony, it 
was difficult to believe that he did not admire her spirit as well as her person: 
he was young, handsome, distinguished in appearance—not one of those 
dowdy Philistines who thought it incumbent on them to blight the gaming-
table with a sour look of protest as they passed by it. The general conviction 
that we are admirable does not easily give way before a single negative. . . . In 
Gwendolen’s normal habits of mind it had been taken for granted that she 
knew she was admirable and that she herself was admired. This basis of her 
thinking had received disagreeable concussion, and reeled a little, but was not 
easily to be overthrown. (11-12)   
She knew he was still watching her. Locked into her mind’s reading of his opinion of her as a 
nonentity, “as one of an insect swarm that had no individual physiognomy,” she tries to take 
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some comfort in his continuing attention which proves, to her that, indeed, she is interesting 
to him. She begins the psychic effort to shore up her shaky self-esteem. She cannot “believe 
that [this man, a stranger across the room] did not admire her.” After all, given her life 
experience, she takes “for granted” that she is admirable, and that “she herself [is] admired.” 
But, she is not wondering why her “admirable” self disappears at this very moment when the 
admiration she expects is missing. The destruction of this “admirable” self is not Deronda’s. 
It is a demolition of self —self-demolition. Deronda’s stern gaze has stirred up a wounded 
self. It had the physical effect of a blow to her head, “a disagreeable concussion,” an assault 
on her mind. Her description of bodily violence, of a concussion, as her personal experience 
of this imagined attack punches home how brutal is the loss of her perfect self. Like the 
experience of intense shame that psychologists say is physically painful, she is “reeling” 
from the blow — that sickening fear of the loss of an idealized self, a disorienting feeling-
based cognitive state of pitching and rolling as you hang on to the idea of who you think you 
are. But, Gwendolen Harleth “was not easily to be overthrown.” She feels humiliated, but she 
rallies. She will fight back. The fateful connection of Deronda’s and Harleth’s eyes across the 
smoke-filled room is over. No words have passed between them, but the conversation of 
eyes, of imagined minds, of felt affect is well-advanced—each has imagined the other’s life 
of the mind. We have encountered the fragile identity behind Gwendolen’s confident mask. 
What comes next? How does she fight back to pick up pieces of her shattered image, to 
recreate her idealized self ? When Gwendolen Harleth appears in the hotel’s salon that 
evening, she has wrapped herself in a  costume of other-world imagery.   
 The uprooted Gwendolen has plunged herself into the costume of a watery world and 
with it a new personna. Eliot is now at work writing into flesh her face and body, or painting 
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the portrait of Gwendolen Harleth as Eliot prefers to think of it. Here is the image, the 
impressionistic visual assemblage Eliot begins to create. It lures our eyes into the portrait she 
paints, first, as a beginning of familiarity, to absorb the outside of a beautiful woman— the 
color, the texture, the detail, the attitude of the body. We, as readers, are audience surrogates, 
gaping at a woman’s fantasy alter-ego : 
The Nereid in sea-green robes and silver ornaments, with a pale green feather 
fastened in silver falling backward over her green hat and light brown hair 
was Gwendolen Harleth. She was under the wing or rather soared by the 
shoulder of the lady who had sat by her at the roulette table . . . They were 
walking about or standing to chat with acquaintances; and Gwendolen was 
much observed by the seated guests.    (12) 
 
This is what we might imagine, our eyes prompted by Eliot’s powerful visuals, of colors, 
textures, and actions: All eyes are on 20-year-old Gwendolen, just as she intended. The 
seated guests look up at the elegant, slender frame, soaring over her older companion. She is 
draped in robes of oceanic hues of pale-green decorated with ornaments of silver that ripple 
as she moves. Her light brown hair is set off with a green hat and a silver clasp from which is 
suspended at the back a pale green feather. The solidity of the earth in the silver and the 
ethereal plumage of the feather teases the visual cortex with the pleasures of contrasts, and 
the marvel of different spheres of deep dark geology and the lightness of the heavens. That 
Eliot should choose to have her either “under the wing of” or “rather soared by” her 
companion is a visual gift of two avian metaphors offering different interpretations.   
 There is no settled mental space for Gwendolen. We sense she is in flux. This is how 
Eliot pulls us from the visual feast into the real nourishment of seeing—to wonder, as in 
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feeling awe, and to wonder, as in the process of what comes after attentive seeing that 
engages the brain: thinking.  Looking at the outside as Eliot shows, is not a dead-end activity. 
When it involves the mind as well as the eye, it has questions to ask. Gwendolen is either 
protected “under the wing” of a mother substitute or is “soar[ ing] by,” breaking free of her. 
Although Eliot’s use of “rather” indicates her choice, the ambivalence suggests an allusion to 
child-woman is in the unsure process of breaking out of the nest. The effect of the body, 
floating in the salon’s airless atmosphere in a mermaid outfit of pale green and silver scales is 
that of a Nereid, a mythical sea nymph. She does not walk like others, she appears elevated, 
“soaring.” No longer just Miss Harleth, she is on an imaginative wave as princess of the sea, 
her feet barely touching the floor, her feather fluttering behind her, alive in her wake. The 
sea-green gown and silvery scales flash in the candlelight as she glides through the hotel 
salon which is now her sparkling silver and green underwater kingdom. She is, in every 
sense, it seems, in her element—in her sense of herself and in the environment Eliot has 
imagined as the backdrop for Gwendolen’s carefully created costume drama. It is a mirage of 
her pretentions. In the mysterious effect of the subdued lighting, she is to the human eye 
shimmeringly beautiful enough to spark the image of one of the fifty daughters of the all-
powerful sea god Nereus, the son of Oceanus who rules the seas, and Gaia, the goddess of the 
earth.  
 Eliot’s Gwendolen is no ordinary creature. She is an object for the eye, an object of 
desire, an object for discussion. Here, Eliot draws us in as eavesdroppers to a nineteenth-
century conversation about the irresistible physical elements that evoke the mind’s and 
body’s sensations of awe in the presence of female beauty. The gossipy onlookers are cast as 
amateur analysts: 
  173 
 “A striking girl—that Miss Harleth—unlike others,” says one guest, setting her apart 
from all the other young women in the room.  Her beauty is sui generis, ‘unlike others.” It is 
not a gentle, caressing beauty that safely draws you into its aura. Instead, it assaults him, 
“striking” him, knocking him down dead in its provocation. Her looks have pummelled him 
breathless with excitement, or anxiety. 
 His companion picks up the scent of danger. “Yes, she has got herself up as a sort of 
serpent now, all green and silver, and winds her neck about a little more than usual.” She is 
dangerous, a “sort of serpent,”  a monster, poised to attack her victim, her neck winding to 
watch her prey, who might be Deronda, or, more likely, a large audience of admiring eyes. 
 “Oh,” observes another, “she must be doing something extraordinary. She is that kind 
of girl.” He sees Gwendolen’s performance as too obvious, she’s a show-off, feeding off 
attention, staging a optic event to galvanize attention. “She’s certanly eye-catching in her 
green and silver gown, but “do you find her pretty?”  
 “Very,” says the distinguished Mr. Vandernoodt, “a man might risk hanging for her.” 
And then, thinking better of it, adds: “I mean a fool might.”  Mr. Vandernoodt, who was first 
struck by her beauty, now daringly imagines it worth risking his neck to have the pleasure of 
embracing hers. A quick look at the penal code would zero in on the criminal offense that 
might end in a rope around his neck. This is what Mr. Vandernodt has in mind, even if for a 
few seconds, but the joking that obscures that desire, the moral sleight of tongue citing the 
punishment of hanging and not the crime of rape passes for what it is. It’s time to move back 
to Gwendolen’s face.  
 Another asks: “You like a nez retroussé then, and long narrow eyes?”  
“When they go with such an ensemble,” quips Mr.Vandernoodt, retreating a little.  
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“The ensemble du serpent?” his friend pushes back to what scares him, the monster temptress 
Gwendolen with the long neck.  
Vandernoodt’s friend says:“Woman was tempted by a serpent.” 
 The tempted Mr. Vandernoodt admits of it, therefore “Why not man?”  
His companion quibbles. Miss Harleth is “certainly very graceful,” but not to his taste,  “a bit 
too pale. She has a sort of Lamia beauty,” he says, reaching for the Keatsian reptilian symbol 
that squeezes him in the tight grasp of Gwendolen’s dangerously beautiful allure. 
The transfiguration from floating Neirid to writhing “Lamia,”of the beautiful snake/woman 
with breasts and female face and scaly snake body below, and a reputation for devouring her 
own children —causes Mr. Vandenoodt to defend her. He finds his evidence in her skin tone 
and the distracting curves of nose and lips. 
 “On the contrary, I think her complexion one of her chief charms. It is a warm paleness . . . 
And that delicate nose with its gradual little upward curve is distracting.” Mr. Vandenoodt’s 
eyes are devouring Gwendolen’s face—bite by bite. The detail: the nose, delicate, its upward 
curve so subtle that the eye must reach out to feel its profile to be able describe it with 
precision. Then, slipping down to the bow below, even more distracted by the sight of her 
mouth, he asks: ‘there was never a prettier mouth, the lips curl backward so finely, eh . . . ? ” 
“Think so?” disagrees his companion. “I cannot endure that sort of mouth. It looks so self-
complacent, as if it knew its own beauty —the curves are too immovable. I like a mouth that 
trembles more.”  This speaker, no doubt familiar with the age’s interest in phrenology, seems 
to prefer the signs of psychology written on the face. Those lovely lips don’t “tremble” with 
insecurity and modesty. Instead, to him, they speak to the “complacency,” the smug 
assurance of beauty that presumes male adulation. Ah, the trembling mouth, a sign of girlish 
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vulnerability, is the preferred presentation for the man who conjures up a snaky, child-
devouring woman in a 20-year-old spoiled child.  
 In the academy of beauty, everyone is an expert. The last word goes to an 
eavesdropping dowager.  “For my part I think her odious,” she says dismissively of 
Gwendolen. This private, but public, conversation about the obvious points of female beauty, 
the grace of the body, the clothes that cover it, the analogizing of female types, the delicacy 
of the complexion, the shape of the eyes, the tip of the nose, the curl of the lips, ends with 
another answer to Daniel Deronda’s question of whether Gwendolen Harleth is beautful or 
not beautful. But, for Gwendolen’s judge and jury it a question of a different order. The 
dowager, whose aesthetic tastes were perhaps frozen in styles of yesteryear, reports her 
considered opinion of that face and body—“Odious.”  And then, “ It is wonderful what 
unpleasant girls get into vogue.”  (all quotations, Daniel Deronda,12) 
As eavesdroppers and analysts in a set-piece of the objectification and dissection of a 
visually kidnapped body, we can judge this as fascinating, banal, inconsequential, bad 
mannered, or obscene, because it is all of these. It is also a societal normality in that it is the 
gossipy pleasure of the vapid observer to strip an attractive woman of her humanity, and lay 
her on their peculiarly-tilted female specimen table for dissection. The purpose, in this case, 
is its frivolous pleasure.  We’ve experienced the deconstruction by beauty by the invaders of 
Gwendolen, the object.  
Now let’s follow Eliot’s technique in thinking about beauty’s meaning. She first deals 
with physical beauty, its heart-stopping sensations, and its powerfully corrupting influence, 
false assumptions, misleading theories, deceptive promises and cruel consequences. With 
Gwendolen under scutinty, we see how Eliot chooses to represent her physical beauty and the 
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meaning it has for her and for the world she moves in. Next, we dive into the delicacy of 
mental life as Eliot illuminates the measure of her character’s spiritual beauty through her 
young consciousnesss, the stress of life’s unpredictibilities, and her estimation of herself in 
relation to others. This leads Eliot to the exposure of Harleth’s dark side—the inversion of 
beauty—the side that her beauty made possible, to become habitual without criticism or 
protest because her enchanting beauty sometimes creates the awe that silences tongues.   
The question “Is she beautiful or not beautiful,” focuses on a deeply ingrained 
cultural mindset, one that controls society’s views of women and, by insidious corollary, the 
adored woman’s and spoiled child’s view of herself.  
Always she was the princess in exile, who in time of famine was to have her 
breakfast roll made of the finest-bolted flour from the seven thin ears of 
wheat, and in a general decampment was to have her silver fork kept out of 
the baggage. How was this to be accounted for?  The answer may seem to lie 
quite on the surface: — in her beauty. A certain unusualness about her, a 
decision of will which made itself felt in her graceful movements and clear 
unhesitating tones, so that when she came into the room on a rainy day when 
everyone else was flaccid and the use of things in general was not apparent to 
them, there seemed to be a sudden, sufficient reason for keeping up the forms 
of life; and even the waiters at hotels showed the more alacrity in doing away 
with the crumbs and creases and dregs with struggling fliers in them. This 
potent charm, added to the fact that she was the eldest daughter for whom her 
mamma had always been in an apologetic state of mind for the evils brought 
on her by a step-father,252 may seem so full a  reason for Gwendolen’s 
                                                
252Gwendolen’s mother had made a disastrous marriage to seafaring Captain Davilow, who was 
seldom home, who stole her jewelry, and when he died left her with another four daughters (superfluous, as 
Eliot ironically calls them in reference to their also-ran position in the family). Gwendolen was the only child of 
the first happy marriage that also ended in the husband’s death. Louise Penner speculates in Unmapped 
Country: Uncovering the Hidden Wounds in “Daniel Deronda.” Victorian Literature and Culture, Vol. 30. #1 
(2002) (77-97) that Gwendolen’s stepfather may have molested her, thus accounting for her dislike of men. 
Given George Eliot’s narrative practices, it seems highly unlikely that she would have withheld critical 
information that would have had a major bearing on her character’s psychic life. 
  177 
domestic empire, that to look for any other would be to ask the reason of 
daylight when the sun is shining. (41) 
 
“How can one “account” for this?” asks Eliot. This is an implicit demand to explain why 
Gwendolen places herself above other members of her family, expecting better food and finer 
considerations for her comforts—an ethical observation that demands a just reckoning. In the 
level playing fields of familial fair-mindedness, Gwendolen assumes the role of the honored 
royal presence, complete with the silver-fork of privilege at the ready, too refined for the 
provisions and the humble abode of those who shelter her. Why this desire, or perhaps 
anxiety, of the family and the servants to attend to her stated preferences and her unspoken 
but intuited desires? What causes an otherwise lackadaisical staff and family to jump to their 
feet to perform for her, and for slovenly waiters in hotels to dance attention to clear away the 
“dregs” when Gwendolen appears? Why is Gwendolen’s lack of inner beauty ignored? Eliot 
with a pinch of reasonableness and a dollop of irony says “the answer may seem to lie quite 
on the surface: —in her beauty.” (emphasis added.) She is preferred because of her beauty. 
Of this commodity, Eliot says “it lie[s] quite on the surface.” The truth about Gwendolen’s 
surface, her face and body, is that “on the surface” it is a beautiful lie. Nevertheless this 
package of beauty, gracefulness, commanding presence, and “potent charms” is verifiably the 
flesh-and-blood attitude of a real princess to mother, sisters, servants and hotel waiters —all 
those who wait on her, wait until she is ready, until she wishes, until she requires the services 
of all these who find her beauty and its power irresistible. With that, and “mamma[’s]” 
perpetual “apologetic” appeasing guilt for inflicting Gwendolen with “evils brought on”  by a 
scoundrel of a step-father, the reason for the child’s imperious control of her “empire” is 
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easily explained. It seems clear “as daylight,” which as likely means that it is as complicated 
as the darkness of  night.  
The idea of Gwendolen, as a commoner-princess, beautiful in comparison to all 
around, is again impressed on our eye as we take in her regal entrance, alone in the spotlight, 
at the aristocratic Mrs. Arrowpoint’s evening soiree; 
No youthful figure there was comparable to Gwendolen’s as she passed 
through the long suite of rooms adorned with light and flowers, and, visible at 
first as a slim figure floating along in white drapery, approached through one 
wide doorway after another into fuller illumination and definiteness. She had 
never had that sort of promenade before, and she felt exultingly that it befitted 
her: any one looking at her for the first time might have supposed that long 
galleries and lackeys had always been a matter of course in her life.     (43) 
 
As a phantasm of the night, she arrives in our presence, a ghostly emanation from a 
gauzy distance. The narration moves from the onlookers’ perspective and slides so smoothly 
into Gwendolen’s exquisite sensations that suggest control of the dramatic moment as she 
“exultingly” floats slowly out of the diffused white distance, through the long rooms into the 
“illumination and definiteness” of her presence as embraced by her audience.The definiteness 
of her form, the certainty of her beauty, the indisputable superiority of her personhood is 
solidified by the admiring onlookers who provide the certainty of the exceptional presence 
that she exults in. It is a theatrical performance. It is also an idealized portrait of a 19th-
century princess—a “princess in exile” or the “Vandyke Duchess” as her cousin jokes (Intro 
xx). As the subject of an imagined portrait she is perfectly posed for effect. Follow the 
descriptive imagery of the vanishing-point architectural perspective of the elegant long 
rooms, the gauzy focus of vases of tall flowers and soft lights backlighting Gwendolen’s 
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swaying body as her onward movement through the arch takes her in front of the wide 
doorway that frames her body, all the while that body declaring as in the act of portraiture, 
her right to be there. All that is missing in the picture are the imagined “lackeys,” the 
inferiors, her imagined servile followers.  
Implicit in this scene is the aura of the social and sexual preference given the 
beautiful female face— eyes glued to the image, then swivelling from head down and across 
the body with awe and longing. To recreate the effect of the promiscuous eye, Eliot flashes 
edited images of Gwendolen as the pages turn, glimpses that we want to hold on to, but find 
difficult to assemble into a whole vision —although that is what the brain always strives to 
do, to complete the picture and solve the mystery — because just pieces of Gwendolen are 
selected out for observation—slices of the hair, the body, the throat, the eyes, the lashes, the 
mouth, caught as she appears and disappears, as the eyes move seeking more of her the idea 
of her as a fragmented woman struggling with physic disconnection between a beautiful 
outside and a lovely mind, becomes imprinted in memory. The author’s recurring images are 
compulsive to the point of obsession, a mimesis of the human response, the inability to take 
our eyes away from grasping the beautiful thing by “trying to keep the thing sensorily 
present,”253 like Leonardo following beautiful people “as though half-crazed” around the 
streets of Florence, as Elaine Scarry describes in On Beauty (6).254 Eliot echoes this desire by 
                                                
 253 Scarry, On Beauty, 6.  
 254 Pater qtd by Scarry in On Beauty, 6.  In The Renaissance (204-5) describing Leonardo’s early 
influences, Pater writes: “Two ideas were especially confirmed in him as reflexes of things that had touched his 
brain in childhood beyond the depth of other impressions — the smiling of women and the motion of great 
waters. And in such studies some interfusion of the extremes of beauty and terror shaped itself, as an image that 
might be seen and touched, in the mind of this gracious youth, so fixed that for the rest of his life it never left 
him. As if catching glimpses of it in the strange eyes or hair of chance people, he would follow such about the 
streets of Florence till the sun went down, of whom many sketches of his remain. Some of these are full of a 
curious beauty, that remote beauty which may be apprehended only by those who have sought it carefully; who, 
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fetishizing Gwendolen’s beauty. Her charms are not described in a discreet paragraph; that 
would be too much to absorb and not as effective. The impression is of visual fragmentation 
dispensed for us in sensual ideas to gather up in a word here, a phrase there, a sentence of 
exquisiteness that triggers a flood of images in the visual cortex, followed by more — and 
yet more—while the effect of her beauty on others is noted in every encounter.  
Eliot’s visual technique is not properly appreciated by a dictionary definition of 
fragment as the “incomplete or isolated portion,” of an object, for this fragmentation, as well 
as a comment on Gwendolen’s psychic condition, it is a classic perceptive exercise in 
concentrated observation that leads to visual acuity. Donald Hoffman observes that “[t]he 
fundamental problem of vision is the image at the eye has countless possible interpretations,” 
(Visual Intelligence, 13). He explains why: 
Without exception, everything you see you[r brain] construct[s]: color, 
shading, texture, motion, shape, visual objects and entire visual scenes . . . are 
simple demonstrations of your visual intelligence and its genius to construct. . 
. . We use the phrase ‘what you see’ in at least two ways [in the phenomenal 
sense]. Sometimes we use it to mean ‘the way things look to you,’ ‘the way 
they visually appear to you,‘ ‘the way you visually experience them.’ . . .[In 
the relational sense] we also use the phrase ‘what you see’ to mean roughly 
‘what you interact with when you look.’ (5-6).  
 
There is a world of sensation and meaning in a face, like the eons of the world’s history 
lurking in a rock face in Death Valley. Trying to “take-in” the whole face in a careless glance 
is as vapid a use of the eye as is an insoucient wave at the “fantastic puzzle”255 of Joseph 
                                                                                                                                                  
starting with acknowledged types of beauty, have refined as far upon these, as these refine upon the world of 
common forms.” http://victorianweb.org/authors/pater/renaissance/6.html.10/16/15.  
 255 See Piper. “Illustrated History of Art.”  
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Mallord William Turner’s “Snow Storm: Steam Boat off a Harbour’s Mouth” (1842) the 
belief that you “get it.” The visual cortex is the most complicated machine in our world, but 
its best work is done, as John Ruskin insists, in the head of a patiently perceptive observer. 
Eliot is guiding us to interact visually and cognitively—usually an unconscious process— 
with Gwendolen’s face and body so that we can experience our own unique visual 
construction as well as the impact of her beauty on the novel’s characters. But there is more 
to Eliot’s practice of visualization: it is her vehicle of sight leading to contemplation of the 
“body as a sensory interface between the interior and exterior world,”  as Lehrer says. 
Here are some images of Gwendolen from the first hundred pages of an 800- page 
novel. If this list seems extravagant, it is only because the visual spotlight on Eliot’s heroine 
is extravagant— evidence to support the contention that the obsessive reference to 
Gwendolen’s appearance is a narrative seduction to the power of the image and of 
imagination’s endless fancy. It becomes impossible to read about her, to think of her, to 
imagine her without a somewhat ethereal vision of her flashing across the mind’s eye. These 
descriptions provide only a fraction of the imaginings of her beauty that continue through the 
work until later in the novel before the harrowing scene when her despotic husband Henleigh 
Grandcourt drowns in a boating accident in the waters off Genoa that “certainly, her troubles 
had not marred her beauty.”As for the aesthetic of face and body? Is she beautiful? What 
follows is Eliot’s narrator’s responsive evidence to the opening question: 
 “She showed the full height of a graceful figure . . . ” (9).“Gwendolen might have 
looked lingeringly at herself for pleasure (surely an allowable indulgence); but now she took 
no conscious note of her reflected beauty” (16).“Her beautiful lips curled into a more and 
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more decided smile, till at last she took off her hat, and kissed the warm glass that has looked 
so cold” (18).“[S] he walked on with her usual floating movement, every line in her figure 
and drapery falling in gentle curves atttractive to all eyes . . . ”(19).“[I]magine [Gwendolen 
compared to the other females] a young racehorse in the paddock among untrimmed ponies 
and patient hacks”(25). “Jocosa took out one comb which fastened the coil of [Gwendolen’s ] 
hair, and then shook out the mass till it fell in a smooth light-brown stream far below its 
owner’s slim waist ”(27). “Certainly, a fine woman never looks better than on horseback, and 
Gwendolen has the figure for it ”(36).  “This girl is worth some expense: you don’t often see 
her equal” (37). “She appeared with her freshly brushed light-brown hair streaming backward 
. . . her long brown eyes glancing bright as a wave-washed onyx from under her long lashes. . 
.” (40). “By George! Who is that girl with the awfully well-set up head and jolly figure?” 
(44).“[T]o a mind of general benevolence, wishing everyone to look well, it was exasperating 
to see how Gwendolen eclipsed the others” (44).“She had the rare advantage of looking 
almost prettier when she was singing than at other times” (48).“That because Gwendolen was 
the most perfect creature in the world she was to make a grand match, had not occurred to 
him “(58). “[Gwendolen] had never looked so lovely before; her figure, her long white 
throat, the curves of her cheeks and her chin were set off to perfection by the compact 
simplicity of her riding dress” (66-7).‘He could not conceive a more perfect girl; and to a 
youthful lover like Rex it seems that the fundamental identity of the good, the true, and the 
beautiful is already extant and manifest in the object of his love” (68).“ Gwendolen, simple 
as she stood there, in her black silk, cut square about the white pillar of her throat, a black 
band fastening her hair which streamed back in smooth silky abundance, seemed more 
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queenly than usual ”(80).  “[A]mong the male judges in the ranks immediately surrounding 
[Gwendolen] there was unusual unanimity in pronouncing her the finest girl present” (100). 
The descriptive narrative translated to tantalizing images colonizes the reader’s mind, 
a drug-like visible effect that further stimulates the imaginative process. At the same time, it 
is not lost on the reader that everyone in Gwendolen’s world is preoccupied by her 
appearance and most elevate her as a queen among women, most admired, most desired, “the 
finest girl present.” Real judgment of her qualities—the look below the surface into the 
human soul—is lost to everyone’s detriment, especially that of the subject who has become 
the object. This is is why Deronda’s question: is she beautiful or not beautiful? is so 
provocative.  
 Here is Eliot entering the self-reflective mind processes of Gwendolen to answer that 
question:   
Then catching the reflection of her movements in the glass panel, she was 
diverted to the contemplation of the image there and walked towards it. 
Dressed in black without a single ornament, and with the warm whiteness of 
her skin set off between the light-brown coronet of her hair and the square-cut 
bodice, she might have tempted an artist to try again the Roman trick of statue 
in black, white, and tawny marble. Seeing her image slowy advancing, she 
thought, I am beautiful—not exultingly, but with grave decision. Being 
beautiful was after all the condition on which she most needed external 
testimony. If any one objected to the turn of her nose or the form of her neck 
and chin, she has not the sense that she could presently show her power of 
attainment in these branches of feminine perfection.   (251) 
 
 There is no closer observer of her own beauty and of its impact on her audience than 
Gwendolen herself. Daniel Deronda may have doubts about her beauty— that it may be only 
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skin-deep— but nothing deeper than the “external” verification of her dazzling impact 
concerns her. “I am beautiful,” she assures herself, “I am beautiful.” The only excitement she 
experiences on her arrival to live at Offendene is “the effect of her beauty on a first 
presentation” (54). Her anxiety about maestro Klesmer’s opinion of her singing “turned 
towards complacency” as she “cherished the idea that now he was struck with her talent as 
well as her beauty” (62).  
 As Eliot explores Gwendolen, we meet a young woman so preoccupied with her own 
beauty, magnificence, desirability, excellence, and entitlement that the people in her world—
with the sometime exception of her widowed-mother, a dependable source of comfort and 
devotion—exist only to feed her love of admiration and her need of it. There is  
a clinical term, “once [and still] applied with pejorative connotations describing those,” like 
Gwendolen, “who behave in a conceited, self-centered, insufferably entitled manner, 
unaware of or unconcerned about their effect on relationships with others and yet demanding 
recognition or some form of tribute from them”:256 Narcissists. 
 In 1876 when George Eliot created Gwendolen neither the word narcissist nor the 
psychiatric condition, Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), existed. The term narcissim 
was first coined by Havelock Ellis 22 years later in 1898. The description was brought to 
public attention with Freud’s 1914 publication On Narcissism in which he wrote that “in rare 
cases” he observed patients whose “ ego has taken itself as an object and is behaving as 
though it were in love with itself. Hence the term ‘narcissism’ borrowed from the Greek 
myth.”257  
                                                
 256 Frank M. Lachmann. Transforming Narcissism, 7 
 257 Sigmund Freud’s On Narcissism. 1914. In Freudian psychiatry and psychoanalysis, the term 
narcissism denotes an excessive degree of self-esteem or self-involvement, a condition that he described as a 
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 No one should be surprised that insufferably self-centered men and women, famously 
known as being—like the mythical Narcissus—“in love with themselves” were shunned and 
taunted. This shaming, according to Frank Lachmann, author of Transforming Narcissism, 
was eventually challenged by Heinz Kohut, founder of the Self-Psychology movement, who 
like Freud was first a neurologist and then a psychoanalyst. Of Kohurt’s seminal paper on 
narcissism, Lachmann observes: 
In a sense, it is a philosophical paper. It speaks of and to the human condition 
on a grand scale. Through maturation we can come to view ourselves and our 
world with empathy, humor, creativity, wisdom and an acceptance of 
transience. Clinically, the paper envisioned a novel fate for archaic narcissism 
[which] Kohut defined as referring to the childhood narcissism, which had not 
yet been met with favorable parental responses and had therefore been 
retained in its archaic form, into adulthood. It had remained in a childlike 
grandiose and peremptory form, unavailable for tension regulation and self-
esteem maintenance. Life’s experiences had not muted or transformed it into 
more mature forms of narcissism, so now it was up to psychoanalysis to do so. 
Kohut proposed that archaic narcissism be transformed into a mature form of 
narcissism: the traits that Kohut expected a patient to develop through analytic 
treatment. More generally, these can be thought of as the hallmarks of 
successful maturation and development over the course of life.            
(Lachmann, 8) 
  
The transformational treatment of narcissism is the introduction and integration of missing 
qualities— empathy, a sense of humor, creativity, transience, and wisdom—into the patient’s 
cognitive, emotional, psychological and social relationship practices. Kohut’s identification 
                                                                                                                                                  
form of emotional immaturity. Freud makes a crucial statement that is solidified by later researchers in child 
development: "I may point out that we are bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in 
the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed" (76-77). 
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of narcissism as a psychiatric condition caused by a trauma in childhood Lachmann claims, 
“uprooted narcissism from its moorings in pathology and moralistic judgment (76).”258  In 
this departure from classical Freudian psychoanalytic theory, Kohut moved the clinical 
approach to narcissism away from the instinctual drives of Freudian theory to Self 
Psychology’s developing focus on affect; he diagnosed narcissism as a disorder of a damaged 
self. His theory of the narcissistic patient emphasizes that narcissism is a normal condition of 
early childhood, part of the process through which a child develops a realistic sense of self 
and the capacity for good relationships with others as the result of an integrated and healthy 
self in a close relationship with a loving, attentive parental figure. The narcissistic patient is a 
victim of a childhood development trauma caused by dysfunctional parenting—abuse, 
neglect, or the inability to guide the child through the grandiose stage of narcissism to a 
healthy ego that is built on the self in partnership others.  As a consequence, due to neglect or 
intemperate adoration, the child remains psychologically, and emotionally stuck in an 
infantile past. The self-centeredness and grandiosity is evidence of, and unconscious defense 
against the sense of worthlessness, and the arrogance is compensatory exaggerated behavior 
to hide the shame of being “less than” others. Kohut’s breakthrough treatment is a therapy of 
empathy, by which he means in the fullest terms of Eliot’s mission of deep sympathy, a 
compassionate response to all humanity that grows from the insights of “seeing” others as 
Nathaniel Hawthorne characterizes it —”with tenderness.”  
 It was not until 1974 — almost a century after Daniel Deronda was published —that 
the condition of narcissism was described by Theodore Millon for the DSM-lll Taskforce. All 
the more remarkable that Eliot’s narrative of Gwendolen’s interpersonal actions and interior 
                                                
 258 Lachmann, Ibid.  Also, see Lachmann’s Transforming Narcissism, for a discussion and examples 
of therapy of Narcissistic Personality Disorder partients based on Kohut’s Psychology of the Self series of 
groundbreaking theoretical works that included Forms and Transformations of Narcissism in 1966. 
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dialogue captures the aspects of the disordered personality of a narcissist. This Eliot engages 
without judgment, without pathologizing or demonizing Gwendolen, with sensitivity and 
empathy, just as Kohut suggested to his trainee analysts. Kohurt, for instance, teaches “that 
the patient’s motivation should be regarded first as one of an intense childlike wish.”259 
In a meeting of minds across time, we discover Gwendolen in the chapter headed 
“The Spoiled Child.” The title suggests emotional and psychological infantilizing, a major 
motif that is continued throughout the novel. Eliot often refers to Gwendolen as child, 
childish, and childlike.  At age twenty, she is afraid to sleep alone in her room. She is 
physically miniaturized as “a delicate-limbed sylph” (39) whose tiny hands make her appear 
helpless. The result, along with the continuous narrative ribbon of her compelling beauty, is 
that the reader begins to relate to her as a victim, a tiny, helpless, beautiful child, and with 
this imagery comes an insistent desire to want to protect her, too, to get to an understanding 
of what has happened to her, who or what has damaged her. Our empathy surges, the disgust 
for her softens, our ambivalence towards her, our queasiness at feeling protective towards the 
child-woman crosses into acceptance of her wounded innocence and expectation of another’s 
guilt.  However, close by in the text are these reports of Gwendolen’s fierce determination 
for personal power: 
Other people allowed themselves to be made slaves of, and to have their lives 
blown hither and thither like empty ships in which no will was present: it was 
not to be so with her, she would no longer be sacrificed to creatures worth less 
than herself, and would make the best of the chances life offered her, and 
conquer circumstances by her exceptional cleverness. Certainly, to be settled 
at Offendene, with the notice of Lady Brackenshaw, the archery club, and the 
invitations to dine with the Arrowpoints, was not a position that seemed to 
                                                
259 Miller, (1985) How Kohut Actually Worked. Qtd in Lachmann, 15-16 
  188 
offer remarkable chances; but Gwendolen’s confidence lay chiefly in herself. 
She felt well equipped for the mastery of life. (39-40) 
 
The mind engaged in the text spins from compassion to confusion comparing these two 
pictures: the one of a frightened child climbing into the comfort of her mama’s bed, the other 
of a haughty grown-up sister considering herself “sacrificed” if asked to help her docile 
younger siblings with their schoolwork, thus exhibiting her ferocious will to self-
determination and control of her environment. It is emotionally destabilizing to be repelled 
and strongly attracted to the same character. Eliot has moved us into this state of discomfort. 
And, of course, that’s the heightened experience of ambivalent “unrest” that Daniel Deronda 
experiences. Eliot’s psychological art causes the reader to feel what we imagine the character 
Daniel Deronda feels as he watches Gwendolen at the sordid game of gambling.  
 If we think of narcissism in its limited understanding as love of self and 
disregard for others, Eliot’s astute observation of Gwendolen’s condition, and her 
deliberation in portraying her behavior with bifocal specificity —the unpleasant details 
detached from derisive damning—is remarkably in tune with Heinz Kohut’s breakthrough 
work. Kohut redefine[d] the therapeutic task as one of empathetic understanding of a 
vulnerable patient’s life experiences rather than “judgmentally viewing narcissism as a 
character structure to be confronted (4).”260  
Although Kohut explicitly acknowleged that analysts from various theoretical 
perspectives have relied on empathy as a means of accessing the experience of 
their patients, he nonetheless placed it at the center of his own definition of 
psychoanalysis. That is, for Kohut, psychoanalysis concerns itself only with 
                                                
 260 “Empathy” was American psychologist Edward Tichener’s translation of the German word 
einfühlng which indicates a mental process of feeling oneself into the experience of another person. Lachmann 
defines empathy as a state “co-created by by one partner who conveys empathegetic understanding and another 
who presents a readiness to be empathetically understood (204). 
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what is accessible through introspection and empathy. Clearly, empathy was 
around before Kohut, but to him empathy was the royal road to the inner life 
of another person. 
 
As patient and therapist together share understanding from the psychic clues that reach back 
to childhood, the work of restructuring and integrating the stunted archaic narcissistic 
structures can lead the patient to a mature expression of selfhood. Eliot, understanding the 
perversity of the behavior of character she has created, observes: “It is possible to have a 
strong self-love without any self-satisfaction, rather with a self-discontent which is the more 
intense because one’s own little core of egoistic sensibility is a supreme care;” And, aware of 
the victim’s cognitive deficit of self-awareness, she explains, “but Gwendolen knew nothing 
of such inward strife” (18).  
 The correspondences between Gwendolen’s words, thoughts, actions, and attitudes 
checked against the description of the pathology of Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) 
is sufficient to propose that Gwendolen suffers from the disorder: Eliot’s portrait of the 
spoiled child/narcissist is text-book accurate. What follows is Millon’s list of the behaviors of 
NPD prepared for the American Psychiatric Association in 1974; under the characteristic 
behaviors are examples of what George Eliot reveals as she takes us inside the troubled mind 
of her character.  
 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder261 
American Diagnostic Criteria from DSM-IV-TR 
 
1. Has a grandiose sense of self-importance: exaggerates achievements and talents, 
expects to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements  
                                                
261 Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing. American Diagnostic Criteria from DSM-lV-TR (1974) 
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 ●Having passed two years at a showy school, where on all occasions of display she 
had been put foremost, had only deepened her sense that so exceptional a person as herself 
could hardly remain in ordinary circumstances or in a social position less than advantageous. 
(23-4)  
 ●The hastening of her toilet, the way in which Bugle used the brush, the quality of the 
shilling serial mistakenly written for her amusement, the probabilities of the coming day, and 
in short, the social institutions generally, were objectionable to her. It was not that she was 
out of temper, but the world was not equal to her fine organism. (80) 
 
2. Is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal 
love. 
 
 ● [Her] confidence lay chiefly in herself. She felt well equipped for the mastery of 
life (46). She fantasizes fame as an actress, as a singer, as an explorer, she basks in her 
beauty, thinks of herself as a goddess, kisses her own reflection in a mirror, she imagines 
herself a leader, speaks incessantly of having power over men, but on the last count of ideal 
love, she has limited demands. She wants to be adored, catered to, denied nothing, but is 
incapable of giving in return— except the gift of her beauty and her presence.  
 ●How I pity all the other girls at the Archery Meeting —all thinking of Mr. 
Grandcourt! And they have not a shadow of a chance (94).   
 ●Her ideal was to be daring in speech and reckless in braving dangers, both moral 
and physical, and though her practice fell behind her ideal, this shortcoming seemed to be 
due to the pettiness of circumstances, the narrow theatre which life offered to a girl of twenty 
who cannot conceive herself as anything else than a lady, or as in any position which could 
lack the tribute of respect (63).  
 ● She rejoiced to feel her self-exceptional; but her horizon was that of a genteel 
romance where the heroine’s soul poured out of her journal is full of vague power, 
originality, and general rebellion (53).  
 
3. Believes he or she is so “special” and unique and can only be understood by, or 
associate with, other special or high-status people 
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●Gwendolen’s relationship with Daniel Deronda begins with hostility because she 
senses he is disturbed by her enthusiasm for the corrupt and greedy activity of gambling. But 
she recognizes him as enlightened and interesting while finding everyone else inferior, or 
boring, or dull, or ugly, He is the person she seeks out as a spiritual counselor. “He was 
unique to her among men, because he had impressed her as not being her admirer but her 
superior; in some mysterious way he was becoming part of her conscience (415). 
 ●When faced with the family’s bankruptcy, she thought her voice and theatrical talent 
would lead to a career on the stage.  To expedite this dream, she sent a letter to the influential 
pianist Maestro Klesmer “a great musician in the fullest sense of the word.” asking for his 
help.262 She viewed Maestro Klesmer as an especially talented person who would recognize 
her as a kindred spirit, but she is greatly mistaken. 
 ●In spite of her self-confidence, she dreaded Klesmer as part of the unmanageable 
world, which was independent of her wishes. . . .  Gwendolen met him with unusual gravity, 
and holding out her hand, said, it is most kind of you to come, Herr Klesmer. I hope you have 
not thought me presumptuous. (252) 
 
4. Has a sense of entitlement, expectation of unreasonable and favorable treatment. 
 ●When she learns her mother’s fortune has been lost: “The implicit confidence that 
her destiny must be one of luxurious ease, where any trouble that occurred would be well 
clad and provided for had been stronger in her mind than in her mama’s being fed there . . . 
by that sense of superior claims which made a large part of her consciousness (16).  
 ●There was no inward exclamation of “poor mama! . . . if Gwendolen had at this 
moment been disposed to feel pity she would have bestowed it on herself. (16). 
 
5.  Is interpersonally exploitive: takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own 
ends. 
 
 ●The genial Reverend Gascoigne takes care of the financial decisions for his family 
and that of his widowed, sister-in-law, Fanny Davilow, Gwendolen’s mother. When the two 
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families face financial ruin following the collapse of the financial institution that managed 
their wealth, they must survive on Rev. Gascoigne’s benefice. Following a discussion of the 
new realities and the difficulty of meeting expenses, Gwendolen is told that she could share 
her cousin’s Shetland pony. But, she counters: “I intend to have a horse and ride a great 
deal.” Her aunt points out that with her four children growing up she has “to cut and 
contrive” and that her husband allows himself “no extras” but Gwendolen insists. “I cannot 
endure ponies. I would rather give up some other indulgence and have a horse.” Her mother, 
afraid to incur her daughter’s anger, wheedles and pleads in her behalf (34-36).  
 
6. Lacks empathy; is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of 
others. 
 
 ●At the fox hunt, Gwendolen on her spirited little chestnut was up with the best, and 
felt as secure as an immortal goddess, having, if she had thought of risk, a core confidence 
that no ill luck would happen to her. But she thought of no such thing, and certainly not of 
any risk that might befall her cousin. If she thought of him, it would have stuck her as a droll 
picture that he should be gradually falling behind, and looking round in search of gates: a 
fine lithe youth, whose heart must be panting with all the spirit of a beagle, stuck as if under 
a wizard’s spell on a stiff clerical hackney, would have made her laugh with a sense of fun 
much too strong for her to reflect on his mortification. (72)  Later when she was told that her 
cousin had been tossed over old Primrose’s head, had put his shoulder out, and that his horse 
had broken both knees, Gwendolen, instead of such symptoms as pallor and silence . . . 
became contented again, since Rex’s arm had been reset . . . the smiles broke forth, and 
finally a descending scale of laughter. . . .  
Pray, Forgive me uncle. Now that Rex is safe, it is so droll to fancy the figure he and 
Primrose would cut — in a lane all be themselves—only a blacksmith running up. It would 
make a capital caricature of “Following the hounds.” (77) 
 
7. Reacts to Criticism with Feelings of Rage, Shame or Humiliation. 
 ●Across the smoky gambling salon, Daniel Deronda unnerves her as he 
disapprovingly watches her at the roulette table. Full of bravado despite big losses, she plays 
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on until penniless, then leaves to pawn an heirloom necklace. When the pawned jewels are 
returned to her by hotel staff, she suspects Deronda redeemed her jewels. She deeply resents 
his thoughtfulness which she sees as more evidence of his disapproval of her gambling:  
 ●He knew he was entangling her in a helpless humiliation; it was another way of 
smiling at her ironically, and taking the air of a supercilious mentor. Gwendolen felt the 
bitter tears of mortification rising and rolling down her cheeks. No one had ever before dared 
to treat her with irony and contempt.” (20).  
 ●Gwendolen screamed again and again with hysterical violence. [When she opened 
the honeymoon gift of the Henleigh family diamonds, passed on from Lydia Glasher and 
read this note:]‘He was meant to marry me. . . You will have your punishment. . . .  The 
willing wrong you have done me will be your curse.’ [Grandcourt] had expected to see her 
dressed and smiling, ready to be led down [to dinner]. He saw her pallid, shrieking, as it 
seemed with terror, the jewels scattered around her on the floor. Was it a fit of madness? In 
some form or other the Furies had crossed his threshold (359). 263 
  
 Two questions arise in considering Gwendolen’s plight. One: what is Eliot telling us 
about Gwendolen’s early childhood? The other: Is personal transformation possible? If so, 
how would this happen?  First, in trying to make sense of her disturbed behavior we seek a 
cause outside of the subject and turn to the mother out of whose mouth has come this 
admission: her ‘child had been her ruler.’ Mrs. Fanny Davilow, the fluttering, indecisive, 
guilt-ridden widow, who bent down to her idolized child by allowing Gwendolen’s normal 
toddler grandiosity to soar forever unfettered, early turned her little daughter into the “strong 
man” that her family lacked following the deaths of two husbands. “It must be remembered,” 
Eliot tells us, “that no one disputed [Gwendolen’s] power or her general superiority . . . .the 
first thought [of mother, sisters, and domestic staff was] ‘what will Gwendolen think?’ (40). 
                                                
263 Following Millon’s description of NPD, the following symptoms were added to later editions of the 
DSM: shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes; requires excessive admiration; is often envious of others 
or believes that they are envious of her. 
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If we apply developmental psychology to the child’s subjective self in relation to the outside 
world to speculate on the Mama Davilow-Gwendolen dyad, we recall the parent-child role 
reversal with Mrs. Davilow denying that she ever thwarted her daughter’s wishes, saying 
defensively—“I am sure I have never crossed you, Gwendolen” (29). Poor Fanny is 
completely under her child’s thumb” (78), indulging her “beautiful darling’s” every whim (as 
does everyone else in the family) bowing down to her “princess in exile” charms while also 
fearing her temper— “You were always too strong for me . . . (96).  
 How can this be accounted for? Eliot’s narrator asks: “The answer may seem to lie on 
the surface—in her beauty, a certain unusualness in her, a decision of will that made itself 
felt, or her graceful movements and clear unhesitating tones . . .” (41). It’s not that simple the 
narrator warns. More likely “it was her power “of inspiring fear as to what she might say or 
do” (41). What Eliot’s narrator is reminding us is that Gwendolen’s beauty is a distraction 
and, although it is uncommonly powerful, it is no match for the “evil genius that drives her” 
(Deronda 7). She is an avenging force of nature when she is crossed which is why her mother 
would protest: “I am sure I have never crossed you.” With that short sentence Eliot has 
spelled out all we need to know about the upside-down power relationship in that family.  
 Eliot categorized the root of Gwendolen’s problem in the world as “spoiled.” This 
same descriptor Kohut uses in his 1960 course for psychoanalysts in the context of Freud’s 
reality principle: “In persons who tend to be “spoiled” one finds fixated primary process, 
omnipotence delusions.”264 Eliot demonstrates that Gwendolen’s omnipotence has become a 
reality. Her will was not thwarted. But there is an earlier thwarting that preempts a child’s 
                                                
 264 Qtd in Allen M.Siegel, 28. Unpublished Lecture Series. Kohut, H. and Sietz, P. (ed.) “The Kohut 
Seminar on Self Psychology and Psychotherapy with Adolescents and Young Adults.” New York and London: 
WW Norton.  
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development. This happens when a too-good mother “automatically” anticipates a child’s 
needs without waiting for that synchronous moment when the child is ready for the next 
small step towards selfhood.  That’s the moment of a “dawning awareness” that the child is 
ready to leave behind the normal narcissistic grandiosity to learn with help a way to “bridge 
the internal sense of self to the external world.” Failing that development, she becomes the 
grandiose Gwendolen Harleth, the supreme ruler of her kingdom.  
A necessary function for the healthy development of an infant’s sense of self is the 
awakening awareness of the separation between “me” and “not me.” This recognition of “the 
not me” which shapes the infant’s relationships with others is what child psychoanalysts call 
the “psychological dialectic.”265 The “dialectic” is the instinctive emotional and 
psychological (non-verbal) attachment processes of the mother’s (or caregiver’s) facial 
expressions, especially the eyes, with the infant. “It is now well established that the infant’s 
personality development emanates from the mother-infant dyad,” says Dr. Margot Beattie, 
citing James F. Masterson’s work  that “the quality of the infant-mother attachment— secure, 
insecure or disorganized—has far-reaching impact on later adult mental and emotional 
functioning.”266  
Daniel Stern, a psychoanalyst and expert in developmental psychology, says in The 
Interpersonal Life of the Child, that the “infant’s major development task is . . . the creation 
of ties with others—that is, increasing relatedness” (xiii).267 Stern says he came to realize that 
women “create a new mental/psychic organization upon becoming mothers . . . a unique, 
                                                
 265 See Siegel, above, for background on Kohut’s theoretical development of the new field of Self 
Psychology and the theory and treatment of Narcissism.  Siegel, Allen M. (2007).  Heinz Kohut and the 
Psychology of the Self. New York:NY Routledge.  
 
 266 Masterson, James. ed. "Personality Disorders through the Lens of Attachment Disorders and the 
Neurobiologic Development of the Self." (2005) Perfect Paperback. Amazon.com. 
 267 Stern xiii The Interpersonal World of the Infant (1985) Basic Books. KY: Lexington. 
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independent, fundamental organization of the mind, and not, as many people have assumed, a 
derivative or new version of old complexes” (xxxiii-iv).”268 And, indeed, this would equip a 
mother for her intense bonding with her child conducted through the galvanizing connection 
of the eyes and facial expressions in the psychological dialectic in which the mother in deep 
empathy with the infant mirrors and reflects back and affirms the child’s inner state. Stern 
explains: 
Mirroring when used in this sense, implies that the mother is helping to create 
something within the infant that was only dimly or partially there until her 
reflection acted somehow to solidify its existence. This concept goes far 
beyond just participating in another’s subjective experience. It involves 
changing the other by providing something that the other did not have before 
or, if it was present, by consolidating it. (144) 269 
 
 The felt experience of Gwendolen’s self-centered egomaniacal drives captured in the catalog 
of symptoms assembled above makes disturbing reading, but Eliot does not lance that boil 
for us. She puts her character under her microscope, but she does not pathologize her, as we 
might want to—against Kohut’s admonition—and, admittedly, with some ambivalence. Eliot 
has drawn her as a victim of Mrs. Davilow’s ineffectual mothering that appears to have taken 
the form of over-indulgence. 
                                                
 268 Stern xxxiii-iv.  
 
 269 Infants as young as 42 minutes old can imitate the facial expressions of an adult. Citing the research 
of Meltzoff (1985,1990) Lachmann tells of a study “in which the infant looked at an adult sticking out her 
tongue. During the following one minute the infant made successive approximations of the adult’s action until 
he finally stuck his tongue out. Sticking out the tongue is not a reflex. Thus, the infants from birth can already 
perceive the correspondence between what he sees in the face of an adult, and what he feels proprioceptively in 
his own face.”(Lachmann, 58)  Lachmann also writes that based on other studies (Davidson and Fox) the infant 
doesn’t actually have to match the adult’s action to be affected by the adult’s facial expression. What the infant 
perceives on the face is sufficient to alter his or her internal state. . . . In effect, the facial expression remains 
with the infant even after the adult leaves . . . the link between perception of the facial expression and brain 
activation patterns of the infant provides one way of coordinating the emotional state of the caretaker and the 
infant. Other studies Lachmann cites (Ekman, Freisen and Ancoli, 1980) “offer evidence of the role of 
nonverbal communication as a precursor of empathy” (61).  
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Eliot’s partner, George Henry Lewes, philosopher, literary critic and man of science, 
was working on The Problems of Life and Mind series in the 1870s when Daniel Deronda 
was taking shape. Eliot was an avid student of science and a welcome intellectual equal 
engaged in an elite community involved in science’s cutting edge ideas in the fields of 
biology, psychology, physics and philosophy which included Lewes and Herbert Spencer. 
“Lewes was in advance of the stream . . . in anticipating later nineteenth-and twentieth-
century developments,” writes Sally Shuttleworth in George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century 
Science. “Mind,” she writes, “defined for Lewes not a separate controlling principle but 
rather the activities of the whole organism in correspondence with the physical and social 
medium” (20). Thus, to be human for Lewes and Eliot, at a time when popular scientific 
thought considered human character immutable, meant to be able to change, to integrate new 
ideas and ways of being as society changes, even demands. Shuttleworth observes that 
“Lewes’ theories of organicism profoundly affected not only George Eliot’s social analysis, 
but also her psychological conceptions ” making possible the knowledge and imagination to 
create complicated characters such as Gwendolen Harleth (19).  
Jonathan Lehrer tells us in his study of neuro-biologically incipient geniuses in Proust 
was a Neuroscientist that in an age when the question of human freedom was at the center of 
scientific debate Eliot’s purpose as a novelist was to give us a vision of ourselves “more sure 
than shifting theory.” Of Eliot’s belief in the plasticity of the human brain, he wrote: “While 
scientists were searching for our biological constraints—they believed we were prisoners of 
our hereditary inheritance—Eliot’s art argued that the mind was “not cut in marble.” She 
believed that the most essential element of human nature was its malleability; the way each 
of us can “will ourselves to change.”    (26) 
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In a character such as Gwendolen, the transformation of a self-centered nature may be 
possible, Eliot shows, and the path to change—at least the desire for change, to seek an 
empathetic connection with others—is through the gift of an enlightened guide and mind-
changing social experience. As Dr. Lachmann explains in discussing the psychoanalytic 
process, it requires an act of neural tinkering through the “therapeutic” partnership of a 
patient seeking an integrated self with an empathetic listener and guide. Eliot’s narrative of 
Gwendolen’s striving to escape the misery of alienation from others provides the ebbs and 
flows of unpredictable human existence that fuels the cognitive and emotional experiences 
and the desire to find a new relationship with self and the world. This emotional bonding of 
self and other, is in line with Kohut’s simple but apparently necessary assertion : “The 
oxygen of psychological life is to be found in an affirming, supportive and validating milieu 
and the need for such an atmosphere exists from birth to death.,270  
The life paths Eliot creates for Gwendolen Harleth and Daniel Deronda present two 
examples of the possibilities of change: in Deronda, a sweeping familial, cultural and 
religious transformation that can be seen as a human metamorphosis, no less; and in 
Gwendolen, a converting psychic shift that suggests the process of Gwendolen discovering 
how to integrate empathy into her life.  The narrative of change is critical to the sweep of the 
novel. It links, and indeed unlinks these two characters. In each case the interior change 
comes in part from exterior human and social forces. Daniel’s material identity as an English 
gentleman is changed by the disclosure of his birth into an Italian Jewish family. His life’s 
purpose is engendered by the transmission to him of the dying Mordecai’s passion to help 
establish a Jewish homeland which he sets out to do with his wife, Mira, Mordecai’s sister. 
                                                
 270 Allen M. Siegel. Acknowledgments, 1. Heinz Kohut and the Psychology of the Self. NewYork: 
Routledge, 2007. 
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Although the change in Daniel’s life is astonishing, it is not surprising. He has a questing 
mind, is receptive to new ideas, is open to incorporate difference into his consciousness, 
eager to understand and imagine the lives of others —all critical steps in a movement 
towards change. But this is not so for Gwendolen. The process of change in Gwendolen is a 
painful struggle to imagine mental and emotional processes that, I suggest, have been 
biologically denied her. 
No chemical process shows a more wonderful activity than the transforming 
influence in the thoughts we imagine to be going on in another. Changes in 
theory, religion, admirations, may begin with a suspicion of dissent or 
disapproval, even when the grounds for disapproval are but a matter of 
searching conjecture.  (Deronda 423) 
 
George Eliot’s understanding of the mind, writes Michael Davis, lay “in her very faith in the 
individual as an agent of change.” As such, she believed that the conditions that could fire 
Gwendolen’s already stirring awareness was the psychological function of her “inner life.” 271 
However, a deeper consciousness of the necessity of change “could only be achieved 
[through] “individual action, which might run counter in opposition to dominant social and 
cultural formalities.”272 This opposition to the status quo seemed problematic given the 
pressures of Gwendolen’s family in her making a fortuitous marriage and successfully 
negotiating the prescribed social and cultural codes of the English upper classes, especially 
since Gwendolen’s prospects, with Grandcourt in the wings, set her determination for the 
fitting life of “palaces and coaches.”As it happens, Eliot’s plan for her heroine’s 
transformation from Gwendolen-before to Gwendolen-after is realistically true to the slow 
and difficult psychological processes of the human struggle to change, often further 
                                                
 271 Michael Davis. (2006), 47. George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Psychology: Exploring the 
Unmapped Country. VT: Burlington. Ashgate Publishing.The metaphor of mind, “Unmapped Country” is used 
by Eliot in Daniel Deronda 
272 Ibid.  
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complicated—and sometimes clarified— when life intervenes with its unexpected and brutal 
consequences. 
To follow Eliot’s insight into her character’s first hesitant steps towards a true-self in 
relationship with others, we return to the first scene in which Gwendolen, after brutally 
dismissing her sweet cousin’s declaration of love, looks into his face and sees something she 
is usually blind to—his feelings marked on his face. This is the first time Gwendolen shows a 
hint of compassionate affect in imagining another’s pain—the effect of her lack of empathy 
for him. Rex, her constant source of companionship and amusement, smitten by her beauty, 
is scarred by her unresponsiveness to his affectionate schoolboy romancing.  She has brutally 
dismissed his loving and impulsive declaration that, “All the happiness of my life depends on 
your loving me—if only a little.” Brave in spite of rejection,  he tries again. “Will it always 
be so?” he asks. To her surprise, her reaction to Rex’s infatuation felt as a bitter offence to 
her —and it was. It released in her a flood of powerful emotion, bringing in its wake a 
recognition that crashed through to her consciousness, and with it came the shock of tragic 
self-knowledge: She could not help seeing his wretchedness and feeling a little regret for the 
old Rex who had never before offended her.  Decisively, but yet, with “some return of 
kindliness,” she said—‘About making love? Yes. But I don’t dislike you for anything else’ 
(81-82). 
 “[S]ome return of kindliness” describes a small effort to show concern. It is unheard 
of for Gwendolen to pay attention to others feelings, and therefore its significance is in her 
perception of Rex’s humanity. She sees that he is suffering, which is a first step toward 
feeling compassion, but at this point that is as far as it goes. She does not stay with Rex’s 
distress. She returns to her self- preoccupation.  What occupies her is not her cousin’s 
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wretchedness and humiliation, but a “little regret” for the expected loss of the considerable 
attention he lavished on her before his infatuation exploded into embarassment for both. At 
least, her “kindliness” was there to assure him that although a romance with him “offended 
her,” she liked him for “anything else.” This blunt honesty followed by the tiny step to soothe 
his pride is no comfort for the spurned Rex, but strangely enough, for Gwendolen it opens up 
the reciprical flow-back that comes from allowing another’s self to meet with her’s.  
 Something touched her—the awareness of her emptiness of feeling. She realizes that 
something is wrong with her—she can’t feel love—and she speaks those words to her 
mother, the only person she feels can trust to protect her. If, as now in her misery, she 
believes that without love life is not worth living, what can she do to make her life 
worthwhile? (82). Although she doesn’t yet identify her longing for the joy and comfort of 
love as something she must give without negotiation of return, she is on the path to 
understanding that it is sympathy, that “other beauty, too” that makes life worth living. In a 
rare moment of emotional turmoil, there is a chastening crack in Gwendolen’s defences, just 
wide enough for self-knowledge to penetrate her consciousness.   
[H]er mother found her on a sofa sobbing bitterly, her hair falling over her 
figure like a garment. ‘My, child, my child, what is it? cried her mother who 
had never seen her darling struck down in this way, and felt something of the 
alarmed anguish that women feel at the sight of overpowering sorrow in a 
strong man; for this child had been her ruler.” . . . She cried out sobbingly, 
‘Oh mama what can become of my life? there is nothing worth living for. . . . I 
shall never love anybody. I can’t love people. I hate them.’   (82)  
 
Even the image of Gwendolen’s weeping is conditioned by the cascading image of her 
beautiful hair draping her body “like a garment.” Eliot’s detail of the sobbing child, her face 
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hidden, shut inside a blanket of hair, impels you to part the hair, to draw it back to wipe the 
tears away. Mrs. Davilow may have done that, we don’t know, but we are told that for her, 
the experience of her daughter’s emotional collapse was like the “alarmed anguish” women 
feel  when they see a strong man weep. Mrs. Davilow felt that helplessness because her child 
had been her “strong man.” The chilling reality: Gwendolen was her mother’s ruler. The 
emptiness Gwendolen discovers, this lack of connective sympathy, is not the drive of her 
ferocious will, but is symptomatic of the supreme tragedy that makes her life not “worth 
living” —the malfunctioning of the biologically-engineered human response to feel love and 
desire for another.  
“Fighting against love is fighting against biology,” says Semir Zeki, who with 
research partner Andreas Bartels,  were the first scientists to see the normal brain’s neurons 
dance in delighted response to the visual prompt of a lover. 273 Zeki observes in the The 
Splendors and Miseries of the Brain that it is “part of our biological make-up to fall in love,” 
that in the metaphoric piercing of Cupid’s arrow, we fall into it pushed by the biological 
Cupid, and often do so with the “least likely” person who magically becomes faultless in our 
eyes. “This suspension of judgment in affairs of the heart,” says Zeki “is so common that it is 
not unreasonable to suppose that it has a sound neurobiological basis.”  
 Saying that “it is not unreasonable to suppose,” is typical of Dr. Zeki’s cautiousness 
in making definitive claims about the workings of the world’s most complicated machine—
the human brain — still in the early stages of discovery. The result of a successful study in 
brain science, neurologists say, invariably means that the new knowledge is only a first peek 
through a doorway that leads to many connecting neural networks in the cortex, calling for 
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further research. Bartel’s and Zeki’s breakthrough research in 2000 showed that when both 
males and females “look at the face of someone we are . . .   in love with, a limited number of 
areas in the brain are especially engaged.”274 These are in the medial insula, anterior 
cingulate, the hippocampus, and parts of the striatum and the nucleus accumbens, which 
together constitute the core regions of the brain’s reward system. Zeki was not surprised to 
discover that the “areas that are activated in reponse to romantic feelings—this also includes 
physical desire—are largely co-extensive with those brain regions that contain high 
concentrations of dopamine, a neuro-modulator associated with reward, desire, addiction and 
euphoric states.”275   
It is difficult to imagine the alienation, loneliness, and loss if deprived of the 
empathetic experiences that bond us to others in the warm connection of friendship and love. 
Beattie, a clinical psychologist and narcissism researcher, explains: “Although these 
[narcissistic] individuals are often highly functioning professionally, they live with pervasive 
inner sorrow and anxiety.”276 It is hard to associate the torment of the complicated affect-mix 
of “pervasive inner sorrow and anxiety” with the bouyant self-confident-centered, attention-
seeking sufferer of narcisissm. That is why their sorrow is “inner sorrow” —because, in spite 
of advances in the perception of narcissism, the stigma of the disorder still exists and they 
dread anyone knowing or seeing what they perceive as a personal weakness.  
                                                
 274 Zeki (2009) 137. Splendors and Miseries of the Brain, 2009. 
 
 275 Ibid.,138-9. Increase in dopamine causes a drop in serotonin similar to that of patients with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. After all, “love is a kind of obsession, “ says Zeki. 
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That perception may change. A group of scientists has for the first time seen the 
evidence of narcissism in brain structures. In 2013, the “Journal of Psychiatric Research” 
reported that a team of German neurologists in an fMRI study of NPD patients and a control 
group of healthy individuals found that all the NPD patients had significant structural 
abnormalities—limited gray matter brain development— in the areas of the left interior 
insula, part of the cerebral cortex associated with emotional empathy: these areas of the brain 
were starved of neuronal development. The scientists concluded that the degree of lack of 
empathy is relative to the thinness of the abnormal area of the cortex. Dr.Stefan Roepke, head 
of personality disorders, PTSD, and the autism branch at Berlin’s Universitätsmedizin, says 
of the study: “This was already a region of interest for empathy, but for the first time, we 
were able to show that it is structurally correlated in the brain.277 Neurologically, the 
necessary change to ease the suffering of NPD patients, may be made possible by the 
biologic magic that builds the brain’s networks, in this case, by supplementing through active 
therapeutic treatments the sparse collection of empathy neurons, the gray matter that Dr. 
Roepke points out is missing ‘in the left anterior insula that plays an important role in feeling 
and expressing compassion.”278 This supports the theories of neural development failure in 
the growing infant that Beattie writes, “leads to narcissism [caused by the limits] of the 
child’s ability to be able to move freely back and forth between internal and external 
realities.” 279   
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Here, in her reference to internal and external realities, Dr. Beattie is pointing to the 
critical development of the two separate psychic domains that are precursers to a cohesive 
human reality— the child’s sense of “self” and the child’s awareness of the “the other,” who 
is “not me.” The irony of this binary is that without their co-existence the human psyche is 
fragmented. To focus on the over-simplified binary categories of the internal and external, 
the inside and the outside, the mind and the body, first is to acknowledge the metaphoric 
embodiment of the psychological, neurological, and biological state of what it means to be 
human. As Nathan Sheppard writes of George Eliot:  
[I]f this is a great mind fascinated with the insoluble enigma of human 
motives, it is a mind profoundly in sympathy with those who are puzzzling 
over the riddle or are struggling hopelessly in its toils. . . .  She says, ‘The only 
true knowledge of our fellows is that which enables us to feel with them, 
which gives us a finer ear for the heart pulses that are beating under the mere 
clothes of circumstance and opinion.’280 
 
That the human internal and external realities are at the heart of Eliot’s literary project, is 
never so visible as in Daniel Deronda, in which she makes clear in an assessment of self and 
the other that “true knowledge of our fellows,” makes it possible for “us to feel with them,” a 
moment of togetherness that provides us with the acute understanding of “the heart pulses,” 
the fact of our common humanity so often speciously denied. The “profound sympathy” 
Sheppard’s claims for Eliot as an artist is acutely observed as she takes the elements of 
Gwendolen’s narcissitic need —to obtain the admiration of Daniel Deronda—the 
consequence of which is a plot-twist that provides a scenario for change. Daniel Deronda 
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becomes the “terrible-browed angel . . .  whose power over her had begun in the rising of a 
self-discontent which could be satisfied only by genuine change” (673). 
 The unfolding of the possibility of change begins with the arrival of Mr. Grandcourt, 
handsome, rich, and heir to titles and estates, who seems “to be in want of a wife,” as Jane 
Austen would say.281 The wife he wants is the most desirable— because the most beautiful 
—Gwendolen Harleth. The event that promises to offer the marriage proposal is the Archery 
Club contest, and with the clever earlier allusion to Cupid’s piercing weapons, Eliot writes—
“[W]ho can deny that bows and arrows are among the prettiest weapons in the world for 
feminine forms to play with? (100)”—Eliot returns our attention to the  powerful sexual 
weapon of the beautiful female form:  
Gwendolen looked lovely and vigorous as a tall, newly-opened lily . . . she felt 
herself moving about like a wood-nymph under the beeches (in appreciative 
company), and the imagined scene lent a charm to further advances on the part 
of Grandcourt. . . . Today Gwendolen foresaw him making slow 
conversational approaches to a declaration, and foresaw herself awaiting and 
encouraging it. . . . (145) 
 
The appalling discovery that chased Gwendolen away from her home, away from the suitor 
who was continually by her side., drove her away towards a like-altering encounter in a 
smoky gambling den in Germany with a stranger called Daniel Deronda. In the twist of Eliot-
created fate, it was Deronda to whom she would in time turn to help find her way towards a 
“life worth living.” But first, there was the archery event and the wooing by Mr. Grandcourt 
to occupy her with “merr[y] thoughts of palaces and coaches,” (146) —fantasies that crumble 
when Gwendolen finds herself in front of a woman and two children (151).  
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The “once-handsome”woman says: 
“I am Lydia Glasher. Mr Grandcourt ought not to marry anyone but me.”  
 I left my husband and child for him nine years ago. These two children are 
his and we have two others —girls—who are older. My husband is dead now, 
and Mr Grandcourt ought to marry me. He ought to make [our son] his heir. . . 
You are very are attractive Miss Harleth. But when he first knew me, I was 
young too. Since then my life has been broken up and embittered.  (152)  
 
Gwendolen “watching Mrs Glasher’s face while she spoke felt a sort of terror;” even shocked 
into a trance-like state, the mind’s defence against horror, her numbed consciousness failed 
to block out a “ghastly vision.” She was enveloped in a dream that said: ‘I am a woman’s 
life.’” Acknowledging that she has become another “woman’s life” means that Gwendolen is 
engaging with Mrs. Glasher’s words, interpreting the tone of her voice and her expressions, 
feeling through these signs how betrayal feels, “as a sort of terror.” Gwendolen is in the 
process of reading another’s mind, a new experience of imagining herself into that mind, and 
sharing the turmoil of her affect. She has connected emotionally. She feels Lydia’s fury as if 
it were hers. Her body has absorbed another’s intense feeling; she has been initiated into 
sympathy for another. Her awakening sense of right and wrong action was moving her to a 
decision. In tones cold and proud, she said: “I will not interfere with your wishes.” And, on 
that day, she meant she would not accept a proposal of marriage from Grandcourt.  
She fled from Grandcourt’s seductive grasp to Leubronn where she encountered 
Daniel Deronda. The meeting with Lydia Glasher and with Daniel Deronda at the roulette 
table became the separate but contingent events that agitated the smooth surface of 
Gwendolen’s conscience and raised in her the anxiety that she might not be an exemplary 
person. Although previously innocent of the knowledge of Grandcourt’s past, she feels 
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herself a participant in Mrs Glasher’s anguish. Both betrayed, Lydia hugely, Gwendolen 
prospectively, their lives intertwined by Grandcourt’s manoeuverings.  
 
 
I will not clothe myself in wreck-wear gems 
Sawed from cramped finger-bones of women drowned; 
Feel chilly vaporous hands of ireful ghosts 
Clutching my necklace; trick my maiden breast 
With orphans heritage. Let your dead love 
Marry its dead.                    
   George Eliot, epigram Ch. 14. 
 
Eliot’s poetic verse captures the dimensions of Gwendolen’s moral distress, her 
deepening connection with Lydia Glasher’s life, of the temptation she has and 
acknowledges—the lure of wealth and position—without the thought of love. The words 
capture the terrors of a nightmare of dread and remorse. The life she covets will be achieved, 
in effect, only by the destruction of another; sawing off the “cramped finger bones” the ring 
fingers of the drowned, despairing mother, to claim the symbolic richness as her own. She 
will be haunted by “ireful ghosts/Clutching” at her neck to snatch back that life, and the 
jewels, not rightfully hers. She condemns “a trick”of her uncontrolled desire in which she 
stands between the innocent Glasher children and the heritage due them. In resolution, she 
declaims,  “Let your dead love/Marry its dead.” At some level she knows that Grandcourt’s 
love is as deadly to her as is the image of Lydia’s watery grave. In a prophecy of dream-work 
Gwendolen’s unconscious delivers the message of her own potential fate:  Grandcourt is the 
kiss of death.  
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Eliot reveals the growing depths of Gwendolen’s remorse for her untrammeled desire 
of a life of distinction and privilege. The discomfort of remorse roils up the placid façade of 
her unquestionable perfection —the precurser emotion for her encounter with Daniel 
Deronda at the gambling table where she goes to chase away the ghosts of “wreck-wear 
gems”282 by indulging in gambling that echoes similar moral turpitude. 
She teeters on the brink of selfish desire.The only moral voice that could have 
reached her, that could have supported her own growing consciousness of the consequences 
of that misalliance, had gone over to the other side. Her uncle, the Reverend Gascoigne had 
with his ecclesiastical ministering skills tapped into the “dread” that afflicted her—the strong 
argument of unwanted marriage for the sake of her mother and sisters. On the other hand, her 
personal longing for “the dignities, the luxuries, the power of doing a great deal of what she 
liked to do . . . .and within her choice to secure or lose, took hold of her nature . . . ” She 
decided to accept him.  She agrees to become Mrs. Grandcourt, the young bride of the 
powerful, 35-year-old aristocrat about whom she knows so little, but we readers are told 
“whose other relations in life are carried on without the luxury of sympathetic feeling (425).   
 
Grandcourt’s “strongest wish was to be completely master of this creature . . . : that 
she knew things which had made her start away from him, spurred him to triumph over that 
repugnance. . . . And she —ah, piteous equality in the need to dominate!—she was overcome 
like the thirsty one who is drawn to the seeing water in the desert, overcome by the suffused 
sense that here in this man’s homage to her lay the rescue from helpless subjection to an 
oppressive lot.  (301-2) 
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Yet, “appalled by the idea that she was going to do what she had once started away from with 
repugnance,” she faced a nightmare of that reckoning: 
It was new to her that a question of right or wrong in her conduct should 
arouse her terror . . . But here had come a moment when some thing like a 
new consciousness was awakened. . . In the darkness and loneliness of her 
little bed, her more resistent self could not act against the the onslaught of 
dread after her irrevocable decision. The unhappy-faced woman and her 
children —Grandcourt and his relations with her—kept repeating themselves 
in her imagination like the clinging memory of a disgrace, and gradually 
obliterated all other thought, leaving only the consciousness that she had taken 
those scenes into her life.  (311-12) 
 
This can only be possible if she has entered into another’s experience. She has begun what 
Eliot calls “the habit of thinking [herself] imaginatively into the experience of others.” 
Admittedly, the desperation of self-preservation may have pushed biology’s neuronal action 
through the cracks of her terror. To feel another’s intensely emotional pain is a hard thing to 
share. If this is a brand-new experience—as it is in a narcissist’s depleted emotional 
repertoire—the feeling of being occupied by an overwhelming sensation unconnected to your 
cognitive processes, may take on aspects of being terrorized.  Something critical has 
happened to Gwendolen in her confrontations with Lydia Glasher and Daniel Deronda, 
something about the uncrossable line between right and wrong that challenged her actions. 
She knew the foundation of perverse dishonesty in a marriage to Grandcourt; she 
acknowledged the disgrace; she had run from it to the spa at Leubrunn; she was consumed 
with disgust and loathing and indignation that in a union with Grandcourt she “should have 
been expected to unite herself with an outworn life, full of backward secrets which must have 
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been more keenly felt than any associations with her.” Despite her innocence of the reality of 
marital relationships, she has been plunged into the catalyzing experience of the past’s hold 
on the future through indelible memory. Worse,“the question of love on her own part had 
occupied her scarcely at all” (298). For as she had admitted to her mother, she feared she 
could not love. But, she listened to her uncle’s unpriestly advice and to her own strong desire 
and when the propitious time came, said “yes” to Grandcourt. 
 
No chemical process shows a more wonderful activity than the transforming 
influence of the thoughts we imagine to be going on in another. Changes in 
theory, religion, admirations, may begin with a suspicion of dissent or 
disapproval, even when the grounds for dispproval are but  a matter of 
searching conjecture.  (423) 
  
So the narrator begins the discussion of Gwendolen’s descent into abnegation in her marriage 
to Henleigh Mallinger Grandcourt. The “chemical process” referred to as mind theory— 
reading or imagining the minds of others—which leads to understanding and sharing of 
emotions and feelings of others through mirror neurons— the chemical activity that mimics 
another’s affect. Eliot introduces us to this powerful transmission of one person’s imagined 
consciousness to another when Gwendolen Harleth and Daniel Deronda encounter each other 
across the casino. The “transforming influence of Daniel’s thoughts, as imagined by 
Gwendolen begins the chain effect of consciousness that changed her life.  She became 
aware of “the darting sense that he was measuring her, and looking down on her as an 
inferior (10). This interior dialog marks perhaps the first time in her life that her sense of 
superiority had been breached. It was the first small crack in her consciousness. Her 
encounter with Deronda is startling.  She felt “[h]e was unique to her among men, because he 
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had impressed her as being not her admirer, but her superior: in some mysterious way he was 
becoming part of her conscience.” Their relationship was not tainted by her physical beauty 
or the lap-dog adoration that came with it; his attention towards her had a different meaning 
for her. His concern was for her moral relationships; those shamed her and touched her 
conscience. That conscience exploded in hysterical shame during their honeymoon when 
Lydia delivered for Gwendolen, as ordered, Grandcourt’s heirloom diamonds. Nestling 
beside the jewels that Grandcourt will fasten around Gwendolen’s neck is this note: 
 
The man you have married has a withered heart. His best young love was 
mine; you could not take that from me when you took the rest. It is dead; but I 
am the grave in which your chance of happiness is buried as well as mine. . . . 
You took him with your eyes open. The willing wrong you have done me will 
be your curse. (359) 
 
Lydia has diabolically inserted herself as the deathly other in the first minutes of the 
Grandcourt’s marriage. The fury is amped up, but one simple sentence that breaks the verbal 
invective, is the reasonable assertion of Gwendolen’s agency: “You took him with your eyes 
open.” Eliot’s use of “eyes open” as the visible organ of sight is a deliberate double-play on 
sight that is insight, seeing that is knowing, the ‘wrong’ that is a ‘willing’ act. That corrosive 
guilt that haunts her and the hard-hearted man who plans to control her were the elements of 
a fate she could not overcome. It takes only seven weeks into the marriage for Lydia’s curse 
to consume the new bride’s life.  Eliot decribes Gwendolen’s unraveling under the effect of 
Grandcourt’s malignant power.  
 
Gwendolen was conscious of an uneasy, transforming process—all the old 
nature shaken to its roots. . . After every new shock of humiliation she tried to 
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to adjust herself and seize her old supports—proud concealment, trust in new 
excitements that would make her life go by without much thinking; trust in 
some deed of reparation to nullify her self-blame . . . and the ever-visiting 
dread of some horrible calamity. . . .  
One belief  which had accompanied her through her unmarried life as a self-
cajoling superstition, encouraged by the subordination of eveyone about her—
the belief in her own power of dominationing—was utterly gone. Already, in 
seven short weeks. . . her husband had gained a mastery, which she could no 
more resist than she could have resisted the benumbing effect from the touch 
of a torpedo. . . .[Grandcourt] had a surprising acuteness in mak[ing] 
Gwendolen’s proud and rebellious spirit dumb and helpless before him. (432) 
 
Eliot’s insights into Gwendolen’s character, especially in how she handles the humiliation of 
Grandcourt’s mastery over her, are brilliant in their detail and clarity in accord with current 
psychiatric understanding of the narcissitic disorder. She identifies humiliation as a 
consistent blow to Gwendolen’s fragile sense of self; she underscores the effort to shore up 
her unraveling core by trying to “adjust herself,” to adapt by attempting to reconstruct a 
facsimile of wholeness and then ‘seize her old supports.” Experts on narcissism such as 
Kohut, Lachmann, Stein and Beattie, have written of the “old supports” in language similar 
to Eliot’s “proud concealment, trust in new excitements that would make her life go by 
without much thinking; trust in some deed of reparation to nullify her self-blame . . . and the 
ever-visiting dread of some horrible calamity.” Eliot’s use of the forcefully active “seize” in 
accessing the “old supports” captures the incipient panic that grabs to right the flailing ego 
structure. Grandcourt “meant to be master” of Gwendolen, ironically, “who would have liked 
to master him,” just as she had dominated everyone who crossed her path. Grandcourt’s view 
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of this was that that “her pride and spirit were suited to command everyone but himself.”  He 
had no doubt of the outcome. She must submit (320).  
Eliot’s depiction of Gwendolen’s speedy disintegration from glowing bride thrilled by 
the dream of the new life she craved, free of financial imposition, rich in adventure and 
luxurious pleasures, came as an assault on the fragile structure of her sense of herself at the 
moment when the affectionate resources of her adoring family had disappeared from her 
daily life. She was in the cold embrace of a man who planned to tame his beautiful wife as he 
trained his magnificent horses to the slightest touch of the reins. As she collapsed into 
misery, which she believed was punishment for her selfishness, she turned to the only person 
she felt she could trust to help her find away through the darkness and fear that was 
suffocating her—Daniel Deronda.  “Her confidence in herself and her destiny had turned into 
remorse and dread . . . this hidden helplessness gave fresh force to the hold Deronda had 
from the start taken on her mind as one who had an unknown standard by which he judged 
her.  He had some way of looking at things which might be a new footing for her” (430).  
We discovered Deronda’s “new way of looking at things” when he asked us whether 
Gwendolen—by the reader, unknown and unseen—was “beautiful or not beautiful” (7). 
Asking us to judge what is invisible is intriguing, but, that, we soon realize is the task George 
Eliot sets for us—to think about what is unseen. The beauty that is unseen, is “that other 
beauty, too,” inner beauty, the goodness of soul, that Castiglione and Emerson thought came 
in a perfect parcel with physical beauty. The beautiful Gwendolen Harleth’s self-obsession 
and lack of sympathy for others gives the lie to that aphorism. She now knows and confesses 
to Deronda: “I am . . . in deep trouble and want to be something better if I could!” Without 
the aid of sacred ceremony or costume, her feeling had turned this man [Daniel Deronda] 
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only a few years older than herself into a priest; a sort of trust less rare than the fidelity that 
guards it” (430).  He did not want to be her confessor. It was too sacred burden to bear, but 
his heart opened to her and he listened. 
Gwendolen and Deronda—the priest as therapist, the confession, the angst, confusion, 
helplessness, empathy, philosophies of living a life worthwhile, the tedious slow process of 
change—is recorded by Eliot over several meetings as Gwendolen sought out Deronda at 
social gatherings, out of her husband’s sight, and asked him for advice to rid herself of 
remorse for her errors. The words that stumbled or rushed out of her spoke to her guilt, her 
sorrow, her fears, her hopelessness, were vague in detail, but precise in context.  
I can’t help feeling remorse for having injured others. I am punished, but I 
can’t alter it . . .  You told me I could do many things. Tell me again. . . What 
should you do—what should you feel, if you were in my place? . . . I am 
selfish. I have never thought much of anyone’s feelings, except my mother’s. I 
have not been fond of people-but what can I do?. . .  You must tell me then 
what to think and what to do; . . .  I have thrust out others—I have my gain out 
of their loss—tried to make it—tried.(449-50) 
  
Pained by her helplessness, her inability to think or act on her own behalf, Deronda tried to 
guide her to a new way of thinking and being, but she seemed lost, unable to see the actions 
that would rid her of her guilt. Deronda was patient, trying to explain the simple processes of 
guilt, remorse, and resolve as processes of thinking in sympathy for and with others. He 
counseled her: 
Feeling what it is to have spoiled one life may make us long to save other 
lives from being spoiled. . . . I suppose our keen feeling for ourselves might 
end in giving us a keen feeling for others, if, when we are suffering acutely, 
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we were to consider that others go through the same sharp experience. That is 
a kind of remorse before commission. Can’t you understand that?   
I think I do—now, she replied. But you were right—I am selfish. I have never 
thought of anyone’s feeling, except my mother’s. I have not been fond of 
people—But what can I do? ( 452) 
 
And so it continued. Eliot, faithful to her understanding of the disordered mind of her  
character knows that eventually [Gwendolen’s] “present suffering” will be “the painful 
letting in of light.” Deronda suggests she broaden her interests by reading which would open 
her eyes to the world “beyond the small drama of personal desire.” “Then tell me what better 
I can do,” Gwendolen said again, still “obsessing on her own small dramas:”  “Try to care 
about something in this vast world beside the gratification of small selfish desires.” He 
contrasts the vastness of the world to the smallness of her interests. Yet, he recognizes that 
because of her recent experiences she has been touched in real ways with others, and “knows 
more of the way in which [her] life presses on others, their life on [hers].” 
That summer, Grandcourt, whom Gwendolen had grown to fear and hate, took her 
against her will on a boating expedition off the coast of Italy.  He “suspected a growing spirit 
of opposition in her” was determined to make her feel that “she was his to do as he liked 
with.” Gwendolen, “[F]ound herself with the . . . husband to whom she felt she had sold 
herself. . . her truthfulness and sense of justice, so that he held them throttled into silence, 
collared and dragged behind him . . . (668-9) And: “Side by side with the dread of her 
husband had grown the self-dread which urged her to flee from the pursuing images wrought 
by her pent-up impulse (763. The “pent-up impulse” in its “intensest form of  hatred” was an 
unspoken wish, so definitively evil, so unthinkable because her former omnipotent will, 
though enfeebled, still lurked there in her imagination to exert its power over her desire. That 
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was the day that Henleigh Mallinger Grandcourt was swept off his yacht and drowned, and 
Gwendolen, plucked from the waters, whispered the resolution of her “pent-up impulse.” ‘It 
is come, it is come! He is dead!’ (686)  She was bent on confession, and Deronda dreaded 
hearing her confession. . . . He was not a priest. He dreaded the weight of this woman’s soul 
flung upon his own with imploring dependence. (689)  
 Gwendolen began: ‘Do you think that a woman who cried, and prayed and struggled 
to be saved from herself, could be a murderess?’ ‘Great God,’ said Deronda . . . ‘You have 
not murdered him. . . . This death was an accident that you could not have hindered.’  
 
The tremor, the childlike beseeching in those words compelled Deronda to 
turn his head and look at her face. The poor quivering lips went on: ‘You 
said—you used to say—you felt more for those who had done some wicked 
and were miserable, you said they might get better—they might be scourged 
into something better. If you had not spoken tin that way, everything would 
have been worse. I did remember everything you said to me. It came to me 
always. It came to me at the very last—that was the reason why I—but now, if 
you cannot bear with me when I tell you everything—if you will turn away 
and forsake me, what shall I do?  Am I worse than I was when you found me 
and wanted to make me better? All the wrong I have done was in me then—
and more—and more—if you had not come and been patient with me. And 
now—will you forsake me?’ . . .  
He took one of her hands, and clasped it as if they were going to walk together 
like two children: it was the only way he could answer. . . . The grasp was an 
entirely new experince to Gwendolen: she had never before had from any man 
a sign of tenderness which her own being had needed . . . (690) 
 
George Eliot’s child Gwendolen has returned—inconsolable, in a dark place of terrors. The 
self she loved in its large place in her life has been replaced by a larger unlovable other-self. 
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That is the other who wanted to kill Grandcourt with a desire “as strong as a thirst,” but 
conscience-stricken, fought it off by locking away her sharp, silver sheath and throwing the 
key in “deep water”(691). Gone is the grandiosity; in its place is the “bright rash girlhood in 
an agony of remorse . . . timid, forlorn, ” (694). The certainty of her perfection is gone. She 
believes herself wicked. She thought only of her own gain, no matter the cost of another’s 
loss. Grown up secure that everyone’s attention is on her beauty, Gwendolen now believes 
that the whole world is looking on her evil—“it was not my own knowledge, it was God’s 
that entered into me. There was no place to hide”. She was compelled to tell Deronda 
everything “as God knows it.” “I knew it all —I knew I was guilty.” “I am a guilty woman” 
(692).  She laid bare her soul, but “Deronda could not utter one word to diminish that sacred 
version of her worst self. Yet, if she did not know, he knew that there was an “awakening of 
a new life within her” (697).  
 Gwendolen wondered about that new life. She was going to be reunited with her 
mother and sisters. “I want to be kind to them all—they can be happier that I can (769). She 
felt different.  She asked if Deronda would recognize her now as the exultant gambler, “ the 
one you saw at Leubronn?”  “Yes,” he said. Although, he saw on her beautiful face the 
sorrow she had suffered. But, “the outside change is not great.” (701). He was obliquely 
saying that something else had changed, something that might change the answer to the 
question that opened the novel— “Was she beautiful or not beautiful?” 
 Has the remorse that shook her to the core changed her and brought with it sympathy 
for others, and the possibility of “that other beauty, too.” Deronda’s belief that she could 
become the kind of woman who “make others glad they have been born,” answers that 
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question in the affirmative. As for Gwendolen, with Deronda’s assurance her body filled with 
a “strength that seemed the beginning of a new existence” (769).  
Eliot has taken us with her on a journey into the mind in which she explores the 
numbing lack of empathetic consciousness that causes the inability to care about the lives of 
others. She imagines the possibility of an altered experience imagining ourselves into others 
lives and with it another reality of what it means to be beautiful. The transformation of a 
narrow consciousness may be possible through a gift of deep human empathy—a 
reverberation of Eliot’s “other beauty, too,” passing in a human chain on a path to change, or 
at least the desire for change, through the gift of an enlightened guide and mind-changing 
experience. What this novel of consciousness provides through Eliot’s psychological insight 
and “that other beauty, too” is a narrative that rides on two tracks of aesthetic reponse: one 
the poetic, intellectual, visual and emotional demands of the reader, the other that holds 
steady the novelist’s commitment to the more obscure aesthetic of Ruskin’s belief —and that 
of many other Victorians—that great art gives the experience of the many beauties that 
enhance society and helps heal its discontents.  
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 Coda. Ruskin’s Wilderness Conversion:  
Discovering ‘The Human Mind and All Things Beautiful’ 
 
 ‘He hath made everything beautiful, in his time,’ became  
 for me henceforward the interpretation of the bond  
 between the human mind and all visible things. 
        John Ruskin, Praeterita283  
 
  
 Incomprehensible as it may seem, there was a time that John Ruskin looked and did 
not see beauty. There was a time when he did not believe that God had “made everything 
beautiful in his time.”284 This confession of an enormous blind spot in his much vaunted 
visual perception of beauty is tucked away in Praeterita, his autobiography. Praeterita was 
published forty-two years after Modern Painters catapulted young Ruskin into the cultural 
headlines as the 19th-century’s Apostle of Beauty.  Marcel Proust’s moving tribute to 
Ruskin —“the things he had made me love . . . seemed to be charged with a value greater 
than life itself”285 captures the mythical stature of Ruskin as the prophet of the ineffable and 
exponential experience of delight in nature’s omnipresent beauty. Proust says the first thing 
that he learned from reading Ruskin was respect for the preciseness of vision. Out of this 
visual acuity came what Proust revered most about Ruskin: the importance of seeking beauty 
in the everday experiences of life. Imbued with Ruskin’s theory of aesthetic perception “in 
                                                
 283 Eccles 3:11. King James Bible. “He hath made everything beautiful in his time: also he hath set the 
world in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end.” 
 
 284 Ruskin. Praeterita, 251-253. 
 
 285 Proust. On Readin Ruskin, 59 
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which the artist’s act of seeing takes precedence over any received ideas or symbols,”286 
Proust writes this of Ruskin’s aesthetic philosophy: 
The most beautiful portrait, the most studied and the most striking and the 
most famous, and thus far the only one, is the Ruskin who during his whole 
life knew but one religion: that of Beauty . . . . Beauty was his sole religion, 
because, in fact, he loved it all his life. . . . the [opinion] that the adoration of 
Beauty was, in fact, the perpetual act of his life may be literally true. . . . This 
Beauty to which he thus happened to dedicate his life was not conceived by 
him as an object of enjoyment made to charm, but as a reality more important 
than life, for which he would have given his own life.287  
 
 Proust, who studied Ruskin’s work for six years before he began writing 
Remembrance of Things Past, believed that Beauty was Ruskin’s “whole life, “the perpetual 
act of his life,” a reality more important than life.” But it is not until late in his life —1885—
when writing his memoir, between periods of madness, that Ruskin admits he did not love 
rampaging forest-covered mountains. In 1842, a year before exhorting his readers to “reject 
nothing”288 in nature, Ruskin himself, was rejecting the green profusion of the wilderness. He 
admits being blind to its beauty. An epiphany— a conversion really, since beauty was 
Ruskin’s religion—on an “utterly dull cart-road” near his Fountainebleau inn, unexpectedly 
opened his eyes to the forest’s beauty. This visual revelation is likely responsible for 
Ruskin’s much-quoted exhortation to his readers “to go to Nature in all singleness of heart. . . 
                                                
 286 Richard Macksey in his introduction to Marcel Proust On Reading Ruskin which includes Proust’s 
La Bible d’Amiens, his translation of Ruskin’s The Bible of Amiens. 
 
 287 Proust. On Reading Ruskin. 32-33. 
 
 288 Ruskin. Artists Ed. MP.Vol 1, 123. 
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rejecting nothing, selecting nothing and scorning nothing,”289 and especially, for his 
insistent—and personal— insight that men look but don’t see what’s in front of their eyes.290  
 On leave from Oxford University because of illness,  Ruskin was traveling in Europe 
through Rouen, Chartres, Fountainebleau and Auxerre en route to Chamouni’s bracing 
mountain air.291 While walking in Fountainebleau, he became tired and lay down at the side 
of the road. He was hoping to sleep “among young trees, [since, he said] there was nothing to 
see but blue sky through thin branches.” Then, he writes, “the branches against the blue sky 
began to interest me, motionless as the branches of a tree . . . on a painted window.”292 So 
begins twenty-three year-old Ruskin’s testimony of the profound perception that bonded him 
to a total vision of nature that was to lead him to become the nineteenth-century’s apostle of 
the religion of beauty. 293 His account continues: 
Feeling gradually somewhat livelier, and that I wasn’t going to die this time, 
and be buried in the sand, though I couldn’t for the present walk any farther, I 
took out my book, and began to draw a little aspen tree, on the other side of 
the cart-road. . . .  
And as I drew . . . the beautiful lines insisted on being traced-without 
weariness. More and more beautiful they became, as each rose out of the rest, 
and took its place in the air. With wonder increasing every instant, I saw that 
                                                
 289 Ibid. 
 
 290 Ruskin. Artists Ed. Vol.1, 129 
 291 Ruskin. Praeterita, 251.  
 
 292 Ibid.  
 
 293 Qtd in The Desire of Mine Eyes: The Life and Work of John Ruskin, p.6. Wolfgang Kemp writes: 
“The Victorians, while reviewing their lives, had a great fondness for interspersing them with dramatic 
conversion episodes. Originally, a Romantic tradition . . . [T]he conversation experience always tended to 
follow the same pattern. Personal distress, coupled with the distress at the course of modern society, would cast 
the person into a deep depression, a state of emotional and physical ill-being . . . whereupon a sudden 
inspiration, or an unexpected encounter with some new concept of live, would bring change.”  
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they “composed” themselves, by finer laws than any known of men. At last, 
the tree was there, and everything I had thought of trees, nowhere . . . . 
That all the trees of the wood (for I saw surely that my little aspen was only 
one of their millions) should be beautiful—more than Gothic tracery, more 
than Greek vase-imagery, more than the daintiest embroiderers of the East 
could embroider, or the artfullest painters of the West could limn,—this was 
indeed an end to all former thoughts with me, an insight into a new sylvan 
world. 
Not sylvan only. The woods, which I had only looked on as wilderness, 
fulfilled I then saw, in their beauty, the same laws that guided the clouds, 
divided the light, and balanced the wave. “He had made everything beautiful, 
in his time,”294 became for me henceforward the interpretation of the bond 
between the human mind and all visible things; and I returned along the 
wood-road feeling that it had led me far;—farther than even fancy had 
reached, or theodolite measured. 
  
There came this moment for Ruskin when low in spirits, worn out by illness, unmotivated  to 
seek other visual distraction,  when he looked at what there was to see, what he previously 
had scorned, and saw it for what it now was  for him—beautiful.  As an old man writing his 
memoir, remembering the days of his far-off youth, he adds his lifetime-earned appreciation 
of “Gothic tracery” in stone and its equivalent in embroidery as fine as that Nathaniel 
Hawthorne stitched into his creation of the beautiful Hester Prynne.  The even finer art of 
nature fills Ruskin’s imagination, with the joy and gratitude he has written comes when the 
mind opens up to the perception of beauty.  He knows now, as he did not know then that it is 
the mind that has reinterpreted the once-rejected wilderness into the luxurious sylvan beauty; 
nothing else has changed, not the skinny lines of the trunks or the scalloped leaves. Looking 
                                                
294 Ecclesiastes 3:11. King James Bible.  
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back, Ruskin says he then had the feeling as he walked back to his inn that he had gone  a 
“far way.” His description of “far” in terms of the mind’s copious capacity for imagination 
that grows from experience, and his reference to the theodolite, the surveyor’s scientific tool, 
means he has traveled an immeasurable distance from a dull earth-bound, cart-rutted road to 
the ethereal world of green tracery.  
 Ruskin’s inability to see the wilderness as classifiably beautiful was influenced by 
Edmund Burke’s theory of the sublime and the beautiful. In the first volume of Modern 
Painters, Ruskin seems to suggest that his youthful problem with the wilderness may have 
stemmed from Burke’s philosophy “Beauty is not so often felt to be sublime,” Ruskin writes, 
“because in many kinds of purely material beauty there is some truth in Burke’s assertion 
that “littleness” is one of its elements.” The enormity of the wild land, its awesomeness, 
precluded it from the category of beautiful. However, in his status as a roadside convert to 
the beauty of things sublime, Ruskin, chiding those that hold Burkean views, continues: 
But he who has not felt that there may be beauty without littleness, and that 
such beauty is a source of the sublime, is yet ignorant of the meaning of the 
ideal of art.  . . sublimity is found where anything elevates the mind   (119).  
 
Ruskin’s sophisticated view of the subjective experience of beauty as a brain-centered 
biological function ttransporting pleasure throughout the body, takes Burke’s separist theory 
of Beauty and the Sublime and unites them.  The blended sum of their parts combines the 
delight of beauty and the sensation of sublimity into an experience sometimes difficult to 
encompass; we experience it as transcendence. This change in Ruskin’s point-of-view gifts 
us with some sublimely glorious descriptions of forests as places of nature’s powerful 
fecundity and alternately of luxuriant sanctuaries.  
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 The example, below, from Modern Painters Vol. ll, of Ruskin’s visually evocative 
and transcendent prose which Virginia Woolf says “takes our breath away,” follows part of a 
paragraph of an example of the intense learning experience of the “visual precision” that 
Ruskin modeled for Marcel Proust. First, here is Ruskin’s observation of the variety and 
symmetry of tree leaf patterns. 
 
One of the most remarkable characters of natural leafage is the constancy with 
which, while the leaves are arranged on the spray with exquisite regularity, 
that regularity is modified in their actual effect. For in every group of leaves 
some are seen sideways, forming merely long lines, some foreshortened, some 
crossing each other, everyone differently turned and placed from all the 
others, the forms of leaves, though in themselves similar, give rise to a 
thousand strange and differing forms in the group; and the shadows of some 
passing over the others, still farther disguise and confuse the mass, until the 
eye can distinguish nothing but a graceful and flexible disorder of 
innumerable forms, with here and there a perfect leaf on the extremity, or a 
symmetrical association of one or two, just enough to mark the specific 
character and to give unity and grace, but never enough to repeat in one group 
what was done in another—never enough to prevent the eye from feeling, that 
however regular and mathematical may be the structure of the parts, what is 
composed out of them is as varied and infinite as any other part of nature.  
                                       ( Modern Painters, Vol.ll, 176 ) 
  
 If an artist thinks that having seen one elm leaf he has seen them all, he falls into the 
Ruskinian category of those who look but don’t see. This painstaking description of the 
particularity of the paradox of similarity in the leaves on the branches of a tree is Ruskin in 
his most meticulous inculcation of showing what it means to see. In detailing the paradoxical 
diversity and symmetry of leaves, his purpose is to illustrate how far the so-called great 
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landscape painters fell below the truth of nature when painting a tree. Here is his assessment 
of the revered 18th-century painter, Gaspar Poussin: 
[T]ake one of his sprays where they all come together against the sky; you 
may count it all round, one, two, three, four, one bunch; five, six, seven, eight, 
two bunches; nine, ten eleven, twelve, three bunches; with four leaves each, 
—and such leaves! Every one precisely the same as its neighbor, blunt and 
round at the end, (where every forest leaf is sharp, except that of the fig tree,) 
tied together by the roots, and so fastened on to the demoniacal claws above 
described, one bunch to each claw.     (Modern Painters,Vol. 11, 177) 
 
Ruskin’s purpose is to compare Poussin’s “house-painter” art to the virtuoso brilliance of 
Turner whose light-inspired vision and the precise visual truth and beauty was “attained by a 
humble and faithful study of nature and not by substituting vague forms, bred by imagination 
on the mists of feeling, in place of definite, substantial reality.” 295  The artists Ruskin refers 
to are, as he points out, both painters and writers, and his method is especially instructive to 
writers who sought to follow his technique of transforming the reader’s experience of their 
art by using language that made them see; writers such as Charlotte Brontë, who said that 
until she read Ruskin, she had been “walking through life as if blindfold”;296 and Edith 
Wharton, who wrote that “Ruskin gave her back the beautiful Europe she lost when she 
returned to New York as a young girl, and awakened in her the habit of precise visual 
observation.”297  
                                                
295 Eliot, Westminster Review April, 1856. 
 
296 Brontë Quoted in Wettlaufer, 245. Letter to W.S. Williams, published in MacMillan’s Magazine 64 (1891). 
 
297 Wharton in The Italian Spectacle, 59. 
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 With that example of his post-epiphany leafy observation, above, Ruskin sets us up 
for a tour de force of description of those leaves we have seen close-up, now seen at a 
distance on their sprays, on the branches of the trunks of “the mass and multitudes” of 
millions of members of their own family tree in a forest. (177) Here is what Ruskin sees the 
year after his epiphany on the rutted cart-track. 
 
The leaves then at the extremities become as fine as dust, a mere confusion of 
points and lines between you and the sky, a confusion you might as well hope 
to draw seasand particle by particle, as to imitate leaf for leaf. This, as it 
comes down into the body of the tree, gets closer, but never opaque; it is 
always transparent, with crumbling lights in it letting you through to the sky; 
then, out of this comes, heavier and heavier, the masses of illumined foliage, 
all dazzling and inextricable, save here and there a single leaf on the 
extremities; then, under these, you get deep passages of broken, irregular 
gloom, passing into transparent, green-lighted, misty hollows, the twisted 
stems glancing through them in their pale and entangled infinity, and the 
shafted sunbeams rained from above, running along the lustrous leaves for an 
instant; then lost, then caught again on some emerald bank or knotted root, to 
be sent up again with a faint reflex on the white under-sides of dim groups of 
drooping foliage, the shadows of the upper boughs running in gray network 
down the  glossy stems, and resting in quiet checkers upon the glittering earth; 
but all penetrable, and transparent, and, in proportion, inextricable and 
incomprehensible, except where across the labyrinth and the mystery of the 
dazzling light and dream-like shadow, falls, close to us, some solitary spray, 
some wreath of two or three motionless large leaves, the type and embodying 
of all that in the rest we feel and imagine, but can never see. 
              (Modern Painters. Vol. ll. 177-8) 
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Those leaves that Ruskin described so distinctly are now indescribable, for at their 
extremities as you gaze up into the mountainous reaches they are as fine as dust. Dust—that 
irritating powdery material of anonymous, mostly suspect microscopic waste that coats the 
world and everything in it. It would be as easy to draw or describe that confusion as to draw 
seasand particle by particle, he says.  Ruskin loves the cognitive and mental power of 
contrast in art. He advises its use in writing because contrast tantalizes the reader’s 
imagination, opening up the world of metaphor for neuronal candy. The comparisons he 
evokes takes us from leafy greenness to dust to sand. Dust? Dust is grime and grimace, but 
seasand is the confounding result of eons of geology, of minerals becoming rocks—igneous, 
sedimentary and metamorphic— through heat and pressure of earthquakes and volcanic 
magma, being torn off mountains around the world, tossed and smashed by glaciers, in 
streams and river currents until smaller and yet smaller they arrive through concrete pipes 
onto a beach that looks the color of sand but is a mixture of miniscule jewels of all colors, 
black to shiny white crystals, ruby reds and greens, and micas and feldspars, gneiss and 
shales, of different hardness, density, cleavage and magnetic properties. From the hot beach 
the seasand is swept into the cold oceans’ sedimentary basins to rest for many lifetimes, one 
layer over another lying like a gigantic bolt of glittering striped cloth that catches the calcium 
shells of oysters and scallops and the wondrously-formed nautilus shells that appear 
millenium later as metamophosized marble on a palace floor or on a kitchen counter that we 
daily scrub free of dust. Ruskin’s choice of contrast is as magnetic as the properties of some 
of the infintesimal magnetic grains of sand on the beach that cling to you: they pull and drag 
at you, attaching you to your self-created vision. 
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  Next, Ruskin pulls your eye down to larger parts of the tree. He plays word-games 
with the light that changes the perceptions of nature. The openings in the foliage gives us 
light that is never opaque. It is always transparent, with crumbling lights through the trees, he 
says, that let us through to the sky. It is a diaphonous light, crumbling, as friable sedimentarty 
rock crumbles into sand. Try to imagine that light. Not a flicker, which is too obvious a 
movement, but a disintegration of light, so nuanced that only close attention tracks its 
demise. Below that are masses of illumined foliage, he writes, calling the luminosity, 
dazzling, and the twisted bonding of the trees in the mountainscape inextricable.  In our 
mind’s eye the vision of a gleaming mass of lacey tracery is a sky-wide painting of nature’s 
compendium of wild green exhuberance. From the dazzle Ruskin slips back to the contrast of 
deep passages of irregular gloom and misty hollows. He gives the twisted stems eyes that 
glance through their entanglement and then, again in contrast, pierces the gloom with shafts 
of sunbeams that rain from above. Magically, as if turning his eye into a moving camera, he 
captures the sunbeam transforming from a shaft to run along the lustrous leaves, then to 
disappear, to flash on a knotted root, and then rebound to hit the undersides, seen as white, of 
drooping foliage. That sunbeam highlights the shadows of the gray network of boughs that 
Ruskin describes as resting in quiet checkers upon the glittering earth.  
 His use  of “rest” and  “quiet” to qualify his shadowy checkers, seems odd, but not for 
long. This descriptive passage, like most of his brilliant visions, begs almost conversationally 
in low gear, then switches to the speeded up pace of the brain absorbing flashes of 
perception, of shape, of color, of movement, and dashing from one image, the rush of word 
images flee on  until one feels that breathlessness that Virginia Woolf talks about when she 
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says that Ruskin’s writing takes your breath away. This is why he lets us stop for breath in 
the suggestive place of  “rest” and “quiet” where the orderly shape of checkers lies quietly. 
From this place, Ruskin takes us back to his green wilderness peroration by flash repetition: 
Inextricable, incomprehensible, labyrinth, mystery, dazzling light until. . . 
. . . a dream-like shadow falls close to us, some solitary spray, some wreath of 
two or three motionless large leaves the type and embodying of all that in the 
rest we feel and imagine, but can never see. 
 
If that be so, we know that John Ruskin had a revelation, saw it, and felt it, and found the 
words to describe it, and so, made it beautiful for us in his time. 
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